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Summary 
This thesis uses the city of Dar es Salaam as a prism for exploring the intersection of the Cold War 
and decolonisation with political life in post-colonial Tanzania. By deconstructing politics in the city 
through transnational and international approaches, it challenges prevailing narratives of the global 
Cold War, African liberation, and the contemporary Tanzanian history. In the decade after 
Tanzania became independent in 1961, President Julius Nyerere’s commitment to the liberation of 
Africa transformed Dar es Salaam into a cosmopolitan epicentre of international affairs in Africa, 
on the frontline of both the Cold War and decolonisation. In shifting the focus away from 
superpower relations and the paradigm of the nation-state, this thesis shows how African 
politicians exercised significant influence over Cold War powers, but also how the global context 
pushed Nyerere’s government into increasingly authoritarian methods of rule. The political 
geography and public sphere of Dar es Salaam, as a ‘Cold War city’, provides an interpretative lens 
through which diverse but ultimately entwined narratives are understood. These include the 
international rivalry between East Germany and West Germany; the politics of the exiled 
Mozambican liberation movement, FRELIMO; the local experience of the global ‘1968’; and the 
course of elite politics in a critical period in the Tanzania’s recent history. This multilateral history is 
made possible by a multiarchival approach, to shed light on developments in Dar es Salaam from 
multiple, triangulated perspectives. 
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Abbreviations and acronyms 
The abbreviations and acronyms listed below cover the main text and footnotes, excluding the archival 
references, which are detailed in the bibliography. Non-English names are translated and the relevant state is 
mentioned where otherwise unclear. 
 
AA  Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office) – FRG 
AAPSO  Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation – Soviet Union, GDR 
ADN  Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst (General German News Agency) – GDR 
ANC  African National Congress – South Africa 
ASP  Afro-Shirazi Party – Zanzibar 
ASPYL  Afro-Shirazi Party Youth League – Zanzibar 
BBC  British Broadcasting Corporation 
BMZ Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation) – FRG 
CCM  Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Party of the Revolution) – Tanzania 
CDU  Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union) – FRG 
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency – US 
CID  Criminal Investigation Department – Tanzania 
CO  Commonwealth Office – UK 
COREMO Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique) 
DAL  Direction Afrique Levant, MAE (Africa and Middle East Division) – France 
DAM  Direction Afrique Malgache, MAE (Africa and Madagascar Division) – France 
EAC  East African Community 
emb.   embassy 
FCO  Foreign and Commonwealth Office – UK 
FRELIMO Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front) 
FRG  Federal Republic of Germany 
GDR  German Democratic Republic 
HC  high commission 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
KGB  Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security) – Soviet Union 
LNS  Liberation News Service – US 
MAE  Ministère des affaires étrangères (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) – France 
MANU  Mozambique African National Union 
MfAA  Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (Ministry for Foreign Affairs) – GDR 
MfS  Ministerium für Staatsicherheit (Ministry for State Security, ‘Stasi’) – GDR 
MNE  Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) – Portugal 
MSZ  Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) – Poland 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
NBC  National Bank of Commerce – Tanzania 
NEC  TANU National Executive Committee 
NUTA  National Union of Tanganyika Workers 
OAU  Organisation of African Unity 
PAC  Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania – South Africa 
PAIGC Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the 
Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) 
PIDE  Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (International and State Defence Police) – 
Portugal 
PLA  People’s Liberation Army – Zanzibar 
RENAMO Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambique National Resistance) 
SCCIM Serviços de Centralização e Coordenação e Informação de Moçambique (Services for the 
Centralisation and Coordination of Information for Mozambique) – Portugal  
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SED  Sozialistiche Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) – GDR 
SPD  Sozialdemocratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany) – FRG 
STC  State Trading Corporation – Tanzania 
SWAPO  South West Africa People’s Organisation 
TANU  Tanganyika African National Union 
TASS  Tyelyegrafnoye agyentstvo Sovyetskogo Soyuza (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) 
TAZARA Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority 
TBC  Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation 
TPDF  Tanzania People’s Defence Force 
TPDF(Z) Tanzania People’s Defence Force (Zanzibar) 
TYL  Tanganyika Africa National Union Youth League 
UDENAMO União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (National Democratic Union of 
Mozambique) 
UDI  Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
UN  United Nations 
UNAMI  União Africana de Moçambique Independente (African Union of Independent 
Mozambique) 
USAID  United States Agency for International Development 
USARF  University Students African Revolutionary Front – Tanzania 
USIA  United States Information Agency 
USIS  United States Information Services 
UWT  Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania (Tanzania Women’s Union) 
ZANU  Zimbabwe African National Union 
ZAPU  Zimbabwe African People’s Union 
ZNP  Zanzibar National Party 
ZPPP  Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party 
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Introduction 
When word that a revolution had broken out on the islands of Zanzibar reached Nairobi, sometime 
on 12 January 1964, the Polish journalist Ryszard Kapuściński immediately cancelled his plans. 
Eager to experience this breaking news first hand, he and forty fellow foreign correspondents 
hastily departed en masse on an evening flight to Dar es Salaam, the capital of Tanganyika. The 
following afternoon, Kapuściński headed back to the airport, but had no success in finding a flight 
to Zanzibar. The islands’ airstrip had been closed by the revolutionaries, who threatened to shoot 
down any aircraft attempting to land. Desperate for information – and a cold beer – Kapuściński 
headed for his usual watering hole, the New Africa Hotel, constructed in 1909 to host Kaiser 
Wilhelm II when he visited the then German colony. ‘Flowering shrubs, palm trees and tables with 
chairs scattered about invited relaxed conversation and lingering over a drink’, recalled a British 
visitor.1 The scene encountered by Kapuściński was rather more charged. 
All of Africa conspires here these days. Here gather the fugitives, refugees, and emigrants from 
various parts of the continent. One can spot sitting at one table Mondlane from Mozambique, 
Kaunda from Zambia, Mugabe from Rhodesia. At another – Karume from Zanzibar, Chisiza 
from Malawi, Nujoma from Namibia, etc […] In the evening, when it grows cooler and a 
refreshing breeze blows in from the sea, the terrace fills with people discussing, planning 
courses of action, calculating their strengths and assessing their chances […] We, the 
correspondents, come by here frequently, to pick up something. We already know all the 
leaders, we know who is worth sidling up to. We know that the cheerful Mondlane talks 
willingly, and that the mysterious, closed Chisiza won’t even part his lips. 
Two floors below, Kapuściński paid a visit to the Paradise nightclub – ‘jammed, crowded and 
noisy.’ ‘Customers are drawn here by the charms of a chocolate-colored Miriam, a beautiful stripper 
from the distant Seychelles.’ The club, however, had other attractions for Kapuściński. He searched 
out the owner, a Polish émigré from Łódź. Kapuściński wanted to know the whereabouts of Abeid 
Karume, leader of the Afro-Shirazi Party, whose members were said to have carried out the seizure 
of power. Had he left the mainland? His compatriot grinned: yes, Karume was in Zanzibar. Within 
hours, Kapuściński had spoken to Karume on the telephone and negotiated an air passage to the 
islands.2 
 
1 Charles R. Swift, Dar Days: The Early Years in Tanzania (Lanham, MD: University of America Press, 2002), 2. 
Swift, a doctor, was less complimentary about the New Africa’s food: ‘thin and tasteless soup, a fish course 
with a wedge of lime, tough overcooked Tanzanian beef, naked boiled potatoes and a vanilla pudding as 
insipid as the soup.’ 
2 Ryszard Kapuściński, The Shadow of the Sun: My African Life, trans. Klara Glowczewska (London: Allen Lane, 
2001), 73-78. 
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En route to the airport, Kapuściński travelled down Nkrumah Street, along which were 
clustered the offices of various southern African liberation movements: the African National 
Congress of South Africa, the Mozambique Liberation Front, the Zimbabwe African National 
Union. Nestled among these unofficial embassies was an innocuous-looking building, the Canton 
Restaurant. Its Chinese cuisine (‘Authentic and Genuine, 1st Floor Air Conditioned’) was popular 
among the city’s political elite, particularly the liberation movement leaders.3 But according to a 
Rhodesian newspaper, the restaurant was a front for Chinese subversive operations in East Africa, 
which were run by a certain Ho Lin.4 An American embassy despatch claimed that Ho ‘handles all 
commercial relations’ for Beijing in Dar es Salaam and that the Canton ‘offers an excellent meeting 
place outside of the official Chinese mission’.5 
Next door, the shelves of the Tanganyika Bookshop were piled high with Marxist periodicals 
and Swahili translations of Mao’s Little Red Book: ‘a Chicom front’, the same American report noted, 
‘well-stocked with communist literature of all types.’6 Alongside propaganda, it also reputedly 
distributed funds to the exiled guerrillas. The manager, Kao Liang, officially worked for the Chinese 
news agency, Xinhua. According to the South Africa expatriate journalist Colin Legum, Liang acted 
as a go-between for Chinese diplomats and their Tanzanian contacts. He had previously been 
expelled from India for ‘unjournalistic activities’, before becoming Beijing’s key man in eastern 
Africa.7 
Polish journalists, Zanzibari revolutionaries, African guerrillas, Marxist booksellers, Chinese 
intelligence agents, Seychellois strippers: Dar es Salaam was a hive of international activity. For 
centuries, the Swahili coast had been a vibrant meeting-place, where traders from the Indian 
subcontinent and the Arabian Gulf encountered the peoples of the African interior. Home to exiled 
liberation movement leaders, invited to the city by President Julius Nyerere, the capital of post-
independence Tanganyika – soon to become Tanzania – was now an entrepôt where Cold War 
politics collided with the struggle for decolonisation in southern Africa. Through a study of political 
life in Dar es Salaam at this cosmopolitan ‘moment’, this thesis reconsiders existing narratives of 
superpower rivalry, anticolonial struggles, and Tanzanian national history. In doing so, it argues for 
more textured, interwoven understandings of Tanzania’s past and the international history of the 
late twentieth century. 
 
3 Advertisement, Standard, 27 July 1968, 3. 
4 SCCIM, 4 January 1967, enclosed in Deslandes to MNE, 28 January 1967, AHD, MNE, PAA 819. 
5 Gordon to State Dept, 22 December 1964, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1964-6, Box 2688, POL 2-3 TANZAN. 
6 ibid. 
7 Colin Legum, ‘China’s African gamble’, Observer, 27 September 1964, 11; directorate-general of political 
affairs and internal administration, MNE, 14 January 1965, AHD, MU, GM/GNP/RNP/49; Ian Greig, The 
Communist Challenge to Africa: An Analysis of Contemporary Soviet, Chinese and Cuban Policies (Richmond: Foreign 
Affairs, 1977), 154-55; Bruce D. Larkin, China and Africa, 1949-1970: The Foreign Policy of the People’s Republic of 
China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 177. 
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Rethinking the Cold War and decolonisation 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the historiography of the Cold War has undergone a significant and 
overdue renovation. Before 1989, scholars fixed their attention on diplomatic relations between the 
United States, the Soviet Union, and their respective allies. Although there were notable shifts in 
interpretations of the origins and nature of the Cold War, they addressed the superpower rivalry in 
a Euro-American context. The notable exception of Indochina aside, historians spent little time 
considering the impact of Cold War politics on the so-called ‘Third World’. This worldview 
reflected that of many leading politicians of the day. ‘History has never been produced in the 
South’, said Henry Kissinger. ‘The axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn, crosses over to 
Washington, and then goes to Tokyo’.8  
While the superpowers remained locked in geopolitical and ideological struggle, the historical 
profession underwent a series of interconnected transformations. The rise of postmodernism and 
poststructuralism, with their interest in discourse and subjectivities rather than events and 
certainties, challenged long-held historiographical shibboleths. Postcolonial theory emerged from 
the process of decolonisation in Africa and Asia to cast new light on relationships between 
colonising and colonised peoples, questioning common assumptions about the distribution of 
power between Europeans and the rest of the world. Academic interest in the phenomenon of 
‘globalisation’ prompted historians to rethink traditional geographic frameworks of inquiry. A 
predilection for studying the past through the paradigm of the nation-state, grounded in the 
experience of modern Europe, seemed inadequate in a world where national borders were 
increasingly permeable. ‘Global’, ‘world’, and ‘transnational’ histories emerged as alternatives, 
emphasising movements and processes which transcended conventional geographic boundaries. 
If historians were slow to respond to this changing intellectual environment, diplomatic 
historians were especially recalcitrant. Before 1989, ‘the majority of historians of international 
relations continued to be preoccupied with the vicissitudes in the Cold War that coincided with 
their own lives’, notes Akira Iriye.9 But in a post-Cold War era in which world affairs are less 
haunted by the spectre of nuclear holocaust, these concerns no longer hold the same relevance. 
There is a growing appreciation of the need to shift the focus of the international history of the 
post-Yalta period away from the superpowers alone, to the global nature of their rivalry and its 
consequences for the rest of the world, especially in what is today termed the ‘global South’. At the 
turn of the century, Odd Arne Westad suggested the ‘Third World’ as a potential paradigm for a 
 
8 Quoted in Mark T. Berger, ‘The Real Cold War Was Hot: The Global Struggle for the Third World’, 
Intelligence and National Security, 23 (2008), 113. 
9 Akira Iriye, Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present, and Future (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013), 25. 
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‘New International History of the Cold War’, as a site of ‘hot’ proxy conflicts between the 
superpowers.10 
Westad answered his own call in The Global Cold War, which draws upon an array of archive 
material to trace the expansion of the Cold War across the Third World, while tying it into a 
broader narrative framework. He stresses the ideological motivations underpinning American and 
Soviet policies, which manifested themselves in the often violent promotion of contrasting models 
of modernisation in the Third World, in order to prove the universal value of their respective 
systems to the newly independent states. Westad concludes that the superpowers ended up 
replicating the same interventionist strategies and neglect for human life that had characterised the 
behaviour of European colonialism in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Through a series of case 
studies – from Congo to Cuba, Vietnam to Angola, and Ethiopia to Afghanistan – he emphasises 
the need to pay heed to voices of Third World actors, sidelined in the ancien régime Cold War 
historiography.11 
Others had already begun to decentre the study of the Cold War from an exclusive focus on 
superpower diplomacy, but in capturing this historiographical Zeitgeist, Westad’s work 
fundamentally reoriented the direction of Cold War scholarship. His pluralising and globalising 
approach has quickly become something of a lingua franca for historians working in the field. ‘The 
splintered paradigm of “the global Cold War” now rivals the monolithic version of “The Cold 
War”’, write Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell.12 As the editors of a recent survey volume state, the Cold 
War ‘must be appreciated as global history, and as global history it reveals nuances, idiosyncrasies, 
and complexities obscured by more traditional accounts.’13 The few dissenting voices who continue 
to frame the Cold War as a project of American foreign policy come mainly from neoconservative 
advocates of American interventions abroad or from an especially critical self-styled anti-American 
left. Both positions are unhelpfully parochial.14 
One key development in this new wave of historiography has been the appreciation that the 
history of superpower rivalry is closely entwined with that of another global metadynamic, 
 
10 Odd Arne Westad, ‘The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms’, 
Diplomatic History, 24 (2000), 551-65. 
11 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
12 Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell, ‘Introduction’, in Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell (eds), Uncertain Empire: American 
History and the Idea of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 4. Italics in original. 
13 Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde, ‘Introduction’, in Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 2. 
14 See for example, Anders Stephanson, ‘Cold War Degree Zero’, in Isaac and Bell (eds), Uncertain Empire, 19-
49; Perry Anderson, ‘Imperium’, New Left Review, 83 (2013), 5-135. Odd Arne Westad sets out these 
arguments at greater length, before delivering a convincing riposte of his own, in ‘Exploring the Histories of 
the Cold War: A Pluralist Approach’, in Isaac and Bells (eds), Uncertain Empire, 51-59. It should be noted that, 
even by the standards of the wider discipline, the practice of Cold War history (and international history more 
generally) remains overwhelmingly dominated by North American and European scholars. 
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decolonisation.15 Parallel to the revolution in Cold War studies, scholars have reassessed the ‘end of 
empire’. Early work understood decolonisation as either an elite-negotiated European withdrawal 
from Africa and Asia or an inexorable process driven by popular nationalist mobilisation in the 
colonial world. More recent scholarship adopts a more nuanced position, framing decolonisation as 
a dynamic empowered by global changes which affected both metropole and colony, while still 
allowing for the contingency of political actors.16 As the rise of postcolonial studies suggests, 
decolonisation was not conceived solely as ‘flag independence’, but a longue durée struggle against 
the legacies of colonialism which continues to the present day. 
The crisis of the European empires, which in Africa stretched from the immediate aftermath of 
the Second World War to the collapse of apartheid in South Africa in 1994, opened up 
opportunities for external intervention in the continent’s affairs. Policymakers in China, the Soviet 
Union, and the United States sought to gain footholds in the post-colonial world, often interpreting 
politics as a zero-sum game of Cold War competition. African states also tried to exploit this rivalry 
to extract aid from the superpowers. The powerful doctrines of Marxism and Maoism were 
disseminated by Moscow and Beijing via educational programmes and propaganda campaigns, but 
could also be reformulated and appropriated to African political interests. The marketplace of 
international ideas and aid was not the exclusive domain of the Cold War powers. As Vijay Prashad 
shows in his counternarrative of history from the perspective of the ‘global South’, Third World 
states, politicians, and intellectuals challenged notions of a hegemonic order controlled by the 
superpowers. In Africa, ideologies like pan-Africanism, pan-Arabism, and African socialism 
articulated alternatives to Cold War binaries.17 
Seeking to escape what he has dubbed the ‘Cold War lens’, Matthew Connelly’s study of the 
transnational and international dimensions of Algeria’s fight for independence collapses traditional 
categorisations of superpower rivalry and decolonisation. Connelly deftly renders a narrative of the 
Algerian war from multiple perspectives, showing the limitations of French and American power in 
the region, and the extent of Egyptian influence. Inspired by Fernand Braudel’s concept of histoire 
totale, he situates the National Liberation Front’s struggle in a changing structural international 
context, surveying the impact on it of such diverse dynamics as demographic change in North 
Africa, Paris’ diplomatic offensive at the United Nations (UN), and radio propaganda disseminated 
by the Voice of Cairo. Connelly posits that, contrary to conventional wisdom, policymakers in Paris 
 
15 Leslie James and Elizabeth Leake (eds), Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2015). 
16 Martin Thomas, Fight or Flight: Britain, France, and their Roads from Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 4; Luise White, Unpopular Sovereignty: Rhodesian Independence and African Decolonization (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2015), 18-24. 
17 Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World (New York: The New Press, 2007). 
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or Washington did not primarily interpret events in terms of East-West Cold War politics, but a 
broader collision between a developed ‘North’ and a developing ‘South’.18 
No scholar has yet written as textured a history as Connelly for the international affairs of the 
sub-Saharan world, which continue to be studied largely through the ‘Cold War lens’. The majority 
of this historiography has been understandably drawn to the ‘hot’ conflicts on the continent, 
particularly in Congo and Angola. Piero Gleijeses’s unparalleled access to Cuban archives has 
enabled him to write detailed accounts of Havana’s interventions in Africa. From Che Guevara’s 
initial forays into Congo in 1964 to the Cuban offensive which pushed South Africa’s armed forces 
out of Angola in 1988, Gleijeses shows how Havana was not a ‘proxy’ of Moscow. Rather, Cuba 
was an assertive actor in its own right, prepared to risk Soviet wrath in a series of operations 
inspired by Fidel Castro’s revolutionary anticolonialism, rather than colder calculations of 
superpower rivalry.19 In her study of the Congo Crisis, Lise Namikas avoids overdependence on 
Western archival sources – a problem that afflicts several histories of the war20 – by using material 
from both sides of the Iron Curtain.21 Whereas studies based exclusively on Western archives or 
memoirs often overstate the centrality of the United States to Africa’s Cold War conflicts, these 
works grounded in multiarchival research emphasise the pluralities of power in the continent’s 
international affairs. 
In these histories of the Cold War in Africa, the superpowers (plus, in Gleijeses’ case, Cuba) 
continue to occupy centre-stage. But just as historians have demonstrated how Africans shaped 
their experience of European colonialism, they exercised significant influence over the development 
of the Cold War in the continent. To label the conflicts in Angola or the Horn of Africa ‘proxy 
wars’ seems a lazy shorthand: in both conflicts, the belligerents’ interests and ideological positions 
far from mapped directly onto those of the superpowers. Instead, they used the Cold War 
environment for leverage in obtaining aid and arms. As Miles Larmer and Erik Kennes argue in 
their reassessment of the Katangese secession in Congo, African politicians could skilfully exploit 
the nexus of external interests brought together in the intersection of decolonisation and the Cold 
 
18 Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War 
Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). See also Matthew Connelly, ‘Taking off the Cold War Lens: 
Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War of Independence’, American Historical Review, 105 
(2000), 739-69. 
19 Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2002); Piero Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria and the Struggle for 
Southern Africa, 1976-1991 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013). 
20 See especially John Kent, America, the UN and Decolonisation: Cold War Conflict in the Congo (London: 
Routledge, 2010). 
21 Lise Namikas, Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960-1965 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson 
Center Press, 2013). 
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War to further their own political ambitions.22 Rather than being conflicts imposed on Africa by 
external actors, Cold War crises were enmeshed with less-well understood local conflicts.23 
Moreover, this understandable preoccupation with ‘hot’ conflict overlooks the lower key, but 
constant presence of the Cold War in African political life in the era of decolonisation. As my thesis 
shows, the ‘Cold War’ was not just a set of geopolitical dynamics, but part of the political landscape 
within which African leaders struggled to establish authority in their post-independence states. The 
Cold War provided an ideological toolkit for assembling programmes of domestic reform, but also 
a rhetoric of fear which could be ranged against political rivals and appropriated to mobilise 
supporters. In her history of decolonisation in Guinea, Elizabeth Schmidt shows how the 
Rassemblement Démocratique Africaine’s connections with the French Communist Party meant that, in 
both metropole and colony, independence was negotiated in a Cold War context.24 Working on 
post-colonial Kenya, Daniel Speich and Daniel Branch have shown how elites used Cold War 
categories to frame development policies and as political ammunition with which to denigrate 
opponents for being too sympathetic to a particular superpower bloc.25 My thesis seeks to analyse 
this political ‘climate’ more closely, through the setting of Dar es Salaam, a ‘Cold War city’. 
The ‘Cold War city’ 
The splintering of the Cold War as a field of study and the eclipse of the staid category of 
‘diplomatic history’ by the more supple ‘international history’26 opens up exciting avenues of 
inquiry, but also poses methodological problems. In 1937, Lucie Varga discussed the problems 
which the rise of Nazism posed to historians, who she accused of being ‘prisoners to old 
metaphors or theoretical biases’. ‘Et les anciennes clefs tournent mal dans les nouvelles serrures’: the 
explanatory ‘old keys’ of Marxism, religion, or liberalism seemed incapable of turning the ‘new lock’ 
of fascism.27 The challenge facing international historians today may not have as pressing political 
stakes as the annalistes’ efforts to account for the coming of the Third Reich. But a pluralised 
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twentieth century, understood from local, global, national, and transnational perspectives, is a 
daunting prospect to confront, with the old keys of diplomatic history clearly inadequate. ‘In the 
deluge of new work’, writes Jeremi Suri, ‘many scholars are swimming in an ocean of new sources 
and interpretations without anchors of insight for guidance and stability’.28 
This thesis suggests that urban settings can serve as Suri’s ‘anchor of insight’ or a ‘new key’ à la 
Varga. In comparison with regional or global frameworks, the city represents a relatively digestible 
geographic unit for historical enquiry. By their very nature, cities present environments in which a 
range of actors and dynamics – local, national, transnational, international, and global – come 
together in a single locus. As sites of human interaction and exchange, city-based studies offer a 
means of analysing the intersection and cross-fertilisation of ostensibly separate narrative threads, 
to reveal complicated, entangled histories. To understand a complex phenomenon, observes Tony 
Judt, it must be pulled apart, but this separation risks falsifying the narrative; ‘its absence has a 
comparably distorting impact on something else.’29 Through the prism of the city, simultaneously 
geographically fixed but porous to movements of people, materials, information, and ideas, such 
entanglements can be addressed without lifting them from their immediate context. 
The globalising dynamics created by the expansion of European empires in Africa and Asia 
from the nineteenth century onwards facilitated the emergence of cosmopolitan cities across the 
world. Tracking the migration patterns and urban geography of interwar Paris, Michael Goebel has 
shown how the physical fabric of the city furthered the spread of anticolonial nationalisms. He 
reveals how Vietnamese, Chinese, and Algerian expatriates came to conceive themselves as not only 
part of a wider anticolonial struggle, but also as distinct national communities. The urban milieu is 
critical to Goebel’s study: using French police files, he reconstructs a social environment of cafés 
and clubs in which such exchanges took place. He also stresses the importance of French 
interlocutors, especially the local Communist Party, in plugging these nascent movements into 
internationalist circuits of Marxist anticolonialism.30 
After the collapse of the Grand Alliance in the aftermath of the Second World War, these 
networks of left-wing revolution were recast as part of the global Cold War struggle. As the sub-
plots and entangled dynamics of Westad’s pluralised conception of the Cold War spread outwards 
from Europe, urban centres around the globe became key sites of geopolitical and ideological 
competition. Articles in a recent special issue of Urban History discuss the permeation of Cold War 
politics into the political, social, and physical fabric of cities on both sides of the East-West divide, 
as well as in the Third World. However, the contributors work from the distinct prism of ‘urban 
history’, seeking to inscribe the Cold War into the local in discussing the implementation of civil 
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defence plans in Baltimore, architecture in Belgrade, or post-earthquake urban planning in 
Managua.31 Similarly, while there is a growing body of historiography on the city in Africa, it 
remains largely socioeconomic or cultural in its interests.32 The ‘global turn’ has moved the urban 
history of Africa away from narrow studies grounded in local or regional perspectives,33 but there 
has been little attempt to situate the continent’s international history within an urban context. 
Concerned primarily with high politics rather than local urban structures, this thesis takes the 
city of Dar es Salaam not as its central focus of study, but as a landscape in which diverse national, 
transnational, and international political dynamics intersected. I argue that major urban centres at 
the periphery of the Cold War were transformed into ‘Cold War cities’, products of both 
geopolitical realities and the mental anxieties that characterised much Cold War thinking. As the 
epicentre of the superpower rivalry, Berlin is the most obvious example of this: the West German 
enclave was a geostrategic flashpoint, but consequently also a politically-charged environment in 
which radical politics and counterculture thrived.34 Mexico City was a key Cold War battleground in 
Central America, caught between the hegemonic superpower to the north and the waves of 
revolution and counterrevolution to the south. It became, Patrick Iber suggests, 
a sort of Latin American version of Casablanca: a large city full of conflicting ideologies, with 
agents from different countries spying on one another; peasant uprisings with big business 
trying to control them; gun-running, drug-running, money-laundering; people hiding out, people 
seeking the people hiding out; and every other permutation of a vast international struggle 
imaginable.35 
The cinematic reference to wartime Casablanca – another city situated at the periphery of a global 
conflict, with attendant grey areas between would-be enemies – captures a sense of atmosphere 
similar to that of the ‘Cold War city’.  
In Africa and Asia, the emergence of such cities was shaped by the collision between the Cold 
War and decolonisation. The political cosmopolitanism of the Saigon captured in Graham Greene’s 
novel The Quiet American, as a city caught between a French colonial fin-de-siècle, the fervour of 
anticolonial struggle, and Cold War paranoia, represents a Southeast Asian example of this juncture. 
In North Africa, Cairo and post-independence Algiers became regional foci of anticolonial dissent 
and mobilisation. Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser and Ahmed Ben Bella welcomed to their capitals 
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liberation movements from sub-Saharan and Arab territories still under colonial occupation. The 
presence of guerrilla leaders ratcheted up the importance of these cities at an important geostrategic 
crossroads, between the southern flank of a divided Europe and the Arabian oilfields. The central 
role which Algeria and Egypt played in the non-aligned, pan-African, and pan-Arab movements 
contributed to a snowball effect, whereby their capitals became crucibles of Cold War politics, 
anticolonial revolution, and Third World solidarity.36 
As the scenes depicted by Kapuściński at the New Africa Hotel suggest, Dar es Salaam occupied 
a similar place as a ‘Cold War city’ on the frontline of the liberation struggle in southern Africa. In 
his history of cultural politics in Dar es Salaam in the 1960s, Andrew Ivaska describes the city as a 
‘nodal point’ between Tanzania and the world, ‘along competing and criss-crossing cosmopolitan 
networks that extend over long distances but are more bounded than the often vague concept of 
flows suggests’.37 My thesis transposes Ivaska’s concept of the city as a ‘node’ to the level of elite 
politics. Like Algiers and Cairo, Dar es Salaam hosted an array of guerrilla leaders, who were 
afforded refuge in the city by Nyerere. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the Tanzanian capital was a 
‘Mecca’ of anticolonialism, simultaneously caught up in complex Cold War conflicts and domestic 
power struggles.38 These dynamics were brought together in Dar es Salaam’s vibrant public sphere 
and the clandestine happenings which took place in its offices, bars, and restaurants. 
By interpreting these entangled narratives through an urban framework, they can be unpicked at 
a micropolitical level. Deconstructing monolithic entities – countries, governments, liberation 
movements, alliance blocs – allows an analysis of international politics through their local 
elaboration, highlighting issues of contingency and agency. Like Goebel, I heed Gregory Mann’s 
plea that ‘the specificities of particular places be brought to the fore, not only to ground research 
empirically but also to disaggregate and cast new light upon colonial and postcolonial 
circumstances.’39 This approach complicates existing international histories of both the Cold War 
and national liberation struggles in southern Africa. In elucidating points of friction in which the 
agency of especially African actors is revealed, it recalibrates our understanding of the distribution 
of power in the era of the Cold War and decolonisation. 
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Tanzanian history and the shadow of Julius Nyerere 
The use of the city as a framework of inquiry is intended to avoid defaulting to the unit of the 
nation-state. Yet Tanzanian politicians, often operating in a principally national (and indeed 
nationalist) context, occupy a central role in the history which follows. As a source of authority, 
permitting, limiting, and blocking the behaviour of Dar es Salaam’s diverse cast of political actors, 
the Tanzanian state exercised significant power over both national and international affairs in the 
capital. From the late 1960s onwards, as the sole legal political party in the country, the Tanganyika 
African National Union (TANU) presided over a far-reaching interventionist scheme of 
socioeconomic reform. Following Nyerere’s principle of ujamaa (loosely translated as ‘familyhood’), 
rather than Marxist doctrine, TANU pressed ahead with a programme of African socialism, most 
notably an ambitious plan to resettle the peasantry into collectivised villages. It is unsurprising that 
much of the historiography of post-independence Tanzania therefore focuses on the relationship 
between the state and society, especially in terms of the villagisation campaign. 
This literature has developed in several stages.40 During the early ujamaa years itself, Tanzania 
attracted the interest of left-wing scholars from beyond the African continent, drawn by what Ali 
Mazrui called ‘Tanzaphilia’ – the intellectual allure of Nyerere’s efforts to build a non-aligned, 
socialist nation.41 Then, as the economic limitations of ujamaa socialism became clear, scholars 
dissected the reasons behind its failures. Those writing from a Marxist position identified ujamaa’s 
inability to ‘capture’ the peasantry or sufficiently transform the nature of the national economy.42 
Others have located the shortcomings of ujamaa socialism in its ‘high modernist’ ambitions or an 
inherently authoritarian streak in ‘developmentalist’ government.43 
As Priya Lal argues, these histories suffer from a misleading sense of teleology: that ujamaa was 
destined to fail, either because of fundamental flaws in Nyerere’s utopian visions, or because of an 
inherent impulse towards authoritarian government common to post-colonial Africa. Lal’s own 
history resituates ujamaa in a context that is both local and global – ‘between the village and the 
world’ – to assess not ‘what was wrong with Tanzanian socialism’, but to understand what it 
actually was.44 As memories of the economic hardships experienced during the ujamaa years recede 
in memory, historians have begun to explore its more enduring legacies, especially the emergence of 
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a genuine, stabilising national identity. While many of its neighbours remain plagued by ethnic strife 
or civil war, Tanzania has enjoyed a relatively peaceful history since independence. Treating ujamaa 
socialism as a flexible political discourse rather than a concrete socialist programme, historians have 
explored the deeper history of this national identity. Ivaska’s and Kelly Askew’s analyses of ujamaa’s 
cultural content, Emma Hunter’s history of democratic discourse, and the work of Ronald 
Aminzade and James Brennan on race and national identity all enrich our understanding of 
Tanzanian socialism. All stress how the discourse and practices of ujamaa were contested on 
multiple planes and rife with tensions. They also challenge the artificial division between colonial 
rule and ‘flag’ independence in 1961 by anchoring their histories in a past that extends back beyond 
the liberation struggle.45 
However, there remains a significant blindspot in the history of contemporary Tanzania: the 
world of elite politics. In general, historians of Africa have avoided the matter of power struggles 
among post-colonial elites. The reasons for this may be sketched out briefly. The emergence of 
African history as a recognisable academic field in the 1950s and 1960s coincided with the 
development of social history in the Western academy, which eschewed narrative histories of ‘great 
men’ in favour of a ‘bottom-up’ study of the past. Among Africanists seeking to escape colonial 
paradigms, the study of high politics seemed a Eurocentric pursuit. Historians have renewed this 
trend into the twenty-first century, abetted by the postmodern or cultural turn. As Stephen Ellis 
observes, historians may also be dissuaded from studying Africa’s contemporary political history 
because its metanarratives are characterised by failure, in contrast to more positive histories of 
precolonial independence or colonial era resistance. Historians of Africa’s recent past thus lay 
themselves open to accusations of ‘Afropessimistic’ readings of the continent’s affairs.46 I suspect, 
too, that historians employed by state-funded African universities are understandably reluctant to 
confront subject matter that remains politically sensitive in the present. 
This historiographical neglect of elite politics in Africa runs counter to the nature of 
contemporary political life in the continent. Although opinion polling suggests Tanzanian voters 
prioritise policies over personalities,47 political debate in both the mass media and on the street 
focuses overwhelmingly on the posturing and rhetoric of party leaders, at least at a national level. 
While parties’ manifestos can appear improvised and incoherent, their leaders draw enormous 
crowds to rallies. Newspapers bulge with salacious political gossip. These stories draw upon 
memories of past struggles, often involving the individuals (or their immediate family ancestors) 
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still active in contemporary politics. Narratives of high politics therefore demand historiographical 
attention. 
Moreover, the rich body of theoretical literature about the nature of the state in Africa invites 
historical investigation into those holding the levers of power. Many historians have borrowed 
Frederick Cooper’s concept of the ‘gatekeeper state’ as a tool for analysing the practice of both 
colonial and post-colonial government. In Cooper’s framework, the underresourced state is 
incapable of fully controlling a vast territory, and so instead seeks to control the ‘gate’ – usually the 
capital city, often on the coast – where it can regulate and extract rents from the inflow and outflow 
of capital. The ‘gatekeepers’ can then distribute aid, tenders, and tariff income along patronage 
networks, while retaining their own positions of privilege.48 Similar ideas of the control of resources 
at the political centre to maintain the support of kinship groups inform Jean-François Bayart’s 
influential idea of the ‘politics of the belly’.49 The struggle for control of the ‘gate’ – i.e. among a 
narrow elite – must therefore be central to an understanding of post-colonial politics in Africa. 
In recent years, historians of eastern Africa have begun to meet this challenge. Branch’s punchy 
account of Kenyan politics since independence demonstrates the relevance of the recent past, 
frequently clouded by popular myth, for a society rent with ethnic tensions.50 Miles Larmer’s history 
of opposition politics in Zambia aims to ‘avoid the pitfalls of teleological meta-narratives of 
nationalism, modernisation and developmentalism’ by exploring schisms within the political elite.51 
For Tanzania, Brennan has made a number of short but valuable interventions, which hint at the 
value of wider study, contextualised like Lal’s work on villagisation in an international context.52 
The need for further study of elite politics to provide an empirically-grounded historical 
counterweight to the popular narratives which thrive in Africa’s contemporary political 
environment are especially pressing in Tanzania. The memory of the country’s first president, Julius 
Nyerere, continues to cast a shadow over political life, years after his death in 1999. In the political 
mainstream, Nyerere’s moral reputation remains largely unimpeachable. Although dissenting voices 
can be heard, especially in the very particular circumstances of Zanzibar, they are marginalised.53 
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The ujamaa era is remembered as a ‘golden age’ of Tanzanian history, thrown into relief against a 
decadent, postsocialist present.54 Politicians of all stripes struggle over the memory of Mwalimu, ‘the 
teacher’, as an idealised symbol of moral propriety. The ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Party of the 
Revolution, CCM) presents itself as the genealogical heir to its former leader, whereas opposition 
parties contrast Nyerere’s moral propriety against what they portray as a corrupt present-day 
leadership.55 
The totemic position occupied by Nyerere in Tanzanian society is reflected in historical 
scholarship, much of which assumes a particularly hagiographic tone.56 ‘Lionizing Nyerere remains 
the rule’, writes Marie-Aude Fouéré.57 Nyerere’s achievement in building a Tanzanian national 
identity synonymous with his own person has produced an intellectual tradition in which much 
locally written history assumes a national(ist) paradigm and unerringly returns to the figure of 
Nyerere. ‘Rather than unsettling the reigning interpretations of the Mwalimu-in-power era’, notes 
Fouéré, these histories ‘renew them in the present.’58 These tendencies do not solely characterise 
Tanzanian scholarship. Paul Bjerk’s rather teleological history of Tanzania’s early years of 
independence maintains a focus on the figure of Nyerere. Centring his history around the concept 
of ‘sovereignty’, Bjerk presupposes the existence of an empty nation-state, to be filled and 
legitimised by Nyerere’s carefully sculpted nationalism, to a triumphant conclusion in 1964.59 This 
thesis suggests that the period after 1964 was no less politically contentious than the immediate 
post-independence years. In criticising these Mwalimu-centric narratives, I do not wish to deny the 
central role played by Nyerere in Tanzania’s post-colonial political history. Indeed, Nyerere’s name 
appears many times more frequently in the pages which follow than that of any other person, 
Tanzanian or otherwise. Yet, contrary to the impression sometimes given by scholars who are over-
reliant on published anthologies of Nyerere’s speeches and writings, his was not the only voice in 
Tanzanian politics during the ujamaa years. Nor did he wield absolute power. 
Instead, as this thesis shows, Nyerere’s authority was challenged by numerous Tanzanian 
political actors. Opposition came from multiple sources: ideological misgivings about ujamaa 
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socialism, cynical political manoeuvring, and personal embitterment. Rather than being a 
benevolent philosopher-king, Nyerere was a political animal himself, prepared to resort to 
authoritarian means to suppress dissent and shore up his own position. As Larmer shows in his 
history of opposition in Zambia, paying attention to opposition at an elite level helps to disrupt the 
unilinear trajectories of nationalist, post-colonial histories.60 While historians of Tanzania have not 
ignored the extent of internal opposition to Nyerere’s government, they address it primarily with 
reference to resistance to the implementation of ujamaa policy, especially villagisation. By retaining a 
grassroots perspective, these histories permit the separation of Nyerere-as-president from the 
impact of his policies. Marrying a desire to fill a major historiographical gap with a need to counter 
the dominant nationalist narrative, my thesis therefore seeks to contextualise the extent and nature 
of Nyerere’s power within a more fluid history, cognisant of the existence of dissent and set in a 
context that looks beyond the nation-state, while appreciating its significance. 
A note on the sources 
To the list of suggested reasons for the relative paucity of historiography on high politics and 
international affairs in independent Africa should be added the difficulties presented by the ‘post-
colonial archive’. In much of sub-Saharan Africa, the archives of the post-colonial state, which 
might be expected to form an empirical backbone of a history of politics after independence, 
remain inaccessible to researchers. A rich debate has developed about the nature of the ‘colonial 
archive’ (whether held in the former metropole or the post-colony), driven by anthropologists 
writing under the influence of postcolonial and poststructural theory.61 But until recently, scholars 
have had little to say about how such conceptual approaches to the colonial archive might translate 
to approaches into its post-colonial successor.62 
For all their nuances, arguments about the colonial archive accept as a fundamental premise that 
the archive – both the physical institution and the documents contained therein – is a political 
entity. Through its organisational structures and the form its holdings take, the archive shapes and 
delimits the possibilities of historical research and scholarship. The same holds true for the post-
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colonial archive in Africa, albeit without the façade of orderliness which the colonial archive seeks 
to maintain. Where states have kept archives, they are often closed to researchers. In cases where 
record-keeping has been neglected, the archive remains only in an especially fragmented form – or 
does not exist altogether. The post-colonial archive has in many cases suffered from environmental 
damage, as a consequence of rainwater, termites, or war. Chronically underfunded archives can 
prove difficult for historians to navigate, as archivists struggle with the task of cataloguing and 
finding documents.  
This destruction and disorganisation is connected to broader patterns of archival neglect in 
Africa, symptomatic of malignant political motivations. In a dynamic characteristic of a general 
suspicion of historical inquiry in Africa, stemming from its potential to challenge the authority of 
the state and its official narratives,63 gatekeeper regimes have denied scholars access to politically 
sensitive documents. As Achille Mbembe observes, as a repository of accumulated records – 
records of the state’s past – the archive forms a keystone of the state’s architecture of power. 
However, ‘the very existence of the archive constitutes a constant threat to the state. […] More 
than on its ability to recall, the power of the state rests rests on its ability to control time, that is, to 
abolish the archive and anaesthetise the past.’64 This epistemological violence assumes a particular 
sharpness in the charged political context of sub-Saharan Africa. As Moses Ochunu recognises, 
archives become ‘weapons of postcolonial political warfare’, and thus can be deliberately mutilated 
(or muzzled).65 The state, concludes Omnia El Shakry – evocatively paraphrasing Mbembe – 
therefore ‘devours the past through either the material destruction of the archives or the 
presentation of a history purified of antagonisms and embodied in empty commemorative 
accounts.’66 
The dead-end which the post-colonial archive frequently represents has pushed historians down 
two routes. Firstly, by preventing historians from consulting its own records, the post-colonial 
regime nudges them towards the colonial-era archive. As El Shakry notes with reference to the 
Middle East, ‘the obstruction of post-independence official state archives has tended to make the 
workings of the colonial state far more visible than the operations of the national states which 
succeeded colonial rule.’67 This has contributed to a more general foregrounding of the better-
documented colonial era, in which historians since the 1970s have searched for the roots of Africa’s 
 
63 Richard Reid, ‘States of Anxiety: History and Nation in Modern Africa’, Past and Present, 229 (2015), 239-69. 
64 Achille Mbembe, ‘The Power of the Archive and its Limits’, in Carolyn Hamilton et al. (eds), Refiguring the 
Archive (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002), 23. 
65 Moses E. Ochonu, ‘Elusive History: Fractured Archives, Politicized Orality, and Sensing the Postcolonial 
Past’, History in Africa, 42 (2015), 290. 
66 El Shakry, ‘“History without Documents”’, 920. 
67 El Shakry, ‘“History without Documents”’, 923-24. For an instructive comparison, see Jeff Sahadeo, 
‘“Without a Past There Is No Future”: Archives, History, and Authority in Uzbekistan’, in Antoinette Burton 
(ed.), Archive Stories: Facts, Fictions, and the Writing of History (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 45-67. 
Sahadeo observes that given the continuities in personnel between the ‘colonial’ period of Soviet occupation 
and the post-1991 independent state, the Uzbekistani authorities restricted access to Soviet-era documents to 
prevent researchers from exposés which had the potential to undermine contemporary nationalist narratives. 
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post-independence travails.68 While the difficulties of the archive are only one factor in this 
occlusion of the post-colonial past, the risk is that Africa’s history since independence (at least in 
terms of academic scholarship) will become marginalised, like the now relatively neglected field of 
the continent’s precolonial history.69 
The other response by historians has been the pursuit of alternative sources and histories of 
post-colonial Africa. In the case of Tanzania, historians have used the limiting holdings of the 
National Archives in Dar es Salaam and its regional branches to study the development and 
implementation of ujamaa socialism, especially the villagisation policy.70 Others have turned to oral 
histories, deftly recovering the voices of ‘the excluded’, as James Giblin puts it, in a deliberate turn 
away from state-centric histories that he argues reproduces European and colonial modes of 
thought and power.71 However, as an alternative means of capturing African voices, oral histories 
have clear limitations, especially when seeking to reconstruct complex political narratives. The 
specifics of time, place, words, and actions become only selectively embedded in memory and 
understandably lost and distorted with passing years. 
While these histories have greatly illuminated our understanding of Africa’s recent past, a less 
welcome effect of the turn away from inaccessible state archives has been to insulate the ‘included’ 
(to invert Giblin’s expression) from the scrutiny of historians.72 The state’s control over what enters 
the archive and who may consult it, with little transparency in either process, therefore enables the 
maintenance of state-sponsored national narratives which are difficult to challenge with empirical 
evidence. In Tanzania, I was denied access to the party archives of CCM in Dodoma, a problem 
encountered by the vast majority of prospective researchers, but perhaps aggravated in my case by 
the close proximity of my visit to a general election. Making enquiries at the more researcher-
friendly Zanzibar National Archives, I found that the years covered by the presidency of Abeid 
Karume – the period relevant for this study – represented a near total lacuna, with records 
essentially ceasing in 1964 and then only beginning again in 1972, the year of his death. 
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Having established first that the post-colonial state is a ripe subject of historical inquiry, then 
that the state puts up barriers to prevent research into this past, to where does the historian of post-
colonial Africa turn for source material? Jean Allman has looked for traces of evidence for her own 
subject, Nkrumah’s Ghana, in ‘shadow archives’ scattered around the world. ‘The postcolonial 
archive is not the easy and direct descendant of the colonial archive project’, she writes. ‘It is not a 
“national archive”. It does not reside in one place, or even two or three. It is a global, transnational 
archive.’73 My thesis therefore uses material drawn from sixteen archives, spread across eight 
countries. With the exception of snippets from the Tanzania National Archives, all of this research 
was conducted in archives based in Europe and North America, which mostly contained the 
records of national governments, especially foreign ministries.74 
In anticipating understandable objections to this methodology, I contend that the limitations of 
writing about Africa through state archives in the global North need not preclude a careful reading 
that permits the elaboration of the continent’s post-colonial politics. As Ellis suggests, the work 
produced by historians of pre-colonial Africa using the records of European explorers, 
missionaries, and traders can serve as a model for historians of post-colonial Africa, provided they 
‘pay more than usual attention to the cardinal rules of gathering historical evidence.’75 While I 
accept that the judgements expressed within these documents represent a particular stratum of 
identities and interests (here almost exclusively white, university-educated males acting on behalf of 
governments, usually in diplomatic representations or foreign ministries), the basic data contained 
therein can be extracted and marshalled with reasonable security. These sources tend to focus on 
questions of elite politics, but this thesis is about elite politics; indeed, they provide a means of 
accessing the corridors of power of the post-colonial state, albeit one with a particular slant. 
Confidence in the data conveyed in them is enhanced by the multilateral, multiarchival approach 
adopted – unlike Bjerk’s work on the early years of independence in Tanzania, which in places 
depends largely on American diplomatic records.76 This permits a degree of triangulation by cross-
referencing, elucidating at the same time the networks through which information was transferred 
in the ‘Cold War city’. At the same time, I am also aware that this defence is in part an exercise in 
straw man construction: this study is not purely one of Africans or Tanzanians, but also 
encompasses narrative strands in which non-Africans play leading roles. 
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The holdings of the archives of foreign ministries should not solely be regarded as a paper-trail 
of official communications. While telegrams and memorandums produced by diplomats and 
bureaucrats do form the bulk of the records, these archives continually turned up surprise 
inclusions. They were replete with verbatim transcripts of speeches, newspaper clippings, snippets 
of gossip, official Tanzanian government circulars, documents from other foreign ministries, press 
releases, propaganda pamphlets, and a variety of locally-produced ‘grey literature’. While I tracked 
down some in Tanzania, at the East African Collection at the library of the University of Dar es 
Salaam, it would be impossible to ascertain where the fragments preserved in the scrapbooks of 
Allman’s ‘postcolonial archive’ might otherwise be found. In toto, state archives constitute a filtered 
but illuminating record of the workings of foreign missions in Dar es Salaam, offering an insight 
into local politics and its public sphere as experienced and understood by diplomats. 
One consequence of the ‘archival turn’ has been a raised awareness of the need to incorporate 
the ‘lived encounter’ of the historian with the archive into his or her work.77 My multiarchival 
approach involved continual disruption and adaptation, both in terms of travel and the research 
environment. Under the temporal and financial pressures of a PhD project undertaken at a British 
university, I moved through archives at a rapid pace: aside from the research in the UK, my 
fieldwork took less than nine months, plus a four-month stay in Tanzania.78 This problem was 
exacerbated by the multilingual demands of my research, which not only added an additional 
challenge to reading my sources, but complicated the navigation of the institutional architecture of 
different archives, which was based on different bureaucratic languages and cultures. 
Communicating my research interests to archivists, however helpful, proved difficult. 
I began my research in the UK, where my permanent residence allowed me to make a large 
number of trips to the National Archives at Kew over a period of several months. Whereas the 
relevant holdings of other state archives are almost exclusively ‘one-way traffic’ – the records of 
diplomats in Dar es Salaam sent back to central government – the British files include policy 
debates within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the input of other government 
departments, and the instructions sent out to the high commission in Tanzania. The records from 
1965 to 1968, when Tanzania severed diplomatic relations with Britain, also contain copies of 
communications between the Canadian high commission in Dar es Salaam and Ottawa. As the 
previous colonial occupier, the British retained numerous contacts within the Tanzanian political 
establishment, including among Nyerere’s personal entourage. 
 
77 Antoinette Burton, ‘Introduction: Archive Fever, Archive Stories’, in Burton (ed.), Archive Stories, 1-24. 
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I started my archival globetrotting with a month spent on the lesser-trodden path of the French 
diplomatic archives, split between Nantes and Paris – though I found little of relevance for this 
study in the latter location. The well-organised holdings at Nantes provide a Western perspective 
with a certain detachment from the American and British archives. Having backed out of the 
military arm of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), France appears less preoccupied 
by Cold War categories; its lack of real interests in Anglophone Tanzania gives its effusive 
diplomatic reportage a more distant feel. Of particular value for this study are the French consulate’s 
records from Zanzibar: plugged into a network of local informers, many of whom were of 
Comorian background, Paris’ representatives on the islands provided the richest source on 
Zanzibari politics in the Karume years. 
The longest of my overseas archival excursions was a three-month trip to the United States, 
beginning with at the National Archives at College Park, Maryland. The records of the State 
Department contain substantially more information on Tanzania during the period of this study 
than any other which I consulted. They are invaluable as a source of precise details on political life 
in the country, especially through the American embassy’s weekly news digest, containing 
information that was omitted from the local press. Whereas the scholarship on the Zanzibar 
Revolution has highlighted the paranoia of American officials in East Africa and Washington, I 
found that a number of prominent diplomats were able to transcend Cold War categories to 
produce insightful commentaries on Tanzanian politics, especially ambassador John H. Burns and 
Thomas Pickering, who later served as ambassador to the UN. Beyond Washington, two months 
spent travelling around presidential libraries proved less productive. The Johnson Library in Austin 
contains illuminating material on the American response to the Zanzibar Revolution and act of 
union in 1964. I also used documents found there to shed light on the Johnson administration’s 
public relations tactics in Africa, plus presidential communications between Johnson and Nyerere 
about the Vietnam war. An expensive visit to the Nixon Library, nestled in deep Los Angeles 
suburbia, yielded little of note for the present study. 
During two months in Berlin, I consulted the collections maintained by the two German states. 
Still in the process of declassification, the limited archives of the West German Auswärtiges Amt 
(Foreign Office) demonstrate Bonn’s overwhelming – and sometimes distorting – preoccupation 
with the activities of its East German rival in the Third World, which is the subject of chapter 3. 
More fruitful were the rather haphazard records of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). 
Although the records are supposedly divided between the party archives of the Socialist Unity Party 
of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands; SED), kept at the Bundesarchiv, and the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs archives, housed at the present-day Auswärtiges Amt, the crossover 
between the two reflected the party’s overarching control over the apparatus of the GDR’s 
international relations. I also obtained access to the files relevant to Tanzania produced by the Stasi, 
the GDR’s security service, although the archive’s procedures limit the scope of research: the 
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prospective historian must leave the process of locating files in the hands of an archivist, and there 
is no finding aid.79 Couched in a dense Marxist-Leninist jargon which skewed perceptions of 
Tanzanian affairs, the GDR’s records reveal a very different set of political networks in Dar es 
Salaam to those found in Western archives. However, they should not be seen as indicative of 
communist policy more generally, nor as a surrogate for research in Soviet archives. Travelling east, 
through the aid of a translator I was able to consult the records of the Polish foreign ministry, 
although the holdings for Tanzania were limited to a handful of folios. I have also used a small 
number of translated Czechoslovakian intelligence documents. 
I concluded my archival research with two months in the largely untapped Portuguese archives, 
where the documents are more heavily coloured by anticommunism than those of the other 
Western holdings I consulted. Although Tanzania did not maintain relations with Portugal due to 
its colonial policy, Lisbon took an active interest in Tanzanian affairs, due to the presence of several 
Lusophone liberation movements in the country, especially the Mozambique Liberation Front 
(Frente de Libertação de Moçambique; FRELIMO). Without an embassy in Dar es Salaam, Lisbon 
sought to acquire knowledge on Tanzanian affairs by piecing together fragments of information. 
The buckle-bound files of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Overseas Ministry therefore 
contain a rich assortment of gossip and newspaper clippings, plus reports shared by their 
Rhodesian or South African allies, as well as informers within Tanzania.80 At the National Archives 
at Torre do Tombo, the files of the secret police (PIDE), mainly operating out of Mozambique, are 
not only valuable sources of information on FRELIMO leaders, but also – by triangulation against 
other sources – reveal the shortcomings of Portuguese intelligence, which remained strikingly 
ignorant of Tanzanian internal affairs. 
This main body of evidence is supplemented by snippets from a number of non-state archives, 
which help to move the thesis away from solely a narrative concerned with state actors. The 
research papers of Graham Mytton, a doctoral student of communications in Tanzania in the 
period under study, provide interviews and insights into the world of the mass media in the late 
1960s. The records of Reuters, the British news agency, elucidate relationships between the 
Tanzanian authorities and foreign correspondents. The Herbert Shore collection, at the remote 
environs of Oberlin College, Ohio, contains personal notes and ephemera relating to Eduardo 
Mondlane, the FRELIMO leader who occupies centre-stage in chapter 4. 
My choice of archives was partly motivated by the spread of angles which they provide upon 
political life in Dar es Salaam, but it was also limited by other factors. Even before issues of archival 
access could be considered, linguistic barriers precluded further research in the Chinese and other 
Eastern Bloc archives. Time and money prevented work in the holdings of Australian and Canadian 
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diplomatic archives. Similarly, the multiple possibilities for research in South Africa – in the 
collections gathered by the various Dar-based liberation movements, as well as the archives of the 
apartheid-era state – could unfortunately not be pursued. 
In addition, this thesis makes use of the international and especially the Tanzanian press. I 
comprehensively surveyed the two main English-language newspapers in Tanzania during the 
period, the Nationalist and the Standard. As Ellis recognises, African newspapers – like any others – 
cannot be regarded as ‘journals of record’. The Nationalist was TANU’s official newspaper, while 
the Standard was nationalised by the government in 1970; ultimately the two were merged to form 
the Daily News in 1972. They occupied a grey area between official party or state propaganda and a 
controlled forum in which voices not entirely congruent with the government’s own programme 
were afforded space in print. Read critically, Tanzanian newspapers are not only a valuable source 
of ‘official’ news, but a keyhole through which broader political messages and conflicts can be 
understood. In many instances, what local newspapers do not contain are as instructive as the 
information which they do.81 As chapter 5 shows, the history of the Tanzanian press is bound up in 
in broader questions of government management, radical politics, and the struggle for control in 
Dar es Salaam’s public sphere. 
International correspondents and agency reporters, as I demonstrate, also played an important 
role as conduits of information between political actors in Tanzania. Through either the use of 
keyword searches for digitalised newspapers,82 or selective research focused on specific events or 
‘tip-offs’ found in primary and secondary material, the domestic press is complemented by a wide 
range of international newspaper sources. These tend to reflect foreign tendencies to view 
developments in Dar es Salaam through the lens of Cold War rivalries. They also often perpetuate 
stereotyped, exoticised assumptions about ‘Africa’ – to a much greater extent than diplomats.  
Finally, this thesis draws on the memories of contemporary actors themselves. In light of the 
inaccessibility of political archives in Tanzania, I carried out a series of interviews with prominent 
former Tanzanian politicians, ministers, bureaucrats, student leaders, and journalists in mid-2015. 
This is not the place for a treatise on the value and potential pitfalls surrounding conducting oral 
history in Africa. Given the microdiplomatic nature of much of my thesis, my subjects’ memories 
were rarely useful for corroborating my archival data or filling narrative blindspots, but rather their 
observations provided a sense of balance: the same Cold War dynamics which ring through foreign 
archives in many instances were not echoed by my interview subjects. A second form of ‘memory’ 
comes from both official organised oral histories, such as the American Foreign Affairs Oral 
History Collection, plus the memoirs of prominent actors. While Africa’s ‘memoir boom’83 has yet 
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to have made a major impact on Tanzania, those accounts that have been published generally fall 
into two camps: one consisting of largely uncritical paeans to Nyerere,84 the other unremittingly 
hostile towards him.85 
As Allman identifies, the postcolonial archive – even before its supplementation with oral 
testimony, biography, and the press – is a complex, multisited structure which challenges the 
historian to think beyond the categories of the nation-state. While the multiarchival approach used 
here is an attempt to analyse the intersection of decolonisation and the Cold War in Africa from the 
viewpoint of multiple interest groups, it also helps the historian to deconstruct local politics, which 
are shown to be embedded in broader international and transnational networks, involving state and 
non-state actors, plus those – like the liberation movements – operating in the grey area in between. 
This evidence is fragmentary, with all of the archival collections I have used replete with lacunae. 
Yet this should not be an insurmountable barrier for the historian. ‘Our talent is to be able, from 
piecemeal traces, to narrate a fleshed-out, elucidatory story’, writes Florence Bernault. ‘Our paradox 
is to use incomplete and fragmentary traces to understand broad patterns and timelines in a past 
that remains, by definition, unreachable […] If this interpretative art needs to be fueled by 
evidence, it hardly depends on the comprehensiveness of the record.’86 
*** 
This thesis starts by setting out a background narrative of the early years of Tanzania’s history. 
Beginning with Tanganyika’s independence in 1961, it shows how a series of regional crises shaped 
the political direction of the nascent state. In 1964, an army mutiny, revolution in Zanzibar, and the 
subsequent act of union all led to an intensification of Cold War politics in Dar es Salaam. Faced 
with a hostile international climate and a precarious domestic situation, Nyerere moved to shore up 
his own power by instituting a one-party state. The chapter ends with a reassessment of the Arusha 
Declaration of 1967, considering it in the context of domestic political machinations, rather than 
simply as an abstract statement of socioeconomic revolution. 
The next chapter sketches out a political geography of Dar es Salaam. Taking a non-
chronological approach, it explores the sites of political activity within the ‘Cold War city’, piecing 
together networks which both followed and cut across national and ideological divisions. It pays 
particular attention to the transmission of information around the city, through official media, 
propaganda, rumour, and ‘black literature’. This establishes a framework within which the following 
chapters can be understood, showing how they were linked together by their overlapping 
geographic milieux and interwoven intelligence networks. 
 
84 A particularly glaring example is Al Noor Kassum, Africa’s Winds of Change: Memoirs of an International 
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The remaining chapters form diverse narrative strands that are shown to be inextricably 
entwined. Chapter 3 examines the unfolding of the ‘inter-German Cold War’ in Dar es Salaam. The 
city became a propaganda battlefield as East Berlin strove for full recognition from Tanzania, while 
Bonn sought to limit the gains of its communist enemy. By scoping out to developments elsewhere, 
such as the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, then zooming into the networks through 
which German diplomats worked in Dar es Salaam, it shows how the dynamics of Cold War 
geopolitics were entangled with local Tanzanian affairs. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the experience of FRELIMO and its leader, Eduardo Mondlane, in 
attempting to wage a liberation struggle from Dar es Salaam. As FRELIMO sought to further its 
war against the Portuguese through the support of various Cold War protagonists, it was gripped 
by an internal crisis that divided the movement along ethnoracial and ideological lines. Dissenters 
were aided by powerful members of the Tanzanian political establishment, who secretly aligned 
with Mondlane’s enemies to denigrate him in public and undermine his security. These schisms 
ultimately facilitated the assassination of Mondlane in 1969. 
The final three chapters focus on Tanzanian political developments, set in the wider context of 
the Cold War and decolonisation in Africa. Chapter 5 uses local reactions to Cold War 
interventions in Vietnam and Czechoslovakia to show how the government channelled radical 
critiques of superpower ‘imperialism’ into nation-building rhetoric. It shows how Nyerere 
recognised the need to give space in Dar es Salaam’s political sphere to more radical voices, but 
also the need to muzzle them when their arguments damaged Tanzania’s international reputation 
and geopolitical interests. 
Together, chapters 6 and 7 confront the political history of Tanzania in the years of ujamaa 
socialism: a series of controversial developments that are widely understood to be significant, yet 
almost devoid of historiographical attention. Faced by threats from both inside and outside his 
country, Nyerere’s regime took an authoritarian turn. By the end of 1972, the elite had been purged 
of opponents, declared or potential. Yet this was not a straightforward drive towards authoritarian 
rule, but a twisted path, contoured by individual decisions and entanglements, and characterised by 
openings, as well as the closure of, alternatives to the doxa of ujamaa. 
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Chapter 1 
From uhuru to Arusha: Tanzania and the world, 1961-67 
Tanganyika became independent from Britain on 9 December 1961. The former German colony 
had been run as a League of Nations mandate after 1922 and a United Nations (UN) trust territory 
since the Second World War. Uhuru – freedom – was attained after a protracted but peaceful 
struggle, waged through negotiation and the ballot box.87 The independence campaign was led by 
TANU, spearheaded by Julius Nyerere, a schoolteacher who had been educated at Makerere 
University in Kampala and the University of Edinburgh.88 Yet amid the euphoria of uhuru, Nyerere, 
initially as prime minister, then as president when Tanganyika became a republic in 1962, was 
deeply conscious of the challenges facing the country. As he wrote in the party newspaper, 
‘[p]overty, ignorance, and disease must be overcome before we can really establish in this country 
the sort of society we have been dreaming of. These obstacles are not small ones, they are more 
difficult to overcome than any alien government.’89 
This chapter shows how in the early years of its existence the new Tanganyikan – and 
subsequently Tanzanian – government was confronted by a series of crises, stemming from the 
collision of Nyerere’s political principles with a domestic and international context shaped by 
decolonisation and superpower relations. Synthesising secondary material, this narrative provides an 
essential framework for understanding the various stands of inquiry which follow in subsequent 
chapters. It also explains how Dar es Salaam came to occupy a central position in the global Cold 
War and the struggle for African liberation. The closing sections of the chapter revisit the pivotal 
period in Tanzanian’s post-colonial history following the Arusha Declaration of February 1967, 
interpreted in light of its far-reaching effects on the country’s political affairs. 
Nyerere’s foreign policy 
While historians may overstate the extent of Nyerere’s influence over Tanzania’s domestic affairs, 
his domination of the country’s foreign policy is less contestable. In terms of both the institutional 
structure of decision-making and the charismatic presence which he assumed on the global stage, 
Tanzania’s approach to the outside world was the product of Nyerere’s bold foreign policy. The 
 
87 On the independence struggle, see John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979); John Iliffe, ‘Breaking the Chain at its Weakest Link: TANU and the Colonial Office’, 
in Maddox and Giblin (eds), In Search of a Nation, 168-97; Ullrich Lohrmann, Voices from Tanganyika: Great 
Britain, the United Nations and the Decolonization of a Trust Territory, 1946-1961 (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2007). 
88 On Nyerere’s formative years, see Thomas Molony, Nyerere: The Early Years (Woodbridge: James Currey, 
2014). 
89 ‘Independence Message to TANU’, in Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity: A Selection from Writings and 
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major TANU committees nor parliament exercised negligible direct influence over foreign affairs.90 
At multilateral organisations like the UN or the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Nyerere 
established himself as a statesman of a standing beyond that which would be expected of the leader 
of a poor nation like Tanzania. 
Nyerere’s foreign policy rested on three mutually reinforcing pillars. The first was an 
unwavering commitment to the liberation of those African peoples still under white minority rule. 
At the Addis Ababa conference in May 1963, where heads of African states founded the OAU, 
Nyerere emphasised the continent’s duty to free those still under colonial oppression. African 
leaders, he argued  
should now view the continued occupation of Africa by any foreign power with the same 
gravity and in the same seriousness as each one of us would have viewed the occupation by a 
foreign power of a part of the country that he has the privilege and honour to lead. We can no 
longer go on saying that Angola is not free or that Mozambique is not free, etc., and that we are 
helping Angolans or Mozambicans to free themselves. Such statements are hiding the truth. The 
real humiliating truth is that Africa is not free; and therefore it is Africa which should take the 
necessary collective measures to free Africa.91 
Nyerere permitted exiled liberation movements to set up their headquarters in Dar es Salaam and 
training camps across the country. Dar es Salaam also became the seat of the OAU’s Liberation 
Committee, a coordinating organisation for supporting the guerrillas. This raised the political stakes 
of Cold War competition in the Tanzanian capital. Representatives of the communist powers 
attempted to build relationships with the movements, which were mostly left-leaning. The 
movements’ leaders, conscious of this competition for influence, sought to broker deals for aid and 
arms. Western governments tracked the guerrillas’ activities, concerned about the prospect of 
future Marxist governments in independent Africa. Agents of the white minority regimes – 
Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa – tried to infiltrate and disrupt these movements. These 
dynamics are explored in chapter 4. 
The second pillar of Nyerere’s foreign policy was a commitment to non-alignment, as a rejection 
of a Cold War order which he regarded as a source of neocolonial intervention into African affairs. 
Addressing the UN in December 1961, Nyerere emphasised that Tanganyika did ‘not have feelings 
of enmity toward any peoples in the world.’ This did not mean equidistance from either 
superpower bloc, but refraining from adopting foreign policy positions purely out of Cold War 
sympathies. ‘Internationally, we believe that we have entered a world riven by ideological 
dissension’, Nyerere said in New York. ‘We are anxious to try to keep out of these disputes, and are 
anxious to see that the nations of our continent are not used as pawns in conflicts which very often 
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do not concern them at all.’92 He welcomed the friendship of any nation (except the white minority 
regimes), regardless of its ideological orientation, provided aid came with no political 
conditionalities attached. 
Finally, Nyerere was a committed pan-Africanist. He believed that the continent’s shared sense 
of ‘African-ness’ could help to form a common front against neocolonial predations and the 
vicissitudes of the global economy to which the independent states were exposed. ‘Indissoluble 
African Unity is the stone bridge which would enable us all to walk in safety over this whirlpool of 
power politics’, he wrote, ‘and enable us to carry more easily the economic and social loads which 
now threaten to overwhelm us.’ He consequently believed in the need for a ‘United States of 
Africa’.93 In 1963, he played an instrumental role in the foundation of the OAU, bringing together 
the so-called ‘Casablanca’ and ‘Monrovia’ blocs. At a regional level, he drove forward plans for 
federation in East Africa. Although these never came to fruition, in June 1967, Kenya and Uganda 
joined Tanzania in establishing the East African Community (EAC), which involved the creation of 
a common market with shared institutions.94 
The Zanzibar Revolution 
While mainland Tanganyika’s path to independence was relatively stable, the situation in Zanzibar 
was more volatile.95 Political life in the archipelago was characterised by a racial cosmopolitanism, 
the consequence of centuries of involvement at the apex of Indian Ocean trade networks and the 
slave trade. Tensions between socioeconomic groups, loosely formed around contested and fluid 
ethnic identities, were exacerbated as much by the work of Zanzibari intellectuals as the stratifying 
impact of British colonial rule.96 In the years leading up to independence in December 1963, known 
as the zama za siasa, or ‘Time of Politics’, elections were characterised by outbreaks of violence and 
shifting partisan alignments, as the elite jostled for power. As Jonathon Glassman has shown, local 
polemicists injected their racial rhetoric with the language of the Cold War, invoking superpower dei 
ex machina to whip up fears and mobilise support.97 
 
92 ‘Independence Address to the United Nations’, in Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, 154-55. 
93 Julius K. Nyerere, ‘A United States of Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 1 (1963), 1-6. 
94 Bjerk, Building a Peaceful Nation, 194-98. 
95 The Zanzibar archipelago consists of the islands of Unguja (often referred to as Zanzibar) and Pemba. 
96 G. Thomas Burgess, Race, Revolution, and the Struggle for Human Rights in Zanzibar: The Memoirs of Ali Sultan Issa 
and Seif Sharif Hamad (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009), 1-25; Jonathon Glassman, War of Words, War of 
Stones: Racial Thought and Violence in Colonial Zanzibar (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011); Jonathon 
Glassman, ‘Creole Nationalists and the Search for Nativist Authenticity in Twentieth-Century Zanzibar: The 
Limits of Cosmopolitanism’, Journal of African History, 55 (2014), 229-47. See also Michael Lofchie, Zanzibar: 
Background to Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965); A. M. Babu, ‘The 1964 Revolution: 
Lumpen or Vanguard?’, in Abdul Sheriff and Ed Ferguson (eds), Zanzibar under Colonial Rule (London: James 
Currey, 1991), 220-47. 
97 Glassman, War of Words, 270-73. 
From uhuru to Arusha   
37 
 
In the pre-uhuru elections held in July 1963, a coalition of the Zanzibar National Party (ZNP), 
which was perceived to be dominated by the wealthier landowning class of Arab descent, and the 
Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party (ZPPP) won a majority of seats in the National Assembly. 
However, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), which had a support base mainly among the African 
population, won a majority of the popular vote. The ZNP-ZPPP government cracked down on the 
activities of opposition groups, restricted the freedom of the press, and dismissed African members 
of the bureaucracy and police force. 
On 12 January 1964, the ZNP-ZPPP government was overthrown in a violent revolution, led by 
militant members of the Afro-Shirazi Party Youth League (ASPYL).98 The sultan fled into exile. 
Thousands of the Zanzibaris, mostly of Arab descent, were killed in racial pogroms.99 Perhaps a 
third of Zanzibar’s Arab population died or were forced into exile.100 Shortly after the seizure of 
power, Abeid Karume, the ASP’s leader, was installed as Zanzibar’s president, at the head of a 
governing Revolutionary Council. 
Although the ASP’s pre-independence rhetoric had depicted its ZNP rivals as being a proxy of 
the communist powers, the revolutionary regime set about a comprehensive programme of socialist 
reform. Among its chief proponents were two committed Marxists, Abdallah Kassim Hanga, the 
vice-president, and Abdulrahman Mohamed ‘Babu’, the minister for external affairs and trade.101 
Hanga was a radical member of the ASP, who had been educated in the Soviet Union. Babu had 
moved in far-left circles in London, where he had studied in the 1950s, and was close to China. 
After being imprisoned by the British on charges of sedition, Babu led his supporters in splitting 
from the ZNP in June 1963 to form the radical Umma party.102 While ZNP members, a handful of 
these Umma cadres had received military training in Cuba.103 Babu was not involved in the 12 
January putsch, but he and his Umma comrades quickly asserted their influence on the 
revolutionary regime. Babu believed that they transformed a ‘lumpen uprising’ into a ‘popular, anti-
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imperialist revolution’.104 Two moderate ministers, Othman Shariff and Hasnu Makame, were 
reassigned to overseas diplomatic positions and replaced by two ASP socialists, Hassan Moyo and 
Abdulaziz Twala.105 
Although Umma was dissolved on 20 January, the presence of Babu and Hanga in Karume’s 
government triggered panic in the West. Washington feared that the revolution had been either 
backed by outside communist forces or would offer openings for Marxist encroachment. Echoing a 
climate of Cold War anxieties, as already evidenced by events in Congo, the American ambassador 
to Tanganyika warned that Zanzibar could become ‘a base for subversive and insurgency 
operations against [the] mainland from Kenya to the Cape.’ The New York Times suggested that 
‘Zanzibar is on the verge of becoming the Cuba of Africa’.106 Britain and the United States 
consequently delayed their recognition of the Karume regime. Washington even tried to pressure 
London into military intervention in the islands.107 
While the West prevaricated, socialist states established close relations with Zanzibar. Aid and 
from the communist world poured into the islands, including a $518,000 grant from China. 
Moscow agreed to purchase $318,000 in stockpiled cloves, Zanzibar’s staple export. Babu became 
the first foreign minister of a non-communist Third World regime to recognise the GDR, which 
made an ambitious commitment to build apartment blocks to house 40,000 Zanzibaris.108 On 8 
March, Karume announced the nationalisation of all land.109 By delaying recognition of the new 
regime, the United States thus helped the emergence of the very spectre of Third World 
communism of which it was so afraid. 
The Dar es Salaam mutiny 
As the revolution unfolded in Zanzibar, Western fears about communist insurrection in East Africa 
were heightened by a near simultaneous army mutiny in Dar es Salaam. On 19 January, soldiers of 
the Tanganyika Rifles at the Colito barracks raided an armoury, arrested their officers, set up 
roadblocks, and took control of government buildings. They surrounded State House, the 
president’s residence. Nyerere had already taken flight, leaving Oscar Kambona, his foreign 
minister, to negotiate with the mutineers. A sense of contagious rebellion was encouraged by the 
outbreak of separate mutinies in Kenya and Uganda. After days of rioting and rumour, on 24 
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January Nyerere called for British help. The following morning, British commandos seized control 
of the barracks, to little resistance.110 
Like events in Zanzibar, the origins of the mutiny lay not in communist subversion, but 
grievances with the decolonisation settlement. The mutineers were disaffected by low pay, poor 
living conditions, and the government’s decision to retain white European officers within the army, 
rather than fully embrace a policy of Africanisation. While the government struggled to regain 
control of the situation, its discovery of documents appearing to connect the mutineers with a 
broader coup plot, involving trade union leaders, pushed Nyerere into calling for the British 
military intervention.111 Putting a gloss on a situation that revealed the fragility of the Tanganyikan 
government, Paul Bjerk claims that Nyerere’s response to mutiny was a demonstration of his 
brilliant statesmanship, a ‘spectacle of power by a sovereign head of state, exercising authority both 
within the nation and as a member of the international community.’112 Yet the resort to military 
intervention from the former colonial occupier was a major embarrassment to Nyerere, who 
described ‘a week of most grievous shame for our nation’.113 
Moreover, the scarring effects of the mutiny continued to be visible in Nyerere’s policy for years 
to come. After the mutiny, Nyerere set about consolidating the hold of the party over the apparatus 
of the state. He disbanded the Tanganyika Rifles and replaced it with the Tanzania People’s 
Defence Force (TPDF), which was closely tied to TANU. To minimise the potential for the army 
to develop into a rival power bloc, service was limited to three years. Brigadier Mrisho Sarakikya, a 
Nyerere loyalist, was appointed head of the armed forces.114 The government dissolved the 
Tanganyika Federation of Labour, the main trade union, and established the National Union of 
Tanganyika Workers (NUTA), a state-affiliated umbrella organisation.115 In February, Nyerere 
began the process of turning Tanganyika into a formal one-party state, which was officially 
promulgated with the 1965 constitution. In late 1964, TANU introduced a system of dividing urban 
communities into ten-house ‘cells’, as a means of monitoring grassroots politics.116 Rather than 
being the masterclass in statecraft that Bjerk suggests, the mutiny therefore revealed to Nyerere the 
weakness of his government and prompted TANU to extend its control over the political system. 
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The creation of Tanzania 
On 23 April 1964, Tanzanian radio suddenly announced that Nyerere and Karume had signed an 
act of union, which brought together the mainland with Zanzibar to form the state that later 
became the United Republic of Tanzania. Although there had been secret discussions between the 
two governments since the revolution in January, the announcement came as a surprise. Under the 
constitutional arrangements, Zanzibar would cede control of several powers, including its foreign 
and defence policy, to a union government based on the mainland, but maintain control of most of 
its own internal affairs.117 Introducing the bill, Nyerere explain that the union was motivated by 
pan-African sentiment. ‘There is no other reason’, he said. ‘It is an insult to Africa to read cold war 
politics into every move towards African Unity […] We do not propose this Union in order to 
support any of the ‘isms of this world.’118 Immediately afterwards several Zanzibaris, including 
Babu and Hanga, took up positions in the new union government. 
No matter has been more fiercely debated in the history of contemporary Tanzania than the act 
of union. Buying into Nyerere’s public rhetoric, some argue that the union was the realisation of his 
genuine pan-Africanism.119 Others present it as a Cold War conspiracy, in which Nyerere and the 
United States engineered the union to crush the Zanzibar Revolution. While this view is most often 
heard from Zanzibaris disenchanted by the status quo today, it can also be found in the 
historiography. Amrit Wilson, collaborating with Babu, depicts the union as an example of 
American imperialism in the Third World and castigates Nyerere as its marionette.120 Neither the 
‘pan-African’ or the ‘Cold War conspiracy’ argument receive much support from the archival 
record. As Ethan Sanders has shown, American documents demonstrate that union was not 
initiated by the West, though it came with Washington’s approval.121 
Between these two poles, the scholarly literature largely accepts that the union was a product of 
clandestine collusion between Nyerere and Karume, each concerned about the political fate of 
Zanzibar. Still rattled by the mutiny, Nyerere feared that Zanzibar’s radical leftward shift would 
invite unwelcome Cold War politics to the East African coast, including the possibility of an 
American intervention.122 He threatened to withdraw 300 Tanganyikan policemen from Zanzibar, 
who had been dispatched to the islands on the request of Karume after the coup.123 Karume had 
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his own reasons for pursuing the union. Babu, Hanga, and the other radicals in the Revolutionary 
Council were consolidating their hold on government, especially with the arrival of vast amounts of 
communist aid. Anxious to maintain his grasp on power, Karume exchanged Zanzibar’s autonomy 
for security, glossed with a pan-African veneer. 
The union sailed through the Tanganyikan parliament, but its passage in Zanzibar was mired in 
legal opacity. The articles were never formally ratified by the Revolutionary Council, but merely 
discussed. Some of its members were unwilling to cede the islands’ autonomy: one former Umma 
cadre, Khamis Ameir, later claimed that he had argued that the articles should be put before the 
people of Zanzibar in a referendum.124 Hanga made an impassioned plea in favour of the union; he 
and Twala had been among the few Zanzibaris who were involved in the negotiations.125 
Babu’s immediate reaction is difficult to ascertain. When the act of union was signed, he was in 
Indonesia, negotiating a triangular trade agreement that also involved the GDR. Babu first received 
notice about the union on 23 April, on a stopover in Pakistan en route back to East Africa. He 
immediately hastened his return. Speaking to the press first in Karachi and then while transiting 
through Nairobi, Babu gave his vague support for the union, although eyewitnesses thought he was 
putting on a ‘brave face’.126 In his later writings, following personal conflicts with both Karume and 
Nyerere that are explained below, Babu was deeply critical of the union. He believed that Nyerere 
had caved in to American pressure to derail the Zanzibar Revolution.127 Other accounts suggest 
that Babu was initially supportive of the union, as a means of giving him a wider arena to realise his 
socialist goals.128 In the weeks immediately after the revolution, he had been involved in discussions 
about a potential East African federation with Tanganyikan representatives. However, the 
deliberate timing of the signing of the act to coincide with Babu’s absence, plus evidence that 
Kambona and Hanga pressed ahead urgently with preparations, suggests that both Tanganyikan 
and Zanzibari negotiators felt that Babu was a likely obstacle to the union.129 
The impact of the transfer of Zanzibari politicians to the mainland government has been largely 
overlooked by historians. Babu became minister of state in the directorate of planning, part of the 
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president’s office; Hanga became minister of industry, mines and power.130 Former members of the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the paramilitary wing of the banned Umma party, were also 
moved to the mainland. Those historians who do comment on the impact of the revolutionaries on 
the position of the unified government do so rather reductively, assuming a causal connection 
between Babu and Hanga and Tanzania’s turn towards Beijing, explained below.131 
Certainly, Babu provided a radical voice within the cabinet over the following years. He played a 
crucial role in facilitating the deepening of Tanzania’s relationship with China, which welcomed the 
union as an opportunity to extend its influence to the mainland.132 Yet the ujamaa project that 
Nyerere later embarked upon with the Arusha Declaration in 1967 ran counter to Babu’s own 
ideological inclinations. In his first position in the directorate of planning, Babu was sandwiched 
between two less radical ministers of state, Amir Jamal and Nsilo Swai, all immediately responsible 
to Nyerere.133 Babu’s efforts to push ujamaa down a more leftward path ultimately had little impact. 
The case of Hanga is more clear-cut. Addressing parliament in July 1964, Hanga outlined an 
economic strategy which emphasised the need for large-scale farming and the development of 
heavy industry, redolent of the Soviet Five Year plans of the 1930s.134 These calls for Stalinisation 
received no sympathy from Nyerere, nor the Soviet Union: a Tanzanian delegation to Moscow in 
August 1964 experienced a cold reception. The Soviet authorities rejected any involvement in major 
infrastructure or development projects.135 This response reflected Soviet disillusionment with sub-
Saharan Africa in the early 1960s, as post-colonial African leaders proved hostile to Moscow’s often 
intrusive approach and narrow conceptions of revolutionary development.136 In a cabinet reshuffle 
in November 1964, Hanga was moved to the less influential position of minister for union 
affairs.137 
The most enduring consequence of the transfer of Babu and Hanga to the union government 
was the residual ties they maintained with their supporters in Zanzibar. As the regime there 
descended into what Babu later described as ‘one of the worst bungling and tyrannical petit-
bourgeois despotisms in Africa’, he and Hanga became increasingly embittered with Karume, who 
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continued to perceive the radical ministers as a threat to his own authority.138 These entanglements 
created a political headache for Nyerere, whom Karume regularly pressured into taking action 
against the ‘exiles’ on the mainland. As chapters 6 and 7 show, the embroilment of Babu and Hanga 
in Zanzibari affairs would play a major role in Tanzania’s political struggles in the ujamaa years. 
More generally, the nature in which the act of union was passed meant it became a permanent 
source of friction in Tanzanian politics. ‘Whatever complex mix of motives impelled various 
actors,’ writes Ronald Aminzade, ‘the reality is that the process of unification was accomplished in a 
top-down, undemocratic manner. This meant that the Union was sure to be an ongoing source of 
conflicts and that the creation of a unified nation would remain more of an aspiration than a 
reality.’139 While arguments about the legality of the act itself seem largely obsolete given that the 
ASP had seized power through unconstitutional means and then proceeded to rule with scant 
respect for any law after the union, the matter continues to be a major bone of contention in 
present-day Tanzania.140 Nyerere’s union government never gained the authority it sought over 
Zanzibar. Although the Marxist drift of Karume’s regime was brought to heel, principled socialism 
gave way to racial oppression and despotism. The union dynamic was, the Economist reflected, akin 
to a python which had swallowed its prey, but had failed fully to digest it.141 
The foreign policy crises of 1964-65 
In the aftermath of the upheavals of early 1964, Tanzania experienced a series of political crises 
with major Western powers, each demonstrating the dangers inherent in the dynamic created by the 
intersection of the Cold War and African decolonisation. The first was a complex diplomatic 
struggle involving both German states. Babu’s decision to recognise East Germany during the 
‘Hundred Days’ of the Zanzibar Revolution had a far-reaching impact. Under the terms of the so-
called Hallstein Doctrine, Bonn refused to maintain diplomatic relations with any state which 
recognised the GDR. Having been initially assured by the revolutionary regime that it would not 
open relations with the GDR, the West Germans had been dismayed by subsequent developments. 
Bonn therefore welcomed the act of union, especially when Nyerere announced that all embassies 
on the islands would be closed. However, the East Germans – and their Zanzibari partners, 
including Babu – were unwilling to concede the gains they had made. This placed the union 
government in a dilemma, in which Nyerere’s non-aligned stance was challenged by the 
particularities of the ‘German question’. Affording equal recognition to the GDR would represent a 
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neutralist position on paper. But in reality, it would be interpreted as major gesture of friendship 
towards the Eastern Bloc, thereby inviting Cold War politics into Tanzania and jeopardising its 
good relations with Bonn.142 
The period of Anerkennungsdiplomatie (‘diplomacy of recognition’) which followed proved 
divisive, both in terms of Tanzania’s external relations and within the country. Ministers who had 
been involved in negotiating aid packages from West Germany, such as Paul Bomani and Austin 
Shaba, baulked at upsetting a donor partner, prompting a serious crisis within the cabinet.143 
Nyerere eventually offered a compromise. In February 1965, the government announced that the 
GDR would be permitted to maintain its representation in Zanzibar, downgraded to the level of a 
consulate, but would only be allowed a low-status consulate-general in Dar es Salaam. This did not 
constitute official recognition. The GDR reluctantly accepted the deal. However, Bonn reacted by 
withdrawing a team of military advisors from Tanzania. In response, Nyerere declared that 
Tanzania would forgo all aid agreements already reached with Bonn, worth around $32.5 million. 
Since independence, West Germany had been the country’s third largest bilateral aid donor.144 As 
Nyerere later wrote, ‘we had to choose whether to become a puppet state of Germany in return for 
any charity she cared to give us.’145 Although relations between Tanzania and West Germany 
deteriorated, Nyerere demonstrated the priority he afforded to non-alignment over economic 
concerns: he would not be blackmailed in the name of Cold War interests. Yet his principled 
foreign policy, which was intended to keep Tanzania aloof from Cold War tensions, ultimately had 
the opposite effect. As chapter 3 shows, Anerkennungsdiplomatie in Tanzania did not end in 1965. 
Instead, the presence of East and West German representations turned Dar es Salaam into a key 
battlefield in this Cold War subplot, as the icy tensions played out across the Berlin Wall were 
transposed to the Tanzanian capital. 
As Tanzania became caught up in the triangle of Anerkennungsdiplomatie, its relations with 
Washington were jolted by two controversies that demonstrated the pervasive influence of Cold 
War politics in post-colonial Africa. In November 1964, the Tanzanian ambassador to Congo 
brought a clutch of photocopies back to Dar es Salaam. They appeared to be letters sent by an 
official at the American embassy in Leopoldville to a mercenary, offering him financial support for 
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a Portuguese-backed coup to topple the Tanzanian government. Nyerere was on vacation at the 
time and entrusted the issue to Kambona, his foreign minister. Rather than calmly summoning the 
American ambassador, as Nyerere might have done, Kambona chose to print the incendiary text of 
the letters in full in the Nationalist, the TANU newspaper, before making the accusations official at 
a press conference.146 
The American ambassador, William Leonhart, quickly concluded that the letters were poor 
forgeries. Addressing a mass demonstration on his return to Dar es Salaam, Nyerere sought to 
defuse the situation, by challenging the Americans to show that the letters were untrue and asking 
for sympathy. What other reaction, he pointed out, could be expected from Tanzania, given the 
threat posed by Portugal and Washington’s own hostility towards his country since the Zanzibar 
Revolution? In December, Nyerere publicly announced that he had accepted an American 
statement that the letters were fakes, although he did not offer a full apology. The letters’ origins 
remain shrouded in mystery. One source has claimed that they were forged by the Czechoslovakian 
secret services as part of an anti-American disinformation campaign in Africa. Bjerk, citing tenuous 
evidence in the Portuguese archives, argues that Lisbon intended to frame Kambona, by 
deliberately feeding him documents that would be revealed to be forgeries, in order to smear him as 
a communist sympathiser.147 
Two months after the ‘letter plot’, the United States was at the centre of another scandal in 
Tanzania. On 15 January 1965, the Tanzanian government suddenly announced the expulsion of 
two American diplomats: Frank Carlucci, consul in Zanzibar, and Robert Gordon, deputy chief-of-
mission in Dar es Salaam. The origins of the affair were innocuous. Discussing the appropriate 
American response to the first anniversary of the Zanzibar Revolution over the telephone, the pair 
felt that simple statement of congratulations from Carlucci alone would be insufficient, and that 
‘bigger guns’ were needed – a reference to a potential visit to Zanzibar by the under-secretary of 
state for Africa, G. Mennen ‘Soapy’ Williams. A Stasi-trained Zanzibari intelligence officer, listening 
in on the conversation, interpreted the figurative expression literally and believed he had uncovered 
an American plot against the Karume regime. Both Carlucci and his assistant in Zanzibar at the 
time, Don Petterson, have alleged that the tape had been doctored by the East Germans. On this 
occasion, Nyerere seemed genuinely convinced that the threat was real. However, he made clear 
that any plot was a private matter involving two rogue officials and that neither the State 
Department nor Leonhart were implicated. Yet if his aim here was to prevent the further 
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deterioration of relations with Washington, Nyerere failed, as the Tanzanian ambassador was 
swiftly expelled from the United States.148 
The crisis over decolonisation in Rhodesia occasioned a rupture with Britain far worse than the 
disputes with West Germany and the United States. As Britain withdrew from Africa in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, the white minority in the settler colony of Rhodesia refused to concede 
power. The collapse of the Central African Federation in 1963 pushed white Rhodesians into an 
increasingly reactionary stance. On 11 November 1965, Prime Minister Ian Smith issued a 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), whereby Rhodesia cut its ties to London without 
making concessions to racial equality. The bold rhetoric with which Harold Wilson’s Labour 
government responded in Britain was not matched by coercive action, which was limited to the 
enforcement of economic sanctions.149 
UDI provoked uproar in Tanzania. The banned Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) 
and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) had previously joined the exiled liberation 
movements in Dar es Salaam. In early December, the OAU committed all its member states to 
breaking off diplomatic relations with Britain if it did not crush the rebellion and pave the way for 
majority rule by 15 December. When the ultimatum expired, Tanzania was one of nine African 
states to sever its relations with London. As with the German imbroglio, the decision came at a 
severe cost, as Britain froze a £7.5 million loan. This was later cancelled after Tanzania announced 
in 1967 that it would cease to pay pensions to British expatriates who had worked for the 
Tanganyikan government prior to independence. Nyerere remained steadfast to the principle of ‘no 
independence before majority African rule’. 
In a move characteristic of Nyerere’s tempered diplomacy, the break in formal relations did not 
mean an end to contact between Britain and Tanzania. Nyerere kept open communication channels 
to the Wilson government via Malcolm MacDonald, London’s special representative to East Africa. 
In January 1968, each of the other eight African states resumed relations with Britain. As this 
African front crumbled, Nyerere decided to return to the negotiating table and formal diplomatic 
ties were resumed in July. However, to avoid the appearance of having caved in for economic 
reasons, Nyerere’s volte face was not accompanied by the resumption of pensions to former 
government employees. Britain responded by cancelling all aid and technical assistance to 
Tanzania.150 The Rhodesian question remained a touchstone in Anglo-Tanzanian relations up to 
Zimbabwean independence in 1980. British diplomats in Dar es Salaam warned that any sign of 
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concession to the Smith regime was inimical to London’s interests in Tanzania. A Rhodesian 
settlement ‘unfavourable to African opinion’, the high commissioner reflected in 1968, would end 
Nyerere’s relatively good relations with the West, ‘a situation which Communist Governments 
(particularly Peking) would relish as a success scored by them without effort on their part.’151 
By early 1965, Tanzania had therefore become embroiled in diplomatic rows with its three 
largest donors of bilateral aid, including the world’s foremost superpower and two of its closest 
allies. These incidents show how Nyerere’s principles of non-alignment and African liberation, 
articulated as a commitment to a more just global order, brought him into direct conflict with 
countries with quite different ambitions. The two German states pursued their own national 
agenda. The United States, rattled by the immediate memory of the Zanzibar Revolution, as well as 
events in Congo, interpreted local affairs in almost exclusively Cold War terms. Britain’s attention 
was devoted to smoothing the rocky process of decolonising its most intransigent settler 
community. While in the period since independence Tanzania had gradually weaned itself off an 
overwhelming reliance on external aid, the cuts in donor support from West Germany and 
especially Britain forced Nyerere to rethink his development strategy.152 
The turn to Beijing 
The disputes with Britain, the United States, and West Germany demonstrated to Nyerere that 
attempting to maintain his chosen course of foreign policy – non-alignment plus anticolonialism – 
in a Cold War environment required a diversification of Tanzania’s sources of aid. A Canadian 
military mission was employed to train the new TPDF. The Nordic countries also provided 
technical expertise. Support from these smaller states was understandably limited, however. For all 
its claims to the leadership of the progressive world, the Soviet Union showed little generosity, with 
any loan agreements tied to strict economic conditions.153 Communist China, on the other hand, 
represented a powerful donor partner, more sympathetic towards Tanzania. 
The Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s led to intense competition between the former 
communist allies for influence among the decolonising states in Africa. As Jeremy Friedman argues, 
whereas Moscow propounded an ‘anti-capitalist’ revolution grounded in the origins of the October 
Revolution among an urban industrial workforce, Beijing’s own historical experience led it to frame 
its own revolutionary visions in distinctly anticolonial terms.154 The experience of China, a fellow 
poor, non-white, Third World state, chimed with the leaders of post-colonial states. ‘Mao’s 
identification of the Third World as the united international proletariat battling against imperialism’, 
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writes Odd Arne Westad, ‘was attractive for many Third World communists and left-wingers.’ 
Once the disastrous industrialisation policy of the ‘Great Leap Forward’ had been abandoned, 
Mao’s refocused attention on rural development and mass mobilisation appealed to African 
leaders.155 
Through a mixture of pragmatic donor politics and a degree of ideological confluence, by the 
end of the 1960s Tanzania had become China’s main partner in Africa. While relations between 
China and Tanganyika existed before the union with Zanzibar,156 they quickly deepened afterwards, 
facilitated by Babu’s presence in the government. In June 1964, Babu accompanied second vice-
president Rashidi Kawawa to Beijing, where the Tanzanian delegation received a warm welcome. 
Kawawa returned with a £16 million aid package. In February 1965, another trip to Beijing by Babu 
paved the way for an official state visit by Nyerere.157 Nyerere was impressed by what he saw. ‘If it 
were possible for me to lift all the ten million Tanzanians and bring them to China to see what you 
have done since the liberation, I would do so’, he said.158 
The most consequential development of Nyerere’s trip was China’s tacit agreement to support 
the construction of a railway between the port at Dar es Salaam and the copperbelt of landlocked 
Zambia, which was hemmed in by the laager of white-minority rule. This problem was exacerbated 
by Rhodesia’s UDI. In September 1967, China, Tanzania, and Zambia signed a tripartite agreement, 
under which Beijing pledged an interest-free $415 million loan to fund the 1,860 kilometre-long 
TAZARA railway.159 Work began in 1970 and was completed in 1974. Some 30,000-40,000 Chinese 
workers were involved: an enormous figure, but well short of the grossly distorted estimates 
offered by some Western observers at the time. Blending a major modernisation project with the 
spirit of anticolonialism, as Jamie Monson argues, the railway was part of China’s drive to become a 
superpower while remaining a member of the Third World.160 
The announcement of the railway agreement revived the spectres in the West which had been 
conjured up by the revolution in Zanzibar three years earlier. The Wall Street Journal cautioned that 
‘the prospect of hundreds and perhaps thousands of Red Guards descending upon already troubled 
Africa is a chilling one to the West.’161 Diplomats in Dar es Salaam were disturbed by the activities 
of their Chinese colleagues. ‘The Chinese are hostile, arrogant, secretive and clannish interlopers in 
what was until recently a western preserve’, wrote the British high commissioner in 1970. ‘They are 
dedicated to supplanting us in it.’162 By 1971, Beijing was Tanzania’s largest bilateral aid partner.163 
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Conscious of the need to maintain both his reputation as a non-aligned leader and the 
confidence of non-communist donor states, Nyerere continually asserted that Tanzania was not a 
Chinese puppet. He and Kenneth Kaunda, president of Zambia, had sought – and would have 
preferred – Western support for the railway, but none was forthcoming. Nyerere bristled at the 
accusation that he was contradicting his own non-aligned stance. ‘Unfortunately money has taken 
up a position. There is Red Money and there is Blue Money – all the money in this world is either 
Red or Blue. I do not have my own Green money, so where can I get it from? I am not taking up a 
Cold War position.’164 As subsequent chapters demonstrate, Nyerere took care to not antagonise 
the other superpowers, concerned that any criticism might be construed as further evidence of 
Chinese influence. 
Much of the literature written during the Cold War on China’s role in Tanzania (and Africa 
more widely) reflects the politics of the era.165 Often high in detail, but low in analysis and 
Sinocentric in focus, it frames China’s involvement in Africa in terms of superpower rivalries.166 
These accounts find echoes in some recent work, which rather simplistically seeks to provide a 
historical context for a renewed Chinese ‘scramble for Africa’.167 More productively, historians have 
relocated the study of Sino-Tanzanian relations, to study not just its geopolitical aspects, but the 
shared ideological connections between the two states. Whereas one earlier book described these as 
‘tenuous at best’,168 more textured accounts based on archival research show how ujamaa drew 
inspiration from the Chinese experience, especially its emphasis on rural development, frugality, 
and disciplined labour. Rather than being a Cold War construct, this relationship was underpinned 
by Afro-African solidarities, founded on the shared experience of colonial oppression and common 
economic underdevelopment.169 
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Revisiting the Arusha Declaration 
On 5 February 1967, following a meeting of its National Executive Committee (NEC), TANU 
issued a major party document. ‘The policy of TANU is to build a socialist state’, it boldly 
opened.170 The tone was polemical: 
We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited a great deal and we have been 
disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness that has led to our being oppressed, exploited and 
disregarded. Now we want a revolution – a revolution which brings to an end our weakness, so 
that we are never again exploited, oppressed, or humiliated.171 
To escape the constraints of a global economy that was weighted in favour of the wealthier states 
of Europe and North America, the Arusha Declaration called upon Tanzanians to build a state 
which was ‘self-reliant’ – a flexible principle with multiple meanings – rather than dependent on 
foreign aid or investment.172 The Declaration eschewed emphasis on industrial growth in 
preference for agricultural development. This principle would later underpin a campaign of mass 
resettlement of the peasantry into centralised ujamaa villages, as outlined in ‘Socialism and Rural 
Development’, another policy paper published the following September.173 
The Arusha Declaration represented the codification of Nyerere’s public rhetoric since uhuru, 
rendering the principles of ujamaa into a political manifesto. It was initially drafted by Nyerere and 
Kawawa. The ‘Arusha Resolution’ which concluded the document, later formalised as a ‘leadership 
code’, set out limitations on the economic activities of TANU and government leaders. They could 
not ‘be associated with the practices of capitalism and feudalism’, hold shares or directorships in 
private companies, or own houses for renting out to others.174 This reapplied language which had 
been previously used in both official and popular discourse to criticise economic ‘exploiters’ in the 
upper echelons of Tanzanian society.175 However, in affirming Tanzania’s commitment to 
socialism, the Arusha Declaration also set a radical tone for the extension of state control of the 
‘commanding heights’ of the economy. In the following days, Nyerere announced a raft of 
nationalisation measures. All commercial banks in the country were brought under government 
control, along with a number of multinational firms and import-export houses, either through 
wholesale nationalisation or the state’s acquisition of a majority share.176 
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The Arusha Declaration was a landmark moment in Tanzanian history. In his global history of 
the Third World, Vijay Prashad describes Arusha as a ‘bombshell’.177 The effect was electrifying: 
thousands of Tanzanians joined marches and demonstrations in support of the Declaration. As 
Emma Hunter argues, the Arusha Declaration – and especially the president’s personal association 
with it – became a banner under which Tanzanian nationalism rallied, guided by the figure of 
Nyerere.178 However, on the plane of high politics, the fallout was characterised as much by 
ideological and personal schisms as unity. As Lionel Cliffe recognises, the Arusha Declaration sent 
‘shock waves’ through the political elite, but this is ‘scarcely acknowledged’ in either official 
statements or scholarship.179 The tensions which accompanied the ratification of the Declaration by 
TANU are attested to in the political science literature, but without access to archival material, this 
analysis does not move beyond the level of abstraction.180 
These tensions were pregnant in the origins of the Arusha Declaration itself. Nyerere conceived 
it from a position of weakness rather than strength. By 1967, it was apparent that the prospects for 
continued economic growth in both the agrarian and industrial sectors were poor. A growing urban 
work force, swelled by numbers of young Tanzanians with secondary education, maintained 
expectations that the current structure of the economy could not meet. In rural areas, uhuru had 
brought little material progress to the peasantry.181 While the government outwardly projected a 
united front, there were cracks among the leadership. ‘There is no party at all’, Babu told the East 
German consul-general in October 1966. ‘There are only large groups and small groups and 
individuals with different and often contradictory attitudes to the same problems’.182 Events 
elsewhere in Africa, especially the coups in Ghana and Nigeria in 1966, heightened Nyerere’s sense 
of anxiety. The foreign policy crises of 1964-65 had occasioned disputes with three of the country’s 
main donor states. Foreign investment in Tanzania had also proved disappointing. 
Internal discontent mounted. There was growing criticism of a governing class – the wabenzi, 
‘those who own Mercedes-Benz’ – that appeared to be profiting from the fruits of independence, 
while the masses suffered. A confrontation between Nyerere and students of University College, 
Dar es Salaam, epitomised these tensions. In November 1966, the students staged a demonstration 
in which they declared their unwillingness to participate in a proposed programme of compulsory 
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National Service for all university graduates. Pointing to the high salaries that civil servants and 
politicians earned, the students claimed that they were being unfairly treated while the ruling classes 
made no sacrifice to the nation. Nyerere reacted angrily. ‘You are demanding a pound of flesh; 
everybody is demanding a pound of flesh except the poor peasant’, he railed.183 Although the 
student demonstrators were subsequently rusticated, the disparities between the privileged few and 
the poorer masses which their demands had highlighted pushed Nyerere into action. 
The principle of ‘self-reliance’ stressed in the Arusha Declaration was a response to the 
economic underdevelopment of Tanzania. However, the proposed solution to the question of 
economic injustices within the country, the ‘leadership code’, was more problematic. TANU 
members were reluctant to adhere to the restrictions on their ability to earn income from houses or 
shares. The leadership rules dominated debate at a meeting of the NEC to discuss the text of the 
Arusha Declaration in January 1967. Cognisant of this opposition, Nyerere added nationalisation to 
the Arusha package to sweeten the pill of the leadership code to the TANU elite: this was Nyerere’s 
‘intellectual coup’.184 Unlike the new leadership rules, which mainly affected the African members 
of the party and political elite, the nationalisations were popular measures that targeted mainly 
European- and Asian-owned businesses. Under the influence of the NEC, the Arusha Declaration 
took on a more radical appearance than Nyerere had initially planned. As he subsequently stressed, 
self-reliance, rather than nationalisation, was initially intended to be the main thrust of the 
document.185 
Opposition to the Arusha Declaration among the political elite came from multiple sources. 
Several more radical ministers and party members thought Arusha socialism was ideologically 
misplaced. Babu opposed the spree of nationalisations, arguing that a longer preparation time was 
required.186 On 22 February, he was switched from the position of minister for commerce and 
cooperatives to the less economically-sensitive role of minister for health. Kambona and his close 
ally, Dennis Phombeah, informed Eastern Bloc officials that Babu had been moved due to his 
failure to draw up a list of foreign firms for nationalisation, as instructed by Nyerere.187 Undeterred, 
Babu warned the East African Central Legislative Assembly in Nairobi in May against overreliance 
on agricultural exports, which were vulnerable to fluctuations in the global marketplace. East Africa 
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could not afford to become a region of ‘banana republics’ and therefore had to develop its heavy 
industry.188 
Other voices challenged Nyerere from the left. At a TANU special conference to discuss the 
implications of Arusha in March, Joseph Kasella Bantu suggested a radical programme of action, 
including the nationalisation of all property and the development of an ideologically-committed 
vanguard party. Nyerere rejected the idea.189 Interviewed in Jeune Afrique, Kambona stated that there 
was no such thing of ‘African socialism’, only an undefined ‘scientific socialism’ – though he made 
it clear that this did not mean doctrinaire Marxism-Leninism. Like Bantu, Kambona called for the 
establishment of an avant-garde TANU party, capable of ‘leading the masses towards socialism.’190 
Seeking to dampen this leftist foment within Tanzania and calm Western fears, Nyerere used a 
set-piece speech in Cairo in April to set clear distance between ujamaa and Soviet-style Marxism. 
Criticising the ‘theology’ of socialism, he stated that 
we have the peculiar position where leaders grappling with existing problems are denounced, or 
approved, on the grounds that they are – or are not – acting in accordance with the book – or 
one person’s interpretation of the book […] I think that this idea that there is one ‘pure 
socialism’, for which its recipe is already known, is an insult to human intelligence.191 
Other discontent with the Arusha Declaration predictably stemmed from the conditions of the 
leadership code. Some felt that the terms had been imposed unjustly, without warning: to dissent in 
public would have been political suicide. The election of 1965 had demonstrated that standing MPs 
were far from safe in their seats, under the highly competitive politics of one-party democracy. One 
former MP told an interviewer in 1988 that the conditions were like ‘someone holding a sharp knife 
to one’s side in such a way that it could not be pulled away without getting hurt.’192 Bibi Titi 
Mohamed, a veteran of the independence struggle, resigned as head of the Tanzania Women’s 
Union (Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania, UWT) and from the TANU Central Committee. At the 
time, she publically ascribed her decision to back pains; rumour speculated that she did not want to 
give up her private properties.193 Kambona’s radical critique of ujamaa socialism may also have been 
camouflage for his more self-interested objections: according to the Polish embassy, he had three 
houses in Tanzania and large sums of money stashed away in European bank accounts.194  
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The June 1967 government reshuffle 
On 7 June, Nyerere announced a major cabinet reshuffle. As a consequence of disputes between 
the government and NUTA, Michael Kamaliza was replaced as minister for labour. Kassim Hanga 
was dropped as minister for union affairs, almost certainly due to pressure placed on Nyerere by 
Karume, with whom Hanga had experienced a troubled relationship since the union three years 
earlier.195 Babu switched position again, becoming minister for lands, settlement, and water 
development. Ministers Paul Bomani (economic affairs and planning), Derek Bryceson (agriculture 
and cooperatives), and Amir Jamal (finance) all kept their cabinet posts. 
The retention of Bryceson, Bomani, and Jamal in portfolios with key economic responsibilities 
demonstrated Nyerere’s concern to prioritise competent administration over political revolution. 
Bomani had privately expressed disquiet over the principles of Arusha socialism, telling the 
journalist Judith Listowel that ‘Julius is out of his mind’ and that ‘we will not live under a crazy 
Nyerere dynasty’.196 Bomani and Jamal were committed to increasing production through private 
capital investment. Nyerere himself had recognised the need to maintain the confidence of external 
investors when he brought a swift end to the post-Arusha swathe of nationalisations to prevent an 
exodus of foreign capital. In a speech in August, Nyerere clarified that overseas aid and investment 
was still welcome, ‘where it acts as a catalyst for Tanzanian activity.’197 ‘To have revolutions just for 
the sake of having them is to commit a deception on our people’, Jamal reminded parliament.198 
The reshuffle reassured Western onlookers. The French ambassador’s snap judgement was that 
Nyerere had placed in key economic positions men ‘who were not suspected of colluding with 
extreme-left subversion’ and ‘capable of inspiring confidence after the caprices of the Arusha 
Declaration.’199 
However, the most significant change in the reshuffle was Kambona’s relegation to the 
position of minister for local government and rural development. Kambona promptly resigned 
from both his new government role and as secretary-general of TANU, citing ill health. The 
previous year, Kambona had travelled to the Netherlands for treatment for high blood pressure. 
However, by mid-1967 he was cured.200 Rather, the marginalisation of Kambona stemmed from 
intra-party feuding, the circumstances of which remain murky. In September 1965, he had been 
transferred from the powerful role of minister for external affairs, when Nyerere brought the 
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portfolio under his own control. Kambona was believed to be locked in a power struggle with 
Kawawa and, through his associations with Hanga, also to have incurred the wrath of Karume.201  
Nyerere’s cabinet reshuffle flushed differences into the open. On 11 June, Kambona – flanked 
by Hanga – addressed 10,000 of his constituents in Morogoro, where he made veiled criticisms of 
Nyerere’s authoritarian tendencies and claimed part-authorship of the Arusha Declaration.202 The 
Nationalist printed an anonymous article, described by an American diplomat as a ‘doctrinaire 
socialist harangue’, which was understood to be the work of Babu. It jarred with the coverage of a 
speech by Nyerere in the same issue of 19 June, entitled ‘No Bible for Development’, which 
reiterated the line of his Cairo address.203 Debates in parliament witnessed heated clashes and the 
budget passed by just 69 votes to 37 – a low turnout for an assembly of over 200 members.204 A 
wild ‘bazaar rumour’ in Dar es Salaam held that a coup was being hatched by Kambona, Kamaliza, 
Hanga, and Babu. The British lent this little credence, but its existence was indicative of the 
anxieties that gripped the elite.205 
In mid-July, these simmering tensions boiled over. On 21 July, the government announced that 
Eli Anangisye and Hamisi Salumu, formerly Hanga’s bodyguard,206 had been placed in detention 
because of subversive activities, confirming rumours that had been circulating for a number of 
days. Anangisye was a disaffected and hot-headed MP, who had been sacked as the secretary-
general of the TANU Youth League (TYL) in March after he was involved in an attack on the 
recently-nationalised General Bank of the Netherlands, in which a portrait of the Dutch Queen 
Juliana was defaced.207 Although the exact circumstances surrounding these arrests are hazy, it 
seems that on 15 July Nyerere called a meeting of MPs at State House. He warned them that 
neither opposition to the Arusha Declaration nor the spreading of rumours would not be tolerated. 
Anangisye then went immediately to Lugalo barracks on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam, where he 
reportedly tried to incite troops in agitating against the government.208 On 23 July, three more men 
– all known Kambona associates – were arrested on charges of subversion.209 
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Oscar Kambona’s flight into exile 
With his room for manoeuvre narrowing, Kambona fled Tanzania. Driving north, he made his way 
to Nairobi, from where he flew on to London. The Tanzanian government maintained its silence 
until 1 August, when it stated that Kambona had fled to Nairobi ‘with much money’ and without 
paying his income tax.210 On 10 August, Kambona gave an interview to a correspondent of the 
Standard, a privately owned Tanzanian newspaper. He alleged that there was a plot to remove 
Nyerere, involving the upper echelons of the Tanzanian security services and army.211 Nyerere 
responded by calling Kambona a liar. ‘Anybody who believes in this talk of conspiracy can well 
believe that his parents are donkeys’, he told a demonstration. ‘If you accept these lies you can well 
accept anything’.212 The pair thus started a verbal spat which ran on intermittently over the 
following years. 
The government painted its opponents in the tones of the Cold War. In an editorial published 
shortly after the announcement of the arrests of Anangisye and Salumu, the Nationalist piggybacked 
on a speech made by Nasser in Cairo to mark the anniversary of the Free Officers’ Coup, in which 
the Egyptian president warned against the neocolonial threat to Third World revolution. ‘Wananchi 
[citizens] must beware’, the editorial stated. ‘The imperialists may try to use local “politicians” to 
lure you with money.’213 Kambona was rumoured to have been in the pay of Moscow: the 
American embassy reported that Soviet diplomats exhibited ‘considerable agitation’ during the 
crisis.214 In May, Lady Chesham, an MP and Nyerere confidante, told the director of the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Tanzania that the president had proof 
that Kambona was receiving money from the Soviet Union. ‘We finally got him’, she said, 
indicating that ‘Nyerere was going to take some strong action against Kambona.’ Her prescient 
words and privileged position vis-à-vis the president suggests Nyerere harboured genuine fears 
about Kambona’s connections with the Eastern Bloc.215 
On 18 August, Hanga was dismissed from his position as vice-president of Zanzibar. No 
explanation was given. Phombeah’s services as a civil servant were ‘terminated’ by the government 
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on 29 August. By September, both had joined Kambona in exile in London. Ahmed Rajab, a 
journalist working for the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and former pupil of Hanga, who 
had been a schoolteacher in pre-revolutionary Zanzibar, recalled being introduced to both 
Kambona and Hanga at their apartment. According to Rajab, Hanga believed that he could safely 
return to Tanzania, since he had done nothing wrong – apparently ignorant of the damage done to 
his reputation by his association with the disgraced Kambona.216 
Hanga returned to Tanzania on 21 December, after a short stay in Conakry, where his wife 
lived. He claimed that he had been sent to Tanzania as an emissary by the Guinean president, 
Sékou Touré, in an attempt to patch-up the split between Kambona and Nyerere.217 Just ten days 
after his return to Tanzania, Hanga was placed in detention, alongside Kambona’s two brothers, 
Otini and Mattiya. Otini Kambona’s newspaper, Ulimwengu, was banned at the same time. 
Announcing the arrests, the party press stated that while constructive criticism of the government 
was welcome in Tanzania, unconstitutional attempts to change it were not.218 
The detention of Hanga pressed Kambona into a fresh assault on Nyerere from London. On 4 
January 1968, he issued a statement in which he accused the government of using preventive 
detention to muzzle opposition, describing Hanga’s imprisonment without trial as ‘a bleak chapter 
in the history of Tanzania.’ Kambona said that he had exercised restraint since fleeing to London, 
‘in the hope that sober counsel would be brought to bear, and so a halt be called to the dangerous 
situation which sheer dictatorship and dogmatism have brought about. Unfortunately, reason has 
now given way to emotional spasm and fear has become a spur to reckless action.’ Nyerere, he 
alleged, was ‘hiding behind a façade of democracy while quietly building himself into a dictator.’219 
In a speech to mark the anniversary of the Zanzibar Revolution, Nyerere responded with a 
blistering attack on Kambona, whom he branded ‘a traitor to Tanzania and Africa’, a ‘thief’, and a 
‘prostitute’.220 
At the same rally in Dar es Salaam, Hanga, under police guard, was paraded before the crowd. 
Nyerere called him an ‘idiot’, who had not accomplished anything as a minister. This humiliation 
followed another speech Nyerere had given in Zanzibar earlier in the day, where he claimed that 
Hanga had been detained after he started muttering that he had been called back by the TPDF(Z) 
to lead a coup.221 In an unconvincing interview with a Standard journalist, Hanga denied any 
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wrongdoing. He appeared astonishing oblivious to the implications of both his and Kambona’s 
decisions to flee the previous year.222 
Conclusion 
A year on from the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere had re-established his authority over the political 
situation in Tanzania. The demands imposed by the leadership code had catalysed existing frictions, 
which ran along ideological and personal faultlines, into intra-party feuding. As the American 
embassy concisely surmised in late August 1967, Nyerere had taken advantage of the post-Arusha 
public outpouring of nationalist fervour ‘to move against many of the more extreme elements in 
Tanzanian politics’, sidelining Babu, imprisoning Anangisye and Hanga, and forcing Kambona into 
exile. Important economic positions remained in the hands of trusted allies, like Paul Bomani, 
Bryceson, and Jamal.223 Nyerere’s relationship with key institutions, especially the TPDF and the 
security services, remained strong. 
However, high-profile political casualties of this consolidation of power – Kamaliza, Bibi Titi, 
and especially Kambona – remained at large. As chapter 6 shows, they would later form the core of 
a genuine plot to overthrow Nyerere. Hostilities between Hanga and Babu on the one hand, and 
the Karume regime in Zanzibar on the other, would also have major repercussions, as would 
Babu’s discontent with the ideological premises of Arusha socialism. In domestic politics, the 
events of 1967 therefore represented a decisive turning-point, clearing the ground of immediate 
political threats to the regime, but simultaneously sowing the seeds of vendetta among a future 
opposition. 
Yet while there had been a substantial transformation in Tanzania’s internal affairs since 
independence, its foreign policy had remained remarkably consistent.224 Some early commentators 
have argued the schisms with the West in 1964-65 and the move towards China suggested a 
complete rethinking of the country’s external affairs.225 This is a teleological reading of 
developments, however, ignoring the fact that as a small state, Tanzania’s actual foreign policy 
activity was on the whole necessarily reactive. Nyerere’s responses to various crises were consistent 
with the principles that had characterised his rhetoric since independence and which were then 
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formally elaborated in the Arusha Declaration.226 There was no ‘revision’ in Nyerere’s foreign 
policy, although the events of 1964-5 certainly consolidated his belief in non-alignment, attuned to 
a Cold War environment.227 The turn towards China was largely pragmatic, even if there were 
genuine ideological affinities between Maoism and ujamaa. 
Paul Bjerk argues that Nyerere’s idealism, present in the language of pan-Africanism and 
anticolonial liberation, ‘masks the fundamental realism of his thinking and Tanganyikan policy’.228 
Yet the actual policies which Nyerere’s principles occasioned led to rifts between Tanzania and 
powerful foreign states. They therefore damaged rather than improved the country’s prospects in 
the short term. If the future which Nyerere imagined was in his country’s best interests, the belief 
that it could be realised through his chosen means was distinctly idealistic: Bjerk’s interpretation 
thus becomes a victim of his own theoretical paradigm.  
The abstract frameworks of political scientists, writing without access to archival records, also 
oversimplify the complexities of the situation in Tanzania. Nyerere was not the sole actor in 
Tanzania’s relations with the rest of the world, but had to contend with rival ideological stances and 
personal ambitions. The resulting clashes took place in Dar es Salaam, transformed into a hive of 
political activity by Nyerere’s own foreign policy stances, plus the impact of the Zanzibar 
Revolution and the union. By the late 1960s, the city was thronged with liberation movement 
leaders, diplomats pursuing Cold War aims, a radical intelligentsia attracted by the allure of ujamaa, 
and a host of journalists and intelligence operatives who followed them. Dar es Salaam was a city 
on the frontline of global politics: the next chapter explores how these manifested themselves on a 
micropolitical scale. 
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Chapter 2 
Karibu Dar es Salaam: the political geography of a Cold War city 
In 1969, a Guardian journalist came to Dar es Salaam, on the trail of the guerrilla fighters. Like 
Kapuściński, he was struck by the international cosmopolitanism that characterised the terrace bar 
at the New Africa Hotel. 
Sit at one of the tables […] order your cup of tea or your glass of fresh lime, and even before it 
arrives you will be approached by a ragged young man in a patched khaki shirt. He carries a 
stock of little books bound in red plastic; you pay your three shillings and join the global 
fraternity of those who own a copy of the Thoughts of Chairman Mao. […] Turn then, as I did 
on the occasion I bought my own copy of the Mao book, to your table companion and brief 
yourself on the realities of Tanzania – and Africa – today. In my case it was an alert, youngish 
man who heads one of the 47 diplomatic missions now operating in Dar.229 
Five years on from Kapuściński’s visit, the New Africa – and the city of Dar es Salaam – still sat at 
the epicentre of international politics in sub-Saharan Africa. 
This chapter sets out the political geography of post-independence Dar es Salaam and its public 
sphere.230 The previous section provided a temporal context to post-colonial Tanzanian history; 
here, the aim is to anchor these narratives in a sense of space, to establish a structural gauze 
through which the narrative strands which follow can be understood. These overlapping political 
spaces in Dar es Salaam include physical places like the New Africa, but also less material 
formations: state institutions, media organs, and networks of communication within (and going 
beyond) the city. These structures were not static, but contoured by local actors, as well as 
developments outside of Tanzania. The colour and atmospherics of this descriptive tour d’horizon of 
the Tanzanian capital are also intended to provide the reader with a sense of immersion, permitting 
an imaginative leap back to a vibrant but unrecoverable past, to understand better the nature of a 
‘Cold War city’. 
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Dar es Salaam 
From its origins as a sleepy Swahili fishing village, Dar es Salaam had become a throbbing 
metropolis by the time of the Arusha Declaration. Between 1957 and 1967, it almost trebled in size, 
from 93,363 to 272,821 inhabitants. This population was overwhelmingly young: 78 per cent was 
under the age of 35. The port city was the country’s cultural, economic, and political hub. In 1967, 
Dar es Salaam handled 63 per cent of Tanzania’s export crops. It was also a city of dramatic 
contrast. Though dwindling in numbers by the late 1960s, the Asian population lived in the well-
do-to neighbourhood of Upanga and the city centre, while along the thoroughfares leading out of 
town sprung up insalubrious shanties like Buguruni and Ubungo. The latter earned the moniker 
Uwanja wa Fisi (‘Field of Hyenas’) because of the thriving local trade in illicit alcohol and 
prostitution. As a consequence of colonial-era urban planning, many Europeans, including foreign 
diplomats, lived in the leafy suburb of Oyster Bay, which abutted the slum settlement of Msasani.231 
Nyerere and his government were aware of the potential dangers of urban disorder. Dar es 
Salaam was the home of the Tanzanian ‘gatekeeper state’, but by the same logic was the only 
physical site where power could conceivably be seized, as the mutiny of 1964 demonstrated. Like 
the British colonial administration, the post-independence government was attuned to the demands 
of Dar es Salaam’s youthful population, the destabilising potential of strikes and riots, and the need 
to contain the city’s racial frictions between Africans and Asians. There was therefore a wider 
concern with urban order that stretched beyond the realpolitikal struggles among the elite upon 
which this thesis focuses. While Nyerere grounded his socialist vision in an idealistic image of rural 
Tanzania, the urban population was treated with suspicion and sometimes hostility. Urban-rural 
divides cut to the bone of ujamaa socialism, which emphasised agricultural transformation over 
heavy industrialisation, and portrayed Dar es Salaam’s poor as a parasitical lumpenproletariat, 
sucking blood from the national project.232 There were regular purges of the unemployed, as the 
government attempted to assert its control over urban space.233 
These tensions did not solely revolve around socioeconomic conceptions of Tanzania’s socialist 
future, but also involved a confrontation between Nyerere’s ‘national culture’ and the tropes of 
globalised modernity which flourished in the more permissive urban society of Dar es Salaam. As 
Andrew Ivaska has shown, elements of Western culture, such as miniskirts and jazz music, were 
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portrayed as a corrupting influence on the city’s young population and contrary to the ‘African’ 
traditions that formed the cultural spine of ujamaa socialism. ‘It was this “decadent city” that was 
the target of nearly all of TANU’s “cultural initiatives”’, writes Ivaska, ‘which, in an era of ujamaa 
ideology celebrating the rural, had the effect of producing the ugly foil against which a countryside 
of boundless productivity could be conjured up.’234 
The inclusive rhetoric of Nyerere’s visions of the nation – or taifa – under ujamaa socialism also 
set him on a collision course with deeper racial animosities between Tanzanians of African and 
Indian descent. The latter formed Dar es Salaam’s business community and rentier class. They 
remained socially aloof from the African population, which regarded them as ‘exploiters’ who 
resisted incorporation into the ujamaa family. Although Nyerere sought to avoid the racialisation of 
Tanzanian socialism, the disjuncture between ujamaa’s egalitarian principles and the class-based 
faultlines in Dar es Salaam, which split the urban population along racial lines, eventually forced the 
president’s hand. As the chapter 6 explains, in testing political and economic circumstances in 1971, 
the National Assembly passed the Building Acquisition Act. This nationalised all buildings worth 
over 100,000 shillings and not primarily occupied by their owner. However, while Dar es Salaam’s 
Asian population halved in size between 1962 and 1973, a small elite remained on favourable terms 
with the TANU party-state, which was reliant on Asian business connections for financial capital to 
drive forward the ujamaa project.235 
These socioeconomic and cultural tensions played out among the general population on the 
streets of Dar es Salaam, but their significance in the realm of high politics should not be 
underestimated. As explained in chapter 5, the TANU Youth League’s defence of the ‘national 
culture’ overlapped with its role in local protest against distant Cold War interventions. The 
denigration of the urban population was the analogue of the rural focus of ujamaa socialism, but it 
also represented an articulation of a distrust of the urban masses that traced its roots back to 
colonial government. This fear shared much common ground with concerns about external threats 
to the post-colonial state which seemed omnipresent in the ‘Cold War city’. 
Spaces 
The conduct of Tanzania’s official relations with the rest of the world was the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which operated out of a former colonial administrative building on Dar 
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es Salaam’s waterfront.236 Unlike other ministries, it had no colonial predecessor: under British rule, 
Tanganyika’s ‘foreign policy’ – to the extent that any existed – fell under the remit of the Colonial 
Office in London. Post-colonial African governments had to construct foreign ministries from 
scratch, and on tight budgets. When Paul Rupia joined the Ministry in 1963, he had just one 
colleague in the Division of African Affairs – a young Benjamin Mkapa.237 By 1970, the Ministry 
had some 480 employees, but their lack of experience and education remained an issue. As a 
Tanzanian study published in 1981 stated, since independence, ‘the main problem facing the 
Ministry has been the inadequacy of qualified, specialized and experienced manpower to handle 
effectively the various aspects of external relations which have continued to grow in complexity’.238 
In 1969, an American diplomat expressed his frustration with Tanzania’s ‘minuscule’ Foreign 
Ministry, which was ‘often plagued with changes of personnel’. However, the lengthy report on 
these movements which followed demonstrated the importance which foreign diplomats attached 
to cultivating contacts within the Ministry, as they jostled with Cold War rivals for information and 
influence.239 
The real locus of power in Tanzanian foreign affairs was not the bureaucracy, but President 
Nyerere. As the previous chapter showed, he set the tone and agenda for Tanzania’s interaction 
with the rest of the world. The party apparatus, the cabinet, and parliament did little more than 
rubber-stamp foreign policy. Charred by the upheavals of 1964-65 and concerned by the power-
seeking activities of his foreign minister, Oscar Kambona, in September 1965, Nyerere tightened 
his grip on foreign affairs. Between 1965 and 1972, he appointed a ‘minister of state for foreign 
affairs’, working directly under the president and without the status of a cabinet minister: Nyerere’s 
statesmanlike position on the continental and global stages demanded total control over foreign 
affairs. 
As a result of Nyerere’s non-alignment and especially the presence of the liberation movements, 
Dar es Salaam became a major hive of diplomatic activity in Africa. At the start of 1968, there were 
forty-seven states with some form of official representation in the city.240 ‘Dar es Salaam is a real 
United Nations, as much as the UN Plaza in New York’, wrote Jack Matlock, the deputy chief of 
mission at the American embassy in 1969. ‘No-one is riding particularly high, and everyone watches 
 
236 The department was originally called the Ministry of External Affairs, before changing its name in October 
1965 to fall in line with the terminology used in the majority of African states. Fullerton to Hobden, 24 
November 1965, UKNA, DO 213/103/63. 
237 Interview with Paul Rupia, central Dar es Salaam, 3 August 2015. 
238 Mushi, ‘Making of Foreign Policy’, 13. 
239 Pickering to State Dept, 2 July 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2515, POL 15-1 TANZAN. 
240 The following states had diplomatic representation in Dar es Salaam in January 1968: Algeria, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, China, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Denmark, Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Mali, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Rwanda, Somalia, Soviet Union, 
Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States, Yugoslavia, and 
Zambia. 
Karibu Dar es Salaam   
 
 
64 
everyone else – civilly for the most part.’241 The French ambassador, André Naudy, emphasised the 
vibrant diplomatic scene and the opportunities it presented. The ‘number and variety’ of missions, 
he wrote, ‘makes Dar es Salaam a particularly fruitful observation point and meeting places […] full 
of interest and possibilities.’242 In 1966, his American counterpart, John H. Burns, noted that the 
telegram volume passing through the embassy was comparable to that of Bonn – a city on the Cold 
War frontline in Europe.243 
The political geography of this diplomatic scene mapped onto Cold War divisions. Western 
representations were clustered around the city centre. The American, Australian, French, and West 
German missions were all located in the National Bank of Commerce (NBC) Building, near the 
Askari Monument, a memorial to the Tanzanian dead of the First World War. The Canadian high 
commission, which also housed the British Interests Section after Tanzania cut relations with 
London in 1965, was nearby on Independence Avenue, the city’s main commercial thoroughfare. 
To the north, the communist embassies, plus a smattering of representations from radical non-
aligned states like Algeria and Indonesia, were scattered along Upanga Road, earning it the nom de 
guerre ‘Red Boulevard’.244 
These arrangements mirrored the intra-bloc networks of cooperation in the city. A group of 
Anglophone diplomats had monthly lunch meetings to share information and coordinate policy.245 
Eastern Bloc representatives worked closely together, under Soviet supervision. Between the 
alliance blocs, however, Third World intermediaries played important roles. In the aftermath of the 
Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet Bloc lent on the North Vietnamese 
chargé d’affaires to explain the necessity of the ‘help-measures’ to the outraged Tanzanian 
government. The North Vietnamese often also relayed information and views from the Chinese 
embassy to Eastern European diplomats.246   
However, these Cold War divisions could never be completely maintained. Despite the city’s 
size, its expatriate community remained small. The white population was essentially isolated from 
all but the elite tip of the local population by differences of culture and language. Diplomats of 
various nationalities and ideological shades therefore mixed relatively freely, especially on the circuit 
of official receptions, often hosted by embassies to celebrate national days. These were far from 
devoid of Cold War tensions. The Portuguese received reports that the Chinese attempted to 
exploit these parties to sow discord among the Cubans and Soviets,247 while the French ambassador 
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expressed concern that Western diplomats became ‘submerged’ at receptions by representatives of 
the ‘revolutionary’ countries.248 
The guests present at these gatherings were drawn from far more cosmopolitan circles than the 
elites of Tanzanian officialdom and the diplomatic corps. Take one colourful scene, described by 
Burns in 1966: 
Looking anything but proletarian in white dinner jacket, with decorations, Soviet 
Ambassador Andrei Timoshenko received 300-400 guests at Karimjee Hall at a reception 
commemorating the October Revolution. […] Attendance was one of the most 
heterogeneous of the year, including, beside the standard diplomatic and Government faces, 
local staffs of western Embassies, freedom fighters, Indian business leaders and an 
assortment of unidentified celebrants who gave the vodka bar an active play.249 
Among these guests prowled journalists, hungry for gossip. When Robert Carl Cohen visited Dar es 
Salaam in mid-1969, he witnessed ‘situations which make the average spy film look like a 
kindergarten vaudeville’. Trying, somewhat naïvely, to pass off as an American tourist, Cohen 
observed that it ‘seemed like every other cat that sidled up to me was convinced that I was there for 
something other than sightseeing’.250 The Tanzanian establishment became concerned about the 
potential for leakages of information and subversion at diplomatic functions. In December 1964, 
the government issued a notice informing all officials that they had to gain permission from the 
their head of department before accepting invitations and then submit a report on the reception 
immediately after.251 
The cosmopolitanism of the diplomatic reception was the more official manifestation of the 
vibrant political mélange that characterised Dar es Salaam’s clubs, restaurants, and bars. As the 
examples of the New Africa Hotel and the Canton Restaurant suggest, these sites of ‘political 
socialising’ were concentrated loci of information exchange and interpersonal connections. Each 
would have its particular clientele. The Tanzanian elites met at the Selander Bridge Club or the 
Leaders’ Club.252 The liberation movement leaders ate regularly at the New Zahir Restaurant on 
Mosque Street, where Che Guevara was also a regular customer during his four month stay in Dar 
es Salaam between 1964 and 1965.253 Other guerrilla fighters met at the waterfront Dar es Salaam 
Club, a formal colonial establishment, where they rubbed shoulders with their communist 
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sponsors,254 or at Etienne’s, a restaurant run by a Frenchman, who was said to have collaborated 
with the Nazis and fled to Tanzania after the fall of the Vichy regime.255 A stone’s throw away, next 
to the Cuban embassy on Upanga Road, was the Palm Beach Hotel, where Abdulrahman Mohamed 
Babu, the Marxist politician, held court.256 ‘The Palm Beach was Babu’s hideout – he was always 
there’, recalled Mohammed Said, an activist in local Muslim politics.257 There Babu might be joined 
by fellow leftists from the Nationalist staff and communist diplomats who often dropped by for a 
beer after finishing the day’s work in the nearby Eastern Bloc embassies. 
The government sought to regulate these spaces. The local elite tried to exclude ordinary 
residents of Dar es Salaam from their social institutions. After independence, barriers which had 
previously prevented Africans from entering certain establishments were removed, but then 
selectively resurrected by post-colonial governments to exclude the non-elites. The Dar es Salaam 
Club, a prominent Tanzanian Asian businessman recalled, was ‘for the holy of the holies. The likes 
of me couldn’t go near the building.’258 When one Tanzanian MP questioned the right of one hotel 
to exclude customers who were not wearing ties, he was told that ‘it would be a disgrace if people 
were allowed to walk into hotels wearing vests.’ As Justin Willis notes, such establishments played 
‘an important part in elite networking across East Africa; these were places of meetings and deals, 
and mere membership of them gave access to power and authority.’259 This exclusivity delineated 
spaces of power within the city and contributed to the concentration of elite political debate within 
a small circuit of establishments. 
Another key locus of Tanzanian politics in the years of Arusha socialism was the university, set 
in the green hills north-west of the city. University College (renamed the University of Dar es 
Salaam in 1970, when it became independent from the University of East Africa) was far removed 
from the noise of the city centre, but became a site of confrontation between TANU’s nation-
building imperatives and students’ own visions and expectations of Tanzania’s future.260 By the late 
1960s, the ‘Hill’ had emerged as a hotbed of radical politics in Africa. A permissive academic 
environment and the allure of Nyerere’s philosophy attracted an influx of Marxist and leftist 
intellectuals from outside Tanzania. Leaders of the liberation movements regularly addressed the 
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students, as did representatives of the Marxist Left, like Babu and the Cuban ambassador.261 As 
chapter 5 explains, the organisation of students into a far-left revolutionary group which criticised 
ujamaa socialism ultimately led to a government crackdown on this radicalism. Nonetheless, the 
University continued to be, Ivaska argues, ‘a place where students were exposed to connections 
with cosmopolitan networks, cultures, discourses, and movements that were often nonnational in 
scope and impact.’262 It sat at the centre of a set of transnational networks that formed a radical Dar 
es Salaam counterculture, comprising far left politicians, diplomats, guerrilla leaders, anti-apartheid 
activists, and an Afro-American diaspora.263 
News 
At the centre of the city’s public sphere stood the Tanzanian media. In the 1960s, most Tanzanians 
received news from the world beyond their immediate community through the radio. Low literacy 
rates, especially outside of Dar es Salaam, made radio broadcasts the primary means of 
communication between the central government and the predominantly rural population. Prior to 
independence, foreign services such as Radio Cairo had provided an alternative feed of news and 
political invective to the colonial Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation (TBC). However, the 
nation-building spirit which followed uhuru encouraged a turn to the TBC, as an ‘African’ rather 
than foreign voice.264 In 1965, the government formally conscripted national radio to these efforts. 
The TBC was nationalised, brought under the auspices of the Ministry of Information, 
Broadcasting and Tourism, and renamed Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam.265 The External Service – 
broadcasting out in foreign vernaculars – became a vital communication path to those Africans still 
under colonial rule to the south. 
Radio ownership in the late 1960s was particularly high in Dar es Salaam. One survey found that 
four in five inhabitants listened to the radio on a regular basis, versus around half of the population 
outside of the capital. However, unlike the print media, the radio’s news sources were restricted to 
the Tanzanian Information Service’s press releases. Events might therefore be reported in the press, 
but delayed or omitted altogether in Radio Tanzania’s news coverage. When Kambona became 
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involved in a war of words from exile with Nyerere in 1968, Radio Tanzania did not mention the 
issue for three days.266 For local political debate, albeit in its officially monitored guise, we must 
turn to the press. 
At the time of the Arusha Declaration, there were four daily newspapers in circulation in Dar es 
Salaam. Two were published in Swahili, Uhuru (‘Freedom’) and Ngurumo (‘Thunder’). Ngurumo was 
the most popular newspaper in Tanzania, boasting a print run of 40,000 at its peak. It specialised in 
local news, particularly salacious gossip about the wealthy elite. For the world of high politics and 
international affairs, the city’s educated classes turned to the news-heavy English-language dailies, 
the Nationalist and the Standard. In addition, there were a host of weekly publications, including the 
trade union newspaper, Mfanyakazi (‘The Worker’). Nairobi’s Daily Nation was also distributed in 
Tanzania. For reasons of language proficiency, only the English-language newspapers are used 
systematically here. However, given the focus of this thesis, it also makes sense to concentrate on 
the Nationalist and the Standard, since they were the primary print sources of information available 
to both local elites and non-Tanzanian diplomats, journalists, and liberation movement fighters 
living in Dar es Salaam.267 
The Nationalist, like Uhuru, was owned by TANU. Founded in April 1964, it struggled to gain a 
large readership and was dependent on government subsidies for its survival. In its early years, the 
newspaper gained a reputation for a wild, radical editorial line, which gave way to moderation in 
April 1966 when Benjamin Mkapa replaced the Ghanaian James Markham as editor. Mkapa 
confirmed to an American diplomat that he had ‘stopped the virulent, anti-Western hyperbole of 
his predecessor’ and that the Nationalist would ‘pursue a more truly non-aligned policy’, less reliant 
on communist propaganda handouts.268 However, there remained a Marxist streak to the 
newspaper’s staff, which included Ferdinand Ruhinda, ‘Che’ Ng’ombo, and Nsa Kaisi.269 By the end 
of the decade, the Nationalist was again characterised by its hostility towards the West. Mkapa told a 
British research student of the constant pressure from radical TANU members for his newspaper 
to take a more left-wing stance.270 
The independent Standard was the more popular of the two English-language dailies. It had been 
founded in 1930 as a colonial newspaper of record. In the post-independence years, it was part of 
the Nairobi-based East African Standard Group and was bought by the Lonrho multinational in 
1967.271 There was a high number of Europeans on its staff, including its editors, Ken Ridley (1964-
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67) and Brendon Grimshaw (1967-70), and around seventy percent of its readership was either 
Asian or European.272 When the South African revolutionary Frene Ginwala was appointed editor 
in 1970, the Standard took a distinctly radical turn; these events are covered in chapter 7. 
Newspaper editors were conscious of the expectation that they should support the government 
and its nation-building policies. In 1967, Ridley explained that the Standard could ‘aid the country’s 
progress best by keeping people informed about Tanganyika [sic], Africa, and indeed the world’. As 
the people of Tanzania had to ‘conscript all their forces and energies’ for Nyerere’s war against 
poverty, the Standard should be dedicated to this effort.273 Mkapa stated that the job of the 
Nationalist was to re-educate the elite, to ‘disinherit’ Tanzanians from colonialism. ‘The role of the 
paper is to help define and then build these attitudes, only then can the right action take place.’274 
This still left room for criticism of the government,  but it was mostly confined to the vibrant 
‘letters to the editor’ pages or concentrated on socio-cultural issues, rather than challenging the state 
on explicitly political grounds. This explains why the government committed large subsidies to 
propping up the two TANU newspapers. According to one estimate, this amounted to 7 million 
shillings between 1965-66 and 1968-69 – equivalent to a third of the entire state grant to Radio 
Tanzania.275 
The printed press played a central role in Dar es Salaam’s public sphere. Newspaper culture was 
an important marker of urban life. Roughly half of the newspapers sold in Tanzania were 
distributed in the capital.276 A survey of the city’s inhabitants in 1968 found that 44 per cent claimed 
to read a newspaper every day; this figure fell to 33 per cent in Arusha, and 8 per cent in the 
provincial town of Kigoma.277 These differences were the consequence of the difficulty of 
transporting newspapers across a country with poor logistical infrastructure,278 as well as the higher 
literacy rates in the capital, which were perhaps twice that of the national figure. As Ivaska writes, 
these disparities in terms of print circulation and literacy figures ‘combined to make regular 
newspaper reading overwhelmingly characteristic of Dar es Salaam.’279 
In Dar es Salaam’s press culture, orality was as significant as literacy. Groups of men would 
congregate on street corners and around newspaper stands to listen to others reading and 
discussing the stories of the day. In her case-study of late colonial Uganda, Luise White identifies 
newspaper reading as a ‘social event’: ‘[v]irtually all newspapers were read by more than one person, 
and many more were read aloud, translated, summarized, amended, and made fun of by a variety of 
audiences. Even newspapers written in languages that required years of schooling to read could be 
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read out loud in a few minutes to illiterates.’280 As Jonathon Glassman has shown in the case of 
Zanzibar before independence, the oral dissemination of newspapers and pamphlets in coffee 
shops and mabaraza281 was an important site of identity formation and politicisation.282 Therefore, 
Ivaska argues, ‘[o]nce public readings and street-corner discussions of newspapers are factored in, 
one can conclude that newspapers and the stories, opinions, arguments, gossip, and tales of the 
town they contained were a vital component of public culture in Dar es Salaam’.283 
If the consumption of newsprint was a localised phenomenon in Dar es Salaam, its production 
was an internationalised affair. The presence of a large foreign press pack in the city was a reflection 
of its position at the frontline of international affairs in Africa and an important contribution in 
itself to the cosmopolitanism of the urban public sphere. The international news agencies were a 
staple feature of the press corps. Mirroring the strong Eastern Bloc diplomatic presence in Dar es 
Salaam, there were a number of communist news bureaux in the city: the Soviet agencies TASS and 
Novosti, East Germany’s Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst (ADN), the Czechoslovakian 
service Četeka, and the Polish Press Agency. In addition, Havana’s Prensa Latina and the Chinese 
agency Xinhua maintained offices in Tanzania.284 There was often little distinction between local 
journalist, foreign correspondent, and agency representative. The same writer could wear multiple 
hats. J. B. Thomson, a New Zealand-born journalist, recalls that every European staff member of 
the Standard’s editorial team was also working for a foreign establishment. Bill Ottewill wrote for 
the Times; David Martin for the United Press agency, the BBC, and Time magazine; and Thomson 
himself for the Associated Press and Newsweek.285 
The outlet of choice for the Tanzanian media was the British agency, Reuters. In 1965, its local 
correspondent estimated that his firm provided up to eighty per cent of the foreign news material 
supplied to the Nationalist and Standard.286 Conversely, material from the communist agencies was 
less popular. The Standard editor said that Reuters was essentially the only agency the newspaper 
used. Other press agencies sent ‘a lot of bumf, but most of it goes in the waste-paper basket’.287 
Likewise, the chief news editor of Radio Tanzania emphasised that Reuters was used ‘above all for 
world news’, TASS and Četeka were taken ‘but not used much’, while the Chinese agency material 
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‘goes straight in the bin’.288 In 1969, the French ambassador noted that the Četeka telex machine at 
Radio Tanzania was out of use and observed that ‘Tanzania shows a lot of revulsion towards using 
information coming from Eastern agencies.’289 Some African editors were uneasy with this reliance 
on a Western sources for their news, however. In January 1966 – just before Mkapa replaced 
Markham as editor – the Nationalist attacked Western news agencies for spreading ‘pernicious 
propaganda’ to make Africans ‘the intellectual slaves of the Capitalist press’.290 
The distributing function of the international news agencies ran parallel to the collection of local 
stories for dissemination elsewhere in the world. Here, the Tanzanian Ministry for Information 
played a critical intermediary role. Every morning, diplomatic representations in Dar es Salaam 
could collect government press releases from the ministry’s offices on the corner of Azikiwe and 
Makunganya streets, just across the road from the NBC building, which housed several Western 
embassies.291 The ministry also negotiated contracts with the international agencies, thereby 
providing some ‘gatekeeper’ control over inward flows of information into the Tanzanian media. 
However, efforts to create a local Tanzanian news agency failed. Despite Oscar Kambona, then 
foreign minister, signing an agreement with Četeka in 1964, it was not until 1976 that Tanzania 
founded the Shihata News Agency.292 
Journalists and agency correspondents were key actors in the city’s internationalised political 
networks. The truffle-hunting nature of the journalists’ profession, operating independently from 
the official protocol which ostensibly restricted diplomatic activity, made them valuable gatherers of 
intelligence. The Reuters correspondent in Dar es Salaam explained in October 1964 that he had 
‘managed to establish a fairly effective collection of contacts at such places as the airport, the police 
departments, embassies and within government.’293 This was particularly true in the case of the 
communist correspondents, who were often undercover intelligence officers. According to the 
French embassy, the Četeka representative in Dar es Salaam ‘seems to belong to the secret services 
and plays a very active role here.’294 A Portuguese intelligence report identified the same man an 
intermediary between the African liberation movement leaders and Eastern Bloc diplomats.295 Such 
activities were not immune from criticism. In 1967, a Chinese propaganda pamphlet called TASS ‘a 
smokescreen for the KGB’ and claimed that Novosti had ‘managed to unwind its slimy tentacles 
throughout the revolutionary countries of Africa’.296 
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 While the political role of the communist news correspondents was scarcely hidden, American 
and British diplomats also milked their media connections for information. In 1973, the British 
high commission reported that the Reuters correspondent was ‘cooperative and tries to get for us 
any material we require from the liberation movements.’297 The insider knowledge provided by 
David Martin, a Standard journalist with access to Nyerere, was highly valued by Western diplomats. 
William Wilson, who served as the head of the British Interests Section in Tanzania during severing 
of relations after Rhodesian UDI, recalled that Martin had ‘excellent access to State House’ and 
often brought ‘morsels of information’.298 One former member of the Tanzanian Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs told me that Martin ‘had lived here long enough and been in close contact with the 
leadership here to know what the [government’s] position would be. He could anticipate what the 
reaction would be on any particular issue.’299 Although it largely goes unmentioned in the 
diplomatic record, there was doubtless a quid pro quo arrangement in these relationships between 
the local authorities, press, and embassies. Tanzanians could test the political waters by tactically 
channelling information through correspondents, which journalists could then exchange with 
diplomats or other foreigners for material which they could then feed back to local elites. 
To compound the blurring of the boundary between press and politics in Dar es Salaam, the 
Tanzanian government contained several men with journalistic experience. Babu cut his political 
teeth writing for anticolonial publications while a student in London in the 1950s and later served 
as the Xinhua’s Zanzibar correspondent prior to the revolution.300 He wrote a weekly column on 
international affairs for the Nationalist, under the alias ‘Pressman’.301 Stephen Mhando, the minister 
of state for foreign affairs between 1968 and 1970, had previously been on the editorial board of 
the Nationalist and Mfanyakazi. Mkapa himself later moved into government, serving as foreign 
minister in the late 1970s, and eventually becoming the third president of Tanzania in 1995. 
Propaganda 
State-sanctioned media was not the only source of information available in Dar es Salaam. All of 
the Cold War protagonists engaged in propaganda activities in the city. These were situated at 
various points on the spectrum between subtle, ‘soft’ propaganda to unapologetic broadsides 
against other states or ideologies. While most studies of Cold War propaganda have focused on 
communications across divided Europe, the peoples of the post-colonial Third World were viewed 
as ripe targets for influence by the superpowers. Although Africans often proved sceptical of this 
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propaganda, its indirect effect in Dar es Salaam was to inculcate the city’s public sphere in the 
language of the Cold War. 
All of the major embassies produced regular information bulletins, which were distributed to 
ministries and the press. These were accompanied by a kaleidoscopic range of newspapers and 
magazines, sometimes translated into Swahili. The communist representations were particularly 
active in this field. In October 1964, the Chinese embassy published the first issue of Vigilance 
Africa, which could be purchased for a pittance from the Tanganyika Bookshop. It contained 
articles in English and Swahili, and described its purpose as being for ‘scientific socialism and 
African unity against colonialism and imperialism.’ The US embassy called it ‘violently anti-
American’. Among its writers was Nsa Kaisi, the Marxist staff member at the Nationalist, who 
appeared in a by-line photograph ‘complete with Cuban type hat’.302 In 1968, Novosti began to 
produce a similar Swahili newspaper, Urusi Leo (‘Russia Today’). It was expressly arraigned against 
China rather than the West. ‘We have much Chinese political literature here condemning Moscow’, 
said its Tanzanian ‘reporter’. ‘We want to give the public the true picture of what the Soviets stand 
for and what is the real picture of what Peking stands for in Africa’. Several members of the 
Nationalist staff were also involved in producing Urusi Leo.303 This communist propaganda was 
available from front organisations, like the Tanganyika Bookshop, and also distributed by the 
embassies. Salim Msoma, who later became a senior bureaucrat, told me that as a student he would 
often visit the Chinese and Soviet embassies to collect Marxist literature.304 Another university 
student, Juma Mwapachu, recalled reading Castro and Guevara in newspapers available from the 
Cuban embassy.305 
The communists did not have a monopoly on foreign propaganda material in Tanzania. In 1965, 
the Johnson administration launched Topic magazine, which contained a mixture of articles on 
American and African society, and was aimed at Africa’s cultural, professional, student, and youth 
leaders. ‘Topic appears to have been an immediate success’, the United States Information Agency 
(USIA) concluded in 1968, noting that there was a high demand for copies and that the Soviet 
Union was now ‘disseminating a number of obvious imitations.’306 Cultural institutions like the 
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British Council, the West German Goethe Institute, and the United States Information Service 
(USIS) maintained public libraries, stocked with literature friendly to the Western cause. 
Although difficult to assess, the impact of radio broadcasting was probably more significant 
than written propaganda, at least in terms of reaching a mass audience. Just as Radio Cairo had 
provided an alternative voice to local or metropolitan radio under colonialism, foreign radio 
broadcasts represented a different source of news, opinion, and entertainment to state-controlled 
media.307 Unlike the printed press, as a transnational form of propaganda broadcast from abroad, 
radio was almost impossible for governments to regulate. Surveys conducted in the late 1960s 
found that foreign radio was immensely popular, with the vast majority of Tanzanians regularly 
tuning in to none-Radio Tanzania stations. Three in five listened to Voice of Kenya and perhaps 
almost a third to the BBC. Voice of America and Deutsche Welle, which had a relay station in 
Rwanda, also attracted significant audiences.308 The Cold War powers sought to exploit this 
demand: by the late 1960s, communist states were broadcasting fifty-seven hours of programming 
in Swahili per week.309  
Another means of capturing the airwaves was to provide material for Radio Tanzania, although 
this became more problematic as the government tightened its control after 1965. Noting that radio 
was the most important form of communication in Tanzania, one East German diplomat 
bemoaned that despite the presence of a GDR radio correspondent in Dar es Salaam, it had no 
success in working with Radio Tanzania, which preferred material from the BBC and Reuters.310 By 
the end of the decade, even the BBC was struggling to have its news and programming accepted, 
especially after a redefinition of Radio Tanzania’s policy in 1970, which saw the English Service 
closed and all domestic broadcasting produced in Swahili.311 
Fearful of the city becoming a Cold War battleground, the government sought to crack down on 
the more blatant and aggressive examples of foreign propaganda in Dar es Salaam. In May 1966, a 
circular declared that ‘[t]he Government of Tanzania will take serious note and exception to the 
circulation of publications in which accounts of the political views of a foreign country contain 
attacks upon a third state’ with which Tanzania had friendly relations.312 But the Tanzanian 
government’s policing of such activities was highly inconsistent. Chinese, North Korean, and North 
Vietnamese representations appeared free to attack the United States and its allies with few 
restrictions. In particular, American complaints about propaganda that savaged Washington’s 
intervention in Vietnam largely fell on deaf ears, as chapter 5 explains. 
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The forms which propaganda took extended beyond the written or spoken word. Photographic 
exhibitions, dance troupes, and football teams all travelled to Dar es Salaam in an attempt to foster 
cultural relations with the Tanzanian people. Film was an especially powerful medium of 
communication. Whereas in 1964, news of the America intervention to defeat the Stanleyville rebels 
in Congo had provoked attacks on USIS libraries in Bujumbura and Nairobi, film showings of the 
Apollo moon landings proved a major local propaganda coup in Dar es Salaam. ‘Apollo was boffo’, 
reported an American diplomat. 
Mobs besieged the space shot open house at the USIS Library, showing a degree of enthusiasm 
in their desire to get inside usually typical only of those in other lands who have wanted to burn 
down USIS offices. On launch night, the crowds had to be controlled by police, but after the 
first few hours of push and crush, attendance at the exhibit settled down to a constant flow-
through even during the small hours of the morning.313 
The ‘soft propaganda’ effect of independently produced foreign film became a focal point of 
cultural conflict between the government, cinemagoers, and foreign powers. Gary Burgess observes 
that as the socialist project in revolutionary Zanzibar constricted cultural expression, young people 
found some escape through the ‘anonymity of the crowd’ and the ‘exotic images on the screen’. 
The Tanzanian government was particularly concerned about the corrupting influence of 
Hollywood film on its nation-building efforts, which rejected the individualism and consumerism 
that characterised Western productions.314 In non-aligned Tanzania, the Cold War content 
characteristic of such films also risked offending potential donor countries. In 1965, shortly before 
a planned trip by Nyerere to the Soviet Union, the government censors banned the showing of the 
James Bond thriller, Goldfinger. Over the next two years, a string of espionage films – The Prize, 
Mission Bloody Mary, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold, and Super Seven Calling Cairo – met the same 
fate. Whereas under colonialism the censorship board had elaborated paternalistic explanations for 
its decision-making, the post-colonial state was more secretive, justifying these bans only by 
describing them as unsuitable for the ‘national interest’.315 
Explicit communist propaganda films fared no better. Cinema attendance figures in Zanzibar 
declined in the late 1960s, when Karume insisted that Chinese propaganda documentaries replace 
Indian and Western productions, despite making the showings free.316 An in-house screening at the 
Chinese embassy in Dar es Salaam of the Anti-China Atrocities of the New Tsars, a ‘documentary’ 
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produced after the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, made little impact. The Chinese hosts were 
reportedly disappointed by the reactions of their guests, who laughed loudly at a scene in which 
Chinese fishing boats were sunk by Soviet forces. However, the Chinese did succeed in preventing 
the screening of an MGM film, The Shoes of the Fisherman, which featured a Russian pope interceding 
to prevent a war between the communist superpowers.317 
What effect did all this propaganda have? Gauging the real impact of any form of media is a 
perennial difficulty for any historian. Nonetheless, the Zanzibari cinemagoers’ response to Chinese 
film demonstrates that African audiences were not passive absorbers of propaganda; rather, they 
were actors in the cultural Cold War in their own right. Propaganda targeted at receptive groups, 
such as the Marxist literature lapped up by students, was probably more successful. At an elite level, 
the government maintained the power to clamp down on (or turn a blind eye to) the intrusion of 
superpower rivalry into the public sphere. This moderation was only partially successful, however. 
The cumulative effect of this steady drip of propaganda was the suffusion of Tanzanian political 
discourse with the language and tropes of the Cold War. In no genre was this more evident than 
that of rumour. 
Rumour 
On 15 November 1964, Nyerere addressed an audience of 45,000 people at the Jangwani Grounds 
in Dar es Salaam. He sought to dampen the popular foment which Kambona had whipped up 
through his ‘exposure’ of the ‘letter plot’, outlined in the previous chapter. At the same time, 
Nyerere issued a warning to the crowd: 
Someone has told me that we should now call Dar es Salaam ‘Rumorville’. Rumors are always 
rife in Dar es Salaam to the extent that not three days pass without rumors being spread, 
especially in the shopping areas […] The difficulty is that there are rumor experts and professors 
here in Dar es Salaam […] Someone has whispered to me that some of your leaders 
thoughtlessly talk in bars about government affairs. This is a very bad thing. I say before the 
masses it is a very serious thing, and I do not want to see anyone brought to me and accused of 
such a thing. […] There are already enough troubles in our country. We are surrounded by 
enough dangers, and we do not want to have more trouble from among ourselves.318 
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The ‘Rumourville’ moniker stuck. Foreign observers routinely referred to the city being engulfed in 
rumour and political gossip.319 ‘Dar-es-Salaam remains one of the most difficult capitals in Africa in 
which to get firmly based information’, admitted the respected Africa Confidential at the peak of the 
political crisis of mid-1967. ‘We have ourselves run the gauntlet of rumour-mongering charges, 
while attempting to reflect what was being said in Dar.’320 Rumour both drew succour from the 
city’s propaganda-filled public sphere and provided the conditions in which such media thrived. A 
recurrent feature was its Cold War rhetoric, which could be used to undermine political enemies, 
while also providing Nyerere’s government with a mobilising discourse by which it could bolster its 
authority. 
The prevalence of rumour was in part a consequence of Tanzania’s movement towards a more 
authoritarian form of government over the course of the 1960s. ‘The postcolonial city is the 
disinformed city’, writes Alessandro Triulzi: authoritarian governments, monopolising the media 
and seeking to control urban space, deprived Africans of the free flow of information.321 In 
Tanzania, this did not mean simply the government control of print and radio media. In 1967, one 
MP floated the idea in parliament of creating a place alike London’s Hyde Park Corner, where 
citizens could freely share their views about politics. He was shot down, the idea branded an act of 
‘hooliganism’.322 
As Jean-Noël Kapferer recognises in his seminal study of rumour, restrictions on political 
freedoms and government secrecy create a ‘frustrated demand for information which encourages 
contraband and an informational black market’.323 The gatekeeper state could control above-ground 
media, but its sluices were never watertight. Salim Ahmed Salim, a diplomat who later held 
numerous top positions in the Tanzanian government, the UN, and the OAU, expressed this view 
when I interviewed him. ‘Rumourmongering’, he said, was 
a problem of a fairly closed society. When everything is done transparently and openly, the 
rumourmongers don’t have much to benefit, but when things are done in a clandestine manner, 
however genuine, it gives them ammunition to create stories, to fabricate stories.324 
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Yet rumour is not necessarily counterhegemonic, as Glassman emphasises in his analysis of politics 
in late colonial Zanzibar: it can be used by elites to muster and direct support.325 Furthermore, a 
simple government-versus-governed dichotomy is an inadequate framework here, even and 
especially under Tanzania’s one-party state. With options for challenging Nyerere in public limited, 
dissident politicians could stir unrest and uncertainty by injecting rumour into political life, playing 
on the city’s reputation as a hotbed of rumour. 
As the term ‘Rumourville’ implies, the urban setting of Dar es Salaam was a fundamental feature 
of the culture of rumour. The sheer size and density of the city’s population enabled the rapid 
spread and mutation of rumour. On the street corner, the bus, and the baraza, what Africanists have 
dubbed radio trottoir (‘pavement radio’) overlapped with the ‘official’ media of print and radio.326 In 
his Jangwani speech, Nyerere explicitly referred to the role of ‘shopping areas’ and ‘bars’ – physical 
sites where the arm of the state was more restricted by the informal mixing of crowds. This fear of 
the subversive potential of the city was congruent with ujamaa’s anti-urban animus. ‘Idlers’ and 
‘loafers’ were criticised not only for their laziness, but also for their tendency to gossip. In April 
1966, Nyerere warned a large crowd at the National Stadium about the danger rumour posed to the 
nation’s development, making unfavourable comparisons between the capital and provincial cities. 
If you are in Tabora you talk about tobacco and its price, if you are in Mwanza you talk about 
cotton and what its price will be, if you are in Mtwara you talk about cashew nuts […] but in 
Dar es Salaam they talk about people […] [W]hen we began TANU here in 1954 I told my 
companions that our country will not flourish if the headquarters is in Dar es Salaam and Dar es 
Salaam is rotten […] If the headquarters is rotten it will corrupt people from other parts.327 
Nyerere’s invocation of places of perceived moral laxity, particularly drinking holes, echoes the 
findings of Benjamin Koerber’s study of rumour in Egyptian political culture. He observes that 
three men accused of supposed rumourmongering in Cairo in 1953 were identified by a tribunal as 
working at a cigarette stall – a ‘topos invested with dark associations of social and moral 
promiscuity.’328 In Dar es Salaam, this concern was transposed from the market in Kariakoo and 
the city’s more insalubrious beer bars to the cosmopolitan, wealthier clientele who met at upmarket 
hotels, restaurants, and embassy receptions. 
The content and spirit of Dar es Salaam’s political culture of rumour was rooted in the Cold 
War. Africa’s experience of the early years of independence had demonstrated the vulnerability of 
the post-colonial state to external intervention. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was widely 
held responsible for the assassination of the Congolese prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, in 1961, 
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while on the eve of the ‘letter plot’ of 1964, the American military backed a South African-led 
assault on Stanleyville, where the Simba rebels claimed to be fighting as the heirs to Lumumba’s 
legitimate Congolese government. Memories of European colonialism and the contemporary 
danger posed by its perceived American successor constituted a history that alarmed Third World 
leaders. Nyerere, an African socialist and an ally of the guerrilla movements, had reason to be more 
fearful than most. 
In these circumstances, the effect of the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana in February 
1966 was predictable. Like Lumumba, Nkrumah was a poster-boy of pan-Africanism; like Nyerere, 
he had struck out on a progressive development strategy, although Nkrumah had dabbled more in 
the aid-seeking politics of Cold War clientelism. Rumours of a potential coup circulated in Dar es 
Salaam. Three ‘moderates’ within the cabinet – Paul Bomani, Amir Jamal, and Nsilo Swai – 
cancelled a visit to Kampala to participate in talks about East African integration.329 The American 
ambassador, John H. Burns, returned from an upcountry visit to find the city in ‘a high state of 
edginess’ with an ‘audible buzz.’ ‘The decibel count has especially increased since Ghana’, he wrote, 
‘which had much the sharpest impact here than any of the recent coups.’330 A British diplomat 
thought the effects of the coup in Accra were ‘undoubtedly more in the realm of talk than in 
action’.331 Other local observers were less sure. Ridley, the Standard editor, told the American 
counsellor that he now anticipated a coup in Cairo, followed by another in Dar es Salaam, 
articulating a rival ‘domino theory’ that imagined a series of military putsches backed by the United 
States against progressive African governments.332 A police investigation, presumably carried out on 
Nyerere’s orders, found no evidence of any coup plot in preparation in Tanzania.333 Nonetheless, 
the cacophony of rumour that greeted the fall of Nkrumah demonstrated how the dangers posed 
by the Cold War weighed heavily on the imagination of Tanzanian elites. 
The Cold War also provided a rhetoric which Tanzanians appropriated to denigrate political 
rivals. In December 1967, a pamphlet signed by the ‘Revolutionary Committee of the TANU 
Youth League’ was circulated in Dar es Salaam. ‘Our country and our beloved Mwalimu are in great 
danger!’ it began. ‘Imperialists and their bootlickers here have formed a perfidious conspiracy to 
divert our country from its socialist way’. It listed a host of supposed American ‘spies’ in Tanzania, 
‘plotting against our nation and revolution’. This was made possible by ‘traitors in Tanzania who 
are working hand in glove with the mad dogs of the CIA!’ It singled out the minister of health and 
housing, Austin Shaba, for special treatment. 
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Minister Shaba! Tell us how many dollars you have received from your disloyalty from America 
and transferred to your bank abroad? Can you deny that you have transformed your house into 
a hornets [sic] nest where American spies can come and plot their evil deeds?334 
Shaba was considered among the most pro-Western of the cabinet ministers, but the wild charges 
received short shrift from the Tanzanian establishment. The government quickly denounced the 
leaflet as ‘stupid’, ‘disgraceful’, and ‘bogus’. An official in the Ministry of Housing told the 
American ambassador that Nyerere was convinced it was the work of the East Germans.335 The 
front pages of the Nationalist and Standard announced a police appeal for public cooperation in 
finding the authors.336 The GDR, for its part, thought that there was some truth in the 
allegations.337 In another case of a Tanzanian leader being accused of collaborating with the CIA, 
the chairman of the university branch of the TYL, Juma Mwapachu, was toppled at a meeting in 
September 1968. The charge was baseless. The Americans described it as ‘no more than an effort to 
use [the] worst possible term in student lexicon.’338 The circumstances of the Cold War thus 
provided an instrumental language for pursuing private rivalries via the medium of rumour and 
innuendo. 
The pamphlet which accused Shaba of collaborating with the United States was characteristic of 
the ‘black literature’ which circulated around Dar es Salaam. These publications represented a 
confluence of rumour, print culture, and Cold War dynamics. As Koerber explains, one response to 
rumour available to government is to ‘entextualise’ it: that is, set out an ‘official’ version of the 
rumour, thereby establishing greater control over its content.339 However, the same tactic can be 
used by those seeking to undermine the authorities. The written word, observes Nils Bubandt, has a 
‘testimonial authority that oral rumors do not have’.340 Further, the fixed form of the printed word 
allows the mass distribution of a duplicated text, preventing the mutation of rumour as it travels. In 
Dar es Salaam, the mailing of letters and pamphlets to key elites – politicians, bureaucrats, 
newspaper editors, ambassadors – ensured that the message reached its target, bypassing the 
distorting nodes of Kariakoo or the baraza. 
If the error-strewn mimeograph slandering Shaba can be regarded as the cruder end of the black 
literature scale, a magazine entitled ‘Revolution in Africa’ was far more professional in style. ‘To 
those who still doubt the extent of communist subversion in Africa’, began a Standard editorial in 
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March 1965, ‘we recommend you read the first edition of “Revolution in Africa”’. The magazine 
claimed to be published in Albania – Stalin Boulevard, Tirana – and had an unmistakably pro-
Chinese line. One article accused Nyerere of being ‘naïve’ for denying the existence of class 
struggles in Africa and of talking ‘nonsense’ with his ‘mythical references the family, the clan, and 
the tribe.’ Another article, written by a Chinese colonel, stated that ‘Babu and his shrewd cadres are 
now in position to take control of a united front in Tanzania as they did in Zanzibar.’341 
The following day, the Nationalist rounded on the Standard. It questioned the wisdom of 
publishing these sorts of subversive extracts.342 The French ambassador assumed that the Standard 
must have been cleared by State House to publish the text from ‘Revolution in Africa’. He 
therefore concluded that Nyerere was beginning to realise that the presence of the Zanzibari 
Marxists in his government was ‘more dangerous than useful’, and so had permitted the editorial to 
broadcast indirectly his concern about communist subversion in Tanzania.343 But TANU’s 
Nationalist had also received the magazine and yet declined to the run the story. In fact, the West 
German embassy reported that the Tanzanian cabinet had held a lengthy meeting at which it 
considered banning the Standard.344 Meanwhile, the Chinese embassy released a statement 
describing ‘Revolution in Africa’ as an ‘out-and-out forgery’. At a press conference, a representative 
called it a ‘gross machination, as any intelligent person would realise’, and attributed it to an 
imperialist plot to denigrate China’s reputation in Africa.345 The magazine’s origins remained a 
mystery. 
The subversive quality of rumour, black literature, and their tendency to embroil Tanzania in 
Cold War struggles concerned Nyerere, as his ‘Rumourville’ speech made clear. In May 1966, he 
gave the press the details of seventeen people accused of ‘rumour-mongering’. Their names were 
published in the Nationalist and repeated prior to every news bulletin on Radio Tanzania for the 
next few days. Nyerere claimed that certain unnamed ambassadors were also sources of rumour.346 
The Nationalist stated that ‘people abroad’ had ‘resorted to a campaign of international rumour-
mongering to discredit our leader […] Having failed, they will now try to set one leader against 
another.’347 The American embassy was sceptical about the accusations, which it felt were solely 
attempts to settle personal grudges.348 However, Nyerere’s decision to channel these rivalries into a 
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broader campaign against rumourmongers reflected his how his confidence had been shaken by the 
Ghana coup. 
Nyerere’s decision to attack foreigners and internal enemies of the nation for seeking to 
undermine the government was entirely consistent with his approach to foreign affairs and security 
matters. As chapter 5 shows, Nyerere and TANU invoked the threats of neoimperialism and 
superpower rivalry to rally the population around a nation-building project that fed back into the 
broader concepts of unity and self-reliance underpinning ujamaa socialism. However, these tactics 
only compounded Dar es Salaam’s reputation as a hotbed of rumour. That the government deemed 
it necessary to intervene in the matter revealed its concern at the level of speculation and suggested 
its vulnerability. Nyerere did not identify the rumours in question: to do so would have only 
afforded them more credibility. His intervention did though recognise their existence, as well as 
that of those who spread them. The Zanzibari journalist Ahmed Rajab has identified this 
phenomenon in the political culture of Nairobi. 
You rise with rumours and go to bed with rumours. In between you read the dailies. Banner 
headlines on the front page deny the main rumour. Down the page, ‘rumour-mongers’ are 
warned. As always the reports never question the existence of the species. In fact, the incessant 
warnings portray the species as a busy-body bent on ‘creating chaos’, ‘disturbing the peace’, or 
‘confusing the wananchi’ (the ordinary citizens). It certainly alarms the dispensers of warnings. Or 
so it seems.349 
The consequence was a smoke-and-mirrors effect of uncertainty and insecurity. Nyerere’s 
biographer and Time correspondent William Edgett Smith observed that ‘a sort of free-flowing 
paranoia sometimes seems to hang suspended in Dar es Salaam’s heavy air.’350 In 1971, the French 
ambassador identified an ‘atmosphere often devoid of trust […] Suspicion is the rule’.351 
The Cold War acted as an incubating context in which rumour was conceived, spread and 
understood. Bubandt argues, with reference to Indonesia, that the Cold War furthered the rise of 
modern conspiracy theory. ‘The intrusion of paranoia into reason’, he suggests, ‘is the effect of a 
conspiratorial Cold War social thought’.352 This characterised not only McCarthyist purges or Stasi 
surveillance, but also the capitals of vulnerable Third World nations like Tanzania. In other words, 
rumours only engulfed Dar es Salaam because of the pre-existing Cold War paranoia upon which 
they played. As Glassman reminds us, ‘[r]umors cannot be fed to a crowd as one force-feeds a 
goose’; they ‘will take hold only if they echo fears and convictions already in place.’353 The 
relationship between the rumour and these ‘convictions’ is a vicious circle, however: the former 
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reinforces the latter, deepening the reservoirs of fears upon which the rumour draws. The urban 
environment of Dar es Salaam amplified this effect further: rumour thus became a key ingredient in 
the pressure-cooker atmosphere of a Cold War city. 
Intelligence 
Amid these networks of personnel and information lurked operatives from the world’s intelligence 
agencies. As the Cold War pushed into the Third World with the retreat of European colonialism, 
the CIA, KGB, and the agencies of the superpowers’ respective allies extended and consolidated 
their intelligence networks. In Africa, Richard Aldrich observes, the division between diplomatic 
and secret activities was also not as sharp as elsewhere, with intelligence officers able to gain the 
ears of local politicians and officials.354 African capitals proved fertile ground for gathering 
intelligence about matters beyond the continent: in Bamako, Mali, the United States discovered in 
1966 that China had plans to test a hydrogen bomb.355 They were also, as demonstrated, suited to 
misinformation campaigns. As documents smuggled out of Russia by the former KGB archivist 
Vasili Mitrokhin show, the KGB attempted to plant seeds of doubt in the minds of Africa’s post-
colonial elites through forged letters and pamphlets, triggering the expulsion of various Chinese 
operatives – although, as will be shown, these efforts could sometimes backfire.356 Moreover, the 
CIA’s perceived role in coups and assassinations across the Third World inscribed a fear of its 
‘hidden hand’ into the imaginations of post-colonial elites and provided a common reference point 
for condemnations of American ‘neoimperialism’. 
Cognisant of the information traffic passing through Dar es Salaam, the city became a major 
centre for intelligence-gathering. When a new American ambassador was being briefed in 
Washington ahead of taking up his post in 1965, the CIA made it clear to him that increasing the 
number of intelligence operatives in Tanzania was among ‘their top priorities in Africa’.357 The Cold 
War antagonists sought to infiltrate each other’s local networks. Junior and Tanzanian staff were 
viewed as prime targets, though often Africans proved far less malleable than external powers 
anticipated. The Portuguese, who relied on a mixture of Rhodesian intelligence and its own 
informers, believed that a secretary at the Novosti press agency was passing information to the 
Chinese embassy.358 In April 1966 – amid the jumpiness that followed the coup in Ghana – the 
American ambassador reported that there had ‘recently been a crude attempt by some of our “chers 
collegues” to “recruit” two members of our clerical staff’, who had laughed off the advances and 
 
354 Aldrich, Hidden Hand, 604-5. 
355 Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 607. 
356 Christopher J. Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World (London: 
Allen Lane, 2005), 440-41. 
357 Interview with John H. Burns, FAOHC. 
358 General chief of staff, General Secretariat for National Defence, 27 August 1968, AHD, MNE, PAA 822. 
Karibu Dar es Salaam   
 
 
84 
duly informed the senior staff. ‘We do not worry about a single individual here’, wrote Burns, ‘but I 
mention this as an example of the sort of atmosphere we work in.’359 
Nyerere and his government regarded such subversive activity as a threat to Tanzania’s 
sovereignty. In particular, they believed that agents working for the Portuguese, Rhodesians, and 
South Africans were attempting to infiltrate the guerrilla movements and destabilise the Tanzanian 
government. As later chapters will show, this belief had some justification. After independence, the 
local intelligence services were run by the Tanganyika Special Branch, which formed part of a 
regional network including Britain’s former colonies, as well as those territories in British Africa 
which were yet to gain independence. Nyerere broke up the Tanganyika Special Branch in October 
1963, having realised that the post-colonial arrangements left his country with intelligence links to 
not only MI5, but also the Southern Rhodesian government. The decision was preceded by the 
expulsion of a number of South Africans and Rhodesians, including a number of ZAPU members, 
who were accused of spying for South Rhodesia. The Special Branch was replaced by a domestic 
‘Security Service’ and an ‘Intelligence Service’, which worked abroad. The focus of security quickly 
shifted from external to internal enemies of the TANU party-state, especially following the mutiny 
and the union with Zanzibar in 1964.360 
Yet, fanned by a government press that regularly merged Cold War threats with internal 
opposition, concern about foreign subversion remained paramount. In particular, all Chinese 
activities in Dar es Salaam were cast under a veil of secrecy by the authorities. For example, in 1969 
a Nigerian student, Cornelius Ogunsanwo, was arrested and detained in what he described as 
‘inhumane and animalistic conditions’ – for thirty-nine days. He had arrived in Dar es Salaam to 
conduct doctoral research on the Chinese presence in Africa. The incident aroused minor dissent in 
the Tanzanian media: the Standard called the ‘current air of spurious discretion’ as ‘unnecessary and 
immature’.361 This paranoia, accompanied by traces of xenophobia, was also evident when the 
TANU Youth League called a march in 1971 in protest against the planned construction of a 
Hilton Hotel in central Dar es Salaam. The TYL argued that the proposed site of the hotel, close to 
institutions such as State House, ‘would pose a serious security risk to the nation as our enemies 
would pour in [sic] Tanzania under the cover of tourists.’362 
The government’s fear about clandestine activity in Dar es Salaam – both homegrown and 
imported – led to the establishment of a massive counter-subversion apparatus. In late 1965, the 
American embassy discovered from an expatriate technician working at the central post office that 
there were over two hundred tapped telephone lines in the city, including those belonging to 
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foreign diplomats and some cabinet ministers.363 The intelligence services do not appear to have 
been solely concerned with eavesdropping on their known enemies. When Nasser made a state visit 
to Dar es Salaam in September 1966, a British telephone engineer discovered some ‘stray wires’ in 
the vicinity of the hotel where the Egyptian delegation were staying. After tying these up, he was 
later hauled in front of the security services and found out that he had destroyed the connections 
which they had laid for the purpose of eavesdropping on the Egyptians’ telephone conversations.364 
These government operations, plus the threat posed by rival foreign intelligence agencies, meant 
that diplomats in Dar es Salaam exercised significant care when discussing sensitive issues. 
Precaution became a matter of routine, especially after the ‘phone-tapping’ incident of 1965. In 
January 1966, Burns, the American ambassador, held a meeting with the Australian high 
commissioner, Hugh Gilchrist, who immediately unplugged the telephone. Gilchrist explained that 
he ‘usually operated under the assumption that everything he said was being listening to by 
someone other than the person with whom he was speaking.’365 Burns held his own team meetings 
at his residence, rather than the embassy – a ‘security nightmare’ – and refrained from dictating 
classified communications.366 
Tanzanian surveillance also extended to the streets, bars, and hotels of Dar es Salaam. In 1969, a 
disgruntled former TANU apparatchik, R. A. Swai, telephoned a junior American diplomat, George 
Roberts. The pair arranged to meet at the Kilimanjaro Hotel. There, Swai said that he was ‘fed up’ 
with the government, Nyerere’s dominance of TANU, and the direction of Arusha socialism. His 
motive for the meeting was self-centred, however: he sought a job in business, ideally with an 
American firm investing in Tanzania. Roberts’ account of the meeting is revealing.  
The telephone at my house is tapped, and the arrangements for this meeting were made over the 
telephone. When I arrived at the Kilimanjaro, a Police Field Forces Unit Microbus was parked 
across City Drive behind the Hotel, and the table next to us just outside the mezzanine bar was 
occupied by a young, well-dressed African who was alone. He and Swai were the only Africans 
at the bar. Although he could easily watch us, he could not hear what we were saying unless the 
table between Swai and myself was bugged.367 
Soft-spoken dissent, contact networks between Tanzanians and foreigners, government 
surveillance, and paranoia: the anecdote offers a snapshot of the daily political grind in Cold War 
Dar es Salaam. 
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Conclusion 
Atmospherics report: Climate overheated, agitated and steamy even by Dar-es-Salaam standards, 
owing no doubt to coincidence [of the] OAU Ministerial [Conference in] Nairobi, TANU 
Convention [in] Dar-es-Salaam, FRG imbroglio, UK-Rhodesian consultations and uneasy 
peripheries to North and South.368 
The American ambassador’s despatch from March 1965 exemplifies Dar es Salaam’s position at the 
intersection of a plethora of local, regional, continental, and global developments. His language is 
also instructive. The city’s political spaces were as much mental as physical, the site of cold fronts 
and rising pressures, as reflected in his meteorological metaphor. 
This chapter has offered a tour d’horizon of Dar es Salaam’s political and public sphere, moving 
from government ministries to embassy receptions, agency correspondents to newspaper editors, 
and unidentified rumourmongers, intelligence officers, and fabricators of black literature. These 
political sites and actors were bound up in a series of overlapping conflicts, which ranged from 
local struggles over urban life to government attempts to tackle the subversive threat latent in Dar 
es Salaam’s streets and bars. Interspersed with these conflicts were imported Cold War rivalries 
from beyond Africa’s borders and liberation movement politics which, as chapter 4 will show, spilt 
over into Tanzanian affairs. Central to this environment were the politics of information, 
disinformation, and misinformation. Press, propaganda, and rumour all fell back on a series of 
tropes which brought together the entwined dynamics of decolonisation and the Cold War. The 
government attempted to control this public sphere, but with difficulty. 
Karibu Dar es Salaam: welcome to Dar es Salaam. 
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Chapter 3 
The inter-German Cold War in Dar es Salaam 
In late January 1969, a pamphlet entitled ‘China and the Devil Slaves’ dropped into the in-trays of 
politicians and journalists in Dar es Salaam. According to its title page, it was written by Walter 
Markow, an East German Africanist, ‘assisted by Stephen Mhando’, who was Tanzania’s minister of 
state for foreign affairs. The publisher was named as the German-African Society in the German 
Democratic Republic. The pamphlet began: 
Why do the Chinese, when they talk among themselves, always refer to the Africans as the 
“devil slaves?” Because for many centuries they have regarded the Africans as inferior beings. 
Beings suitable only for slavery, or to be sterilised, or to be wiped off the face of the earth. 
The bizarre tract offered a batch of ‘historical’ examples to back up these wild accusations.369 
Characteristic of much of the ‘black literature’ circulating at the time in Dar es Salaam, the 
pamphlet raised several questions. Was it a genuine East German production? Or was it a false-flag 
forgery by their West German counterparts? Why the attack on China? And why did it claim the 
co-authorship of a senior figure in the supposedly non-aligned Tanzanian government? 
This chapter explores how Tanzania became a battlefield in a key Cold War subplot, the global 
struggle waged between the two German states. Left out in the cold by the West, the GDR turned 
to the non-aligned (and in many instances decolonising) states of the Third World for international 
recognition and the sense of legitimacy it craved.370 The West German response was the so-called 
‘Hallstein Doctrine’, which asserted that Bonn would sever diplomatic relations with any state that 
recognised the government of the ‘Soviet-Occupied Zone’. From a German point of view, this 
zero-sum game came to be the overriding factor in the two states’ foreign policies. ‘We judge 
almost every foreign event primarily from the standpoint of whether it increases or diminishes the 
isolation of the Zone’, said Karl Carstens, Bonn’s deputy minister for foreign affairs, in 1965.371 
While historians have made good use of archives in Berlin to trace the course of 
Anerkennungsdiplomatie in Tanzania, the story often ends with the establishment of the East German 
consulate-general and Nyerere’s rejection of West German aid in 1965. However, this was only the 
first chapter in a longer narrative. Dar es Salaam became the first capital in sub-Saharan Africa to 
house both West and East German diplomatic representations. Both sides sought the support of 
their respective blocs: the West Germans from their NATO allies, with their embassies clustered 
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around the city centre; their counterparts from among the communist embassies dotted along 
Upanga Road (‘Red Boulevard’). 
The inter-German rivalry in the Third World always involved a third party. In the aftermath of 
the Zanzibar Revolution and the act of union in 1964, Tanzania became embroiled in the German 
dispute, as the discussion of Anerkennungsdiplomatie in chapter 1 showed. Fighting their own Cold 
War in Tanzania, representatives of both German states had to negotiate the local political jungles 
of Dar es Salaam. At the same time, Tanzania fought to maintain a non-aligned position, detached 
from either Cold War alliance bloc. Tanzania occupied an anomalous position within the 
framework that the Hallstein Doctrine should have established: it is therefore an instructive test-case 
of the dynamics of the global inter-German rivalry. 
Tanzania’s own approach to foreign affairs meant that Dar es Salaam was a particularly valuable 
asset in the GDR’s Third World policy. As a key non-aligned state in Africa, Tanzania had potential 
to influence other states in the region should it decide to recognise the GDR. Representation in 
Dar es Salaam also gave the GDR access to the exiled liberation movements based in the city, 
especially FRELIMO. By the same token, Bonn’s reputation in Tanzania was damaged by its 
continued military and political support for FRELIMO’s enemies, the Portuguese. The GDR made 
this a centrepiece of its propaganda campaign in Africa, claiming it as evidence that West Germany 
had not escaped from its colonial and fascist past.372 As a memorandum drawn up by the 
International Relations Division of the SED in December 1968 put it, Tanzania represented a ‘key 
point in the GDR’s foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa’.373 The consequence of these 
dynamics was that both states became obsessively preoccupied by the other’s activities in Dar es 
Salaam, with reports on ‘West Germany’ or the ‘Soviet Occupied Zone’ dominating diplomatic 
despatches home. 
The two German states thus fought a bitter propaganda war across Dar es Salaam, utilising and 
contributing to city’s rumour-filled public sphere. This ranged from glowing reflections on the East 
German socialist paradise or the West German economic miracle, through subtler stories placed in 
the local press, to libellous pamphlets like ‘China and the Devil Slaves’. Both sides fought for 
influence among the local press. The GDR found sympathy among the staff at the Nationalist and 
its sister publication Uhuru. When Mhando was removed from his position as managing editor of 
the newspapers in 1966, the GDR bemoaned the decision as an attempt by Nyerere to curb the 
radicalism of the party press.374 The West Germans lamented the greater resources which the GDR 
pumped into its Dar es Salaam propaganda campaign. After visiting Tanzania in March 1967, one 
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federal minister expressed his concern at the ‘well produced’ handouts distributed by the East 
German consulate-general and Bonn’s incapability of mounting a comparable operation.375 
The dark arts of propaganda could backfire, however. In December 1965, the West German 
embassy complained to the Tanzanian government about a pamphlet entitled ‘Brown Book: War 
and Nazi Criminals in West Germany’. The Braunbuch accused the West German president, 
Heinrich Lübke, of having as a Gestapo agent directed the construction of a concentration camp 
during the Second World War. When the West Germans received no reply to their complaint, they 
approached the Tanzanian ambassador in Bonn, demanding that Gottfried Lessing, the East 
German consul-general, be declared persona non grata. Nyerere ordered the Ministry for Home 
Affairs to ban the booklet. According to information the West German embassy obtained from the 
Indonesians (who had good relations with the Eastern Bloc representations in Dar es Salaam), the 
government tried to pull in around one thousand copies of the pamphlet from circulation – an 
indication of the size and expense of such propaganda operations. Lessing was hauled before the 
Tanzanian authorities and severely reprimanded.376 Shortly afterwards, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs issued its circular banning attacks on third party states in Tanzania. ‘We will have to be 
more cautious and reserved from now on’, wrote an East German diplomat, tellingly.377 
East German aid remained concentrated in Zanzibar, but as the Anerkennungsdiplomatie saga 
showed, full recognition could only be achieved by negotiation with a more circumspect union 
government. Talks in late 1965 over long-term aid, technical assistance, and trade agreements came 
to little, despite the involvement of A. M. Babu.378 By the turn of 1967, the GDR believed it had 
made little ground in mainland Tanzania. The Stasi observed that the measures taken by West 
Germany in response to the creation of the GDR consulate-general in Dar es Salaam had been a 
success in terms of the Hallstein Doctrine. No other African state had established official ties of 
any sort with the GDR since, while Bonn had been ‘gradually and quietly improving its relations 
with Tanzania’.379 
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Post-Arusha politics and the GDR  
The GDR greeted the Arusha Declaration with quiet optimism. The Weltanschauung set out by 
Nyerere may not have been congruent with communist doctrine, but the East Germans welcomed 
the nationalisation measures, revolutionary language, and Marxist undertones of the Declaration. 
The Stasi enthused that Nyerere, under the influence of left-leaning governments in Guinea, Mali, 
and the United Arab Republic, had decided that capitalism would not serve the interests of the 
Tanzanian masses. Even more important, the Stasi believed, were events in Zanzibar. ‘The fact is 
that without the existence of the Zanzibar Revolution, the present developments on the mainland 
would have been unthinkable.’380 The political windfall for the GDR also seemed favourable. From 
Mhando, then editor of the trade union newspaper Mfanyakazi, the GDR received reports that 
Nyerere was privately more favourable than generally believed towards raising the status of the East 
German representation in Dar es Salaam.381 
In response, GDR ratcheted up its propaganda activities in Dar es Salaam. The East German 
news agency, the ADN, introduced a Swahili-language bulletin. The consulate-general recognised 
that given official criticism of West Germany’s ‘revanchism, militarism, and neocolonialism’ was 
difficult, the news agency might have greater room for manoeuvre.382 It also pointed out to 
Tanzanian bureaucrats a series of articles appearing in the West German press which were critical 
of the Arusha Declaration.383 In June, the West Germans complained about the circulation of a 
‘Grey Book’ in Dar es Salaam by ‘agents of the Soviet Occupied Zone’. West Germany claimed that 
this pamphlet was ‘a conglomeration of forged documents, distorted quotes and data which are 
designed to bolster false charges against German personalities.’384 
Lessing determined that Tanzania’s long-term objective must be to strengthen its relations with 
the socialist states. He therefore sought to forge links with ‘progressive politicians’ among the 
Tanzanian élite. Lessing singled out Oscar Kambona as a potential ally, plus the two leading 
Zanzibari Marxists in the union government, Kassim Hanga and Babu.385 Hanga and Kambona had 
been long acquainted with the GDR, which both had visited in 1962. Hanga had come to East 
Berlin in his capacity as general-secretary of the ASP, prior to Zanzibar’s independence. An East 
German journalist noted that ‘he did not shrink from describing himself as a communist.’386 
Kambona had been introduced to the GDR by Oginga Odinga, the Kenyan socialist, as part of ‘a 
general scheme recently agreed upon by progressive forces in East Africa to establish at Party level 
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good working relations with Communist parties in socialist countries.’387 When Peter Spacek, a 
correspondent for the ADN and Neues Deutschland, moved from Zanzibar to Dar es Salaam in 1965, 
he was instructed to make contact with Kambona, who was deemed to have been always in favour 
of improved relations with the GDR.388 
Having aligned itself with what it perceived to be Tanzania’s ‘left’, the GDR’s standing in the 
country was severely damaged by the political turmoil which followed the Arusha Declaration. In 
the immediate aftermath of the June ministerial reshuffle, the development expert Martin 
Breetzman cautioned from East Berlin that while Arusha socialism presented new opportunities to 
the GDR, the cabinet changes had strengthened the position of those with ‘right-wing, pro-
capitalist’ views.389 By September, Babu had been marginalised and Kambona and Hanga had taken 
flight to London. Even worse, the rumour that the GDR had been paying Kambona, whether true 
or false, was a severe blow to its reputation. 
The fundamental flaw in the GDR’s approach was the ideological lens through which it 
interpreted local affairs in Tanzania. The left-right spectrum was a distinctly European 
construction, with its apogee in the interwar politics of Berlin and Paris, which had been recast 
along the bipolar lines of the Cold War order. Nyerere’s attempts to break free from these 
restrictions through a non-aligned African socialism should have been a warning that such 
distinctions were unsuitable for interpreting Tanzanian politics. Moreover, personal ambition often 
relegated ideology to secondary concerns. At its weakest, Marxism or Maoism was little more than 
an emancipatory language of protest rather than a theoretical basis for political action.390 
The GDR therefore looked to a Tanzanian ‘left’ for political support. Its diplomats made a 
series of misjudgements about the ideological inclinations of certain Tanzanians. As we have seen, 
Kambona may have been a radical, but he was also deeply opportunistic and caught up in a 
personal rift with Nyerere. The example of Eli Anangisye is instructive here. He was a close contact 
of the GDR, which was impressed by his impassioned rhetoric about African liberation and militant 
activism as secretary-general of the TYL. Reporting Anangisye’s arrest in July, Spacek described 
him as ‘the archetypal ultra-left-wing revolutionary’.391 However, a former student leader doubted 
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that Anangisye was ‘ideologically left’, but rather ‘just a young, hot-headed patriot, who did not 
agree with certain policies of the state, particularly in terms of foreign policy.’392 Communist 
diplomats were not alone in making such judgements: a West German diplomat stated that 
‘Anangisye must be described as extreme-left’.393 But unlike their Western counterparts, the GDR 
compounded these ill-considered judgements by associating itself with the likes of Kambona and 
Anangisye. 
Even before the wave of arrests and Kambona’s flight into exile, the GDR was reconsidering its 
position in Tanzania. On 17 July, Lessing cautioned against working with the ‘so-called left’, which 
was disparate and disorganised group of individuals, lacking both political talent and constructive 
alternatives to ujamaa socialism. Given these shortcomings, he stated, ‘in our further work here, it is 
important to change our stance towards Babu.’394 The response from East Berlin was scolding. On 
23 August, the head of the Africa Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Ministerium für 
Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, MfAA) wrote that the GDR’s ‘close contacts’ were ‘too oriented to one 
side’, with ‘the danger of political damage to the GDR.’ Lessing rejected this criticism, claiming that 
the consulate-general had other friendly connections among the local elite. He also argued that the 
GDR had distanced itself from Kambona once he had lost his government positions and his 
‘adventurous line’ became clear.395 
However, this last claim was not wholly correct. Between early April and 6 July, Lessing 
travelled to East Germany to attend the SED’s Seventh Party Congress. In his absence, the GDR’s 
junior diplomats in Dar es Salaam maintained public contacts with the extremist fringe of the local 
political scene. After Anangisye was dismissed as TYL secretary-general, Lessing had instructed his 
colleagues to break off contacts with him. Yet in the consul-general’s absence, one subordinate, 
Hans Fischer, maintained close relations with Anangisye. On 4 July – less than a fortnight before 
Anangisye was arrested – the pair had dined together in a public place. In another colourful 
episode, Fischer bumped into Babu at the Palm Beach Hotel, the Zanzibari’s baraza of choice. An 
alcohol-fuelled evening ended with Fischer accompanying Babu to the home of a South West 
Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) leader, where they stayed drinking until the early hours. 
When Lessing found out about these escapades, Fischer narrowly escaped being sent back to East 
Germany.396 
The GDR sought to extricate itself from these entanglements in the messy fallout from the 
Arusha Declaration. According to Czech intelligence, in November 1967, Kambona and Hanga 
attempted to travel from Guinea back to London via Berlin, where they wished to meet with an 
MfAA representative. However, the Stasi intervened to return the duo to Britain via Paris instead. 
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The East Germans then informed Karume about their actions, presumably to demonstrate that 
they had severed their ties with the two disgraced politicians.397 However, this was a case of damage 
limitation. The events of the mid-1967, with which the GDR had been ‘guilty by association’ were a 
major setback, especially given the growing Chinese presence in Tanzania: in September, the first 
tripartite agreement on the TAZARA railway was signed. 
If at first glance the Arusha Declaration had therefore represented grounds for optimism for the 
GDR, by the end of 1967 the outlook was more pessimistic. Although a paper high on Marxist 
jargon produced by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in January 1968 accepted that the Arusha 
Declaration ‘forms a favourable foundation for the struggle of progressive forces for non-capitalist 
development in Tanzania’, it coldly stated that ‘the conception of socialism does not comply with 
modern science’ and so ‘will not lead to the construction of a socialist society’.398 A report 
submitted by Lessing in March predicted that development would be slow on the mainland, where 
the most progressive influence would come from Zanzibar, where the GDR continued to extend its 
aid commitments.399 All the same, he realised that the prize of full diplomatic recognition could 
only be won in Dar es Salaam.400 
Ostpolitik in Afrika 
In October 1967, a new West German ambassador presented his credentials to President Nyerere. 
Herbert Schroeder, the outgoing head of mission, had held the post since 1962. According to the 
French ambassador, with whom he shared premises on Azikiwe Street, Schroeder had ‘maintained 
an insufferable obsession’ about the GDR’s presence in Dar es Salaam, which ‘certain 
representations from the Eastern countries’ had encouraged by ‘throwing oil on the fire’.401 
Referring back to Nyerere’s rejection of West German aid, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung argued 
that there was little to be gained by ‘crying over spilt milk’ and suggested that the change in 
ambassador was an opportunity for improving Bonn’s relations with Tanzania.402 
Schroeder’s successor was Norbert Hebich, who made a very different impression. His views on 
East Germany were remarkably relaxed. Shortly after his arrival in Dar es Salaam, Hebich made a 
courtesy call on the dean of the diplomatic corps, who was coincidentally the Soviet ambassador, 
Andrei Timoschenko. Hebich told Timoschenko that he accepted that there were essentially two 
German states and that the Hallstein Doctrine in its present form was unsustainable. He said that 
 
397 Rivat, 16 November 1967, ABS, HSR, 12234. 
398 Africa Division, MfAA, 5 January 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/964, 1-17. 
399 Lessing, 11 March 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/958, 7-16; Helmut Matthes, ‘Zur Entwicklung 
außenpolitischer Grundlagen’, 74-76. 
400 Lessing, 25 September 1967, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/963, 369-96. 
401 Naudy to MAE-DAL, 14 March 1967, CADN, 193PO/1/25 AII3. 
402 Herbert Kaufmann, ‘Worüber zwischen Bonn und Tansania gesprochen werden könnte’, Franfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 December 1967, 2. 
Inter-German Cold War  
94 
he had to follow Bonn’s strict instructions to not attend diplomatic functions at which the GDR 
was also represented, although he personally disagreed with this protocol.403 In his own account of 
the meeting sent to the Auswärtiges Amt, Hebich stated his intention to attend such functions 
‘without regard to the GDR’s presence, so as to not leave the field open and thereby not yield 
ground.’404 The GDR consulate-general’s early impression was that Hebich was ‘significantly more 
flexible and adroit than Schroeder, who was not very popular among the Tanzanian side.’405 
Hebich’s arrival came at a time when the basic tenets of West German foreign policy were going 
through something of a revolution. In December 1966, the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich 
Demokratische Union, CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemocratische Partei Deutschlands, 
SPD) formed a ‘grand coalition’ government in Bonn. The SPD’s Willy Brandt became foreign 
minister. A former mayor of Berlin, Brandt looked for an impasse out of a Cold War order based 
on mutual deterrence. He sensed a grassroots desire for a more progressive foreign policy. Rather 
than isolate the communist regimes, he sought to reach out to Eastern Europe, building 
connections through trade negotiations across the Cold War divide. In a Europe stalemated by 
nuclear standoff, Brandt believed that opening dialogue with communist societies would spread 
Western consumerism and liberal values to the East. In Brandt’s vision, writes Jeremi Suri, ‘Bonn 
would induce the Kremlin and its satellites to dig their own grave.’406 Brandt’s new Eastern Policy – 
Neue Ostpolitik – involved compromising the principle of cutting relations with states that 
recognised the GDR. In January 1967, West Germany resumed diplomatic ties with Romania. A 
year later, it reopened relations with Yugoslavia.407 
For the participants in the triangular East German-West German-Tanzanian relationship, 
Bonn’s new policy contained a mixture of opportunity and danger. From Tanzania’s perspective, 
the waters of the Hallstein Doctrine, muddied by the implications of the Anerkennungsdiplomatie saga, 
were disturbed once more. As an advocate for world peace and the relaxation of superpower 
tensions, Nyerere welcomed Brandt’s endeavours towards détente. Tanzania’s support for self-
determination in Africa and the spirit of pan-African unity which it claimed to underpin the 
Tanganyika-Zanzibar union also made it favourable to any policy leading to reunification in 
Germany. ‘We were the United Republic of Tanzania’, the country’s ambassador to Bonn at the 
time told me. ‘So as a country which seeks to unite its people […] we welcomed the efforts of Willy 
Brandt.’408 The possibility that the diffusion of tensions in Europe might lead to a weakening of the 
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Hallstein Doctrine also renewed hopes that the suspended aid arrangements, which Bonn had 
partially withdrawn and Tanzania totally rejected in 1965, might be revived. 
Whereas previously West Germany’s foreign policy had been based on upholding the Hallstein 
Doctrine, now it sought to rally global opinion behind détente in Europe. Brandt believed that a 
relaxation in Cold War tensions over the Berlin Wall would free up West German resources to 
support development in Africa.409 Unlike the Hallstein Doctrine, which was ostensibly a rule 
governing Bonn’s relations with the whole world, Ostpolitik was grounded in the geopolitical 
situation in Eastern Europe.410 Yet the overlapping nature of the two positons, embodied by 
Bonn’s establishment of relations with Romania and Yugoslavia, meant they became enmeshed, 
thereby ‘globalising Ostpolitik’, as Sara Lorenzini puts it.411 This global dimension was problematic 
for West Germany: diplomatic concessions to the GDR in the Third World would reduce Bonn’s 
bargaining power in Europe. The Hallstein Doctrine was therefore required as ‘political cover’ for 
Ostpolitik.412 Brandt’s initiative thus presented West Germany with the possibility of rebuilding its 
relations with Tanzania via the resumption of capital aid, but at real political risk. 
For the GDR and its sympathisers, the thaw provided precedents which lent themselves to the 
argument that the Hallstein Doctrine no longer applied. In March 1967, Hanga told the GDR that 
in the light of Bonn opening diplomatic relations with Romania, the Hallstein Doctrine was 
‘absolutely meaningless’.413 In September, a senior bureaucrat in the Tanzanian Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs told Lessing that the government was receptive to the GDR’s stance towards West 
Germany, which ‘only formally maintains the Hallstein Doctrine and no longer believes in it.’414 On 
the other hand, Eastern European policymakers feared that Ostpolitik represented a tool with which 
to split the socialist bloc. Moscow responded to Brandt’s early overtures by demonstrating greater 
solidarity with East Germany. The Soviet Union sent a memorandum in March 1967 to selected 
non-aligned leaders, including Nyerere, warning them of the ‘neocolonial’ nature of the Hallstein 
Doctrine, which it described as ‘an expression of great power policy’, in the same mould of Second 
Reich imperialism and Hitler’s fascism.415  
In these circumstances, Hebich’s arrival in Dar es Salaam gave West German policy in Tanzania 
a liberalising shot in the arm. In his first lengthy despatch to the Auswärtiges Amt in December 
1967, Hebich set out the case for bringing Tanzania in from the cold. He expressed concern at East 
Germany’s expanding local presence at the same time as more West German technical experts were 
being withdrawn: ‘even if we cannot expand our field, we should at least defend the territory we 
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have already required’. ‘The new orientation of our Ostpolitik must have been noticed by the 
Tanzanian government,’ Hebich observed, given the questions he was receiving about the current 
status of the Hallstein Doctrine. The establishment of the EAC incentivised deepening economic 
relations, especially as an association agreement with the European Economic Community was 
under negotiation (and was signed in July 1968). Hebich argued that the Hallstein Doctrine was 
outdated. Just as Yugoslavia was considered a special case in the communist world, so Tanzania 
should be treated as such in Africa. Hebich recommended ‘a broad-minded policy towards 
Tanzania, which in the long-term will give us greater freedom of manoeuvre to defend our interests 
than the present insistence on barely tenable standpoints.’416 
Hebich’s call for the revival of full ties with Tanzania divided opinion in Bonn. In March, the 
Auswärtiges Amt prepared a lengthy report on West German-Tanzanian relations, in response to a 
request made by Kai-Uwe von Hassel, the federal minister for displaced persons, refugees, and war 
victims.417 Although the report’s authors agreed that there was some merit in renewing 
development aid, they provided a string of counterarguments. New aid for Tanzania would be at 
the expense of states which had greater respect for West German interests. Tanzanian policy was 
increasingly anti-Western, as its stance on Rhodesia, relations with the communist world, and the 
‘radical role’ it played at the UN all showed. The country was becoming a ‘military bastion for Red 
China’ and did nothing to stop the GDR’s propaganda campaign against West Germany. The 
report also highlighted the underlying danger that providing new capital aid would encourage other 
African countries to institutionalise contact with the GDR.418 The document chimes with Rui 
Lopes’ observation that the Auswärtiges Amt at this time exhibited an overriding concern for Cold 
War geopolitics and a profound scepticism towards post-colonial African states.419 
These divisions persisted at a conference of West German ambassadors to sub-Saharan Africa 
held in Abidjan in March-April 1968. There, as Lorenzini notes, ‘the clash between the old thinking 
of the diplomatic establishment and the more open attitude of the new political leadership became 
manifest’. Brandt told the meeting that the priority of West German relations in Africa was to drum 
up support for Bonn’s stance on the German question, which would then be linked to development 
assistance. He did not mention the Hallstein Doctrine. In contrast, the secretary of state, von 
Scharpenberg, used his concluding speech to restate West Germany’s commitment to the Hallstein 
Doctrine. He even claimed that Bonn’s policy towards Tanzania had been a success, contrary to 
Hebich’s own impression.420 
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Sensing a relaxation in Bonn’s stance, by the time of the Abidjan conference Tanzania had 
already put out diplomatic feelers to West Germany. On 5 March 1968, Amir Jamal, the pro-
business minister for finance, called on Hebich. He broached the subject of West Germany’s 
reopened relations with Yugoslavia and Romania, and mentioned he was considering tagging a visit 
to Bonn on to the end of a meeting of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development in Paris the following month. Hebich maintained the government’s line that Ostpolitik 
was West Germany’s own concern and that it reserved the right to distinguish between ‘friendly’ 
and ‘less friendly’ states.421 But the problem of defending ad hoc policy that seemed to contradict 
the axioms of the Hallstein Doctrine was apparent. On the Tanzanian side, there was a clear 
willingness to re-engage with West Germany in the search for the aid required to drive forwards its 
socialist policies. 
In Dar es Salaam, the GDR noted an intensification of West German activity. Lessing reported 
that there seemed to have been a ‘change in tactics in the West German attitude towards Tanzania. 
It must therefore be reckoned that a rethinking process [Umdenkungsprozeß] is taking place.’422 The 
GDR exhibited a hypersensitivity to West German propaganda activity. On 2 February, Nairobi’s 
East African Standard ran a story critical of communist aid projects in Zanzibar.423 This followed a 
motif in which the West Germans were believed to insert stories into Kenyan newspapers that were 
then distributed in Tanzania, where the left-leaning local press was resistant to such tactics.424 By 
June, the West German embassy (or the ‘German embassy’, as its name plaque provocatively read) 
was distributing a Swahili-language news bulletin, imitating the East German initiative in 1967.425 
The GDR feared that Ostpolitik’s peace-building appearance masked Bonn’s real intention of 
spreading discord among the Eastern Bloc. It was concerned by the local manifestation of Ostpolitik 
in Dar es Salaam, as West German representatives went on a microdiplomatic offensive to 
construct relationships with their Eastern Bloc counterparts. The consulate-general highlighted 
West Germany’s policy of ‘bridge-building’ (Brückenschlag) in Tanzania, in which Hebich was 
cultivating ties with Czechoslovakian, Hungarian, Polish, and Bulgarian diplomats in an attempt to 
isolate the GDR.426 Lessing stressed to his Eastern Bloc colleagues in Dar es Salaam the dangers 
these meetings represented.427 In Moscow, Pravda condemned the shift in West German 
Afrikapolitik set out by Brandt at Abidjan as a ‘neocolonial intrigue’, designed to deepen the 
continent’s dependence on the capitalist world.428 
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On the other hand, the weakening of the Hallstein Doctrine, implicit in Bonn’s opening of 
relations with Belgrade and Bucharest, offered the GDR hope for improving relations with 
Tanzania. In early 1968, the consulate-general used the example of Yugoslavia in both printed 
material and a string of meetings with government officials to make the case for full recognition of 
the GDR by Tanzania.429 However, Lessing was disappointed by the lack of a concrete Tanzanian 
response to these initiatives, blaming it on Western pressure.430 The consulate-general asserted that 
it had been unable to fully eliminate the Tanzanian government’s illusions about Ostpolitik and the 
entry of the SPD into the coalition government. ‘Bonn’s demagogic efforts to demonstrate a 
conversion in its Ostpolitik are not seen through.’431 This concern underlines that Ostpolitik was 
perceived by East Berlin less an opportunity than a threat to its unique position among sub-Saharan 
states in Tanzania. 
The GDR responded by intensifying the propaganda war. It continued to attack West German 
policy towards Portugal and South Africa. This predictable line found favour among the Tanzanian 
press. A Nationalist article in April made unfounded accusations that 17,000 West German troops 
were fighting in Mozambique and 2,000 ex-Wehrmacht officers were training South African forces.432 
In his pseudonymous column in the Nationalist, Babu sarcastically mocked a report on the Abidjan 
conference which he had read in a West German embassy handout, the Bulletin, quoting Brandt as 
saying that ‘[n]early all African states follow and welcome Bonn’s policy of detente, its policy 
towards Eastern Europe and its policy of peace.’433 The Auswärtiges Amt believed it was ‘probably 
inspired by the “Soviet Occupied Zone” consulate-general’ and submitted a formal protest about 
both articles to the Tanzanian ambassador in Bonn.434 In doing so, it perceived the unlikely hand of 
the GDR in an article that was characteristic of Babu’s general hostility towards Western 
‘imperialism’435 – another indication of the Federal Republic’s tendency to view developments in 
Tanzania through a Germanocentric prism. 
On 5 July, Hebich handed Nyerere a protest note, which catalogued purported GDR attempts 
to slander West Germany in its news bulletins. Nyerere told Hebich that the West Germans had his 
full support on the matter. He had long found the GDR’s propaganda activities disagreeable and 
had warned the consulate-general about its behaviour. Nonetheless, he thought that the GDR was 
‘slapping itself in the face’ with its crude propaganda and ‘showing its inferiority complex’. After all, 
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the GDR had built the Berlin Wall, which sent out a stronger message than any propaganda. 
Nyerere affirmed that he would not recognise the GDR, which he thought did not represent the 
people of the ‘Zone’ and was merely a Soviet puppet. He also said that the GDR’s position in 
Zanzibar was slipping, since the Karume regime was tiring of its ‘pushy and schoolmasterly 
attitude’.436 
The visit of von Hassel 
The various strands of the localised inter-German struggle in Dar es Salaam were brought together 
by the visit of von Hassel, the West German minister who had previously floated the idea of 
restarting capital aid to Tanzania. After touring the country and holding a private interview with 
Nyerere, on 9 August von Hassel called a press conference at the West German embassy. The 
report in the more radical Nationalist predictably dwelt on von Hassel’s insistence that Bonn would 
not support the southern African liberation movements. However, the Standard cited von Hassel as 
claiming that Nyerere had told him that Tanzania would never recognise East Germany. The West 
German embassy told its American colleagues that von Hassel had been ‘too enthusiastic’ in his 
account of his audience with Nyerere, although its gist was consistent with Hebich’s own recent 
meeting with the president.437 
Von Hassel’s visit took place amid a propaganda cyclone. Just prior to his arrival, a pamphlet 
entitled ‘Outlook from the Pamirs’ was circulated in Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam. The booklet was 
a vicious assault on China. It drew comparisons with Hitler’s Germany, alleged Beijing planned to 
create an ‘Asiatic Reich’, and described Mao as the ‘Socialist Genghis Khan’. This followed a visit 
by Nyerere to China and North Korea in June.438 Shortly afterwards, two anonymous Swahili 
pamphlets appeared in Dar es Salaam, the former criticising the government in quite temperate 
terms, the latter a scurrilous personal attack on Nyerere. The American ambassador reported that 
the president was ‘furious’ and was considering taking libel action if the authors could be 
identified.439 
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Suspicion immediately fell on the GDR – an indication of their track record for propaganda in 
Tanzania. The consulate-general thought that ‘Outlook from the Pamirs’ was the work of Western 
intelligence agencies seeking to denigrate the GDR ahead of von Hassel’s trip. In response, the 
consulate-general prepared a series of counterpropaganda articles in its Swahili-language newspaper, 
Urafiki (‘Friendship’). East Berlin also instructed its consulate in Zanzibar to prepare a 
memorandum for the Karume government, distancing the GDR from the pamphlet and explaining 
that its timing was no coincidence.440 Although the Swahili pamphlets were generally regarded as 
the work of the exiled Kambona and his supporters, the rumours which had connected Kambona 
with communist money in 1967 meant that the GDR again fell under the spotlight. Hebich 
considered the GDR’s involvement unlikely, but understandably did nothing to dampen the 
gossip.441 
By the time the GDR submitted its aide-mémoire in Zanzibar, the union government had already 
intervened in the affair. On 13 August, the Nationalist carried an editorial entitled ‘Hands Off’, 
which explicitly warned the Eastern Bloc against interfering in Tanzanian affairs. ‘We did not fight 
against the Western colonialists to become the playthings of any Eastern country’, it stated.442 Dar 
es Salaam, as the East Germans put it, was transformed into a ‘real rumour-mill’ 
(Gerüchtemacherei).443 American and British diplomats believed that the author was Nyerere 
himself.444 Communist and Western observers alike felt that it was directed at the GDR. Rashidi 
Kawawa, the second vice-president, insisted to Lessing that it neither targeted the GDR nor was 
connected with von Hassel’s visit. However, the Yugoslavian ambassador was told by the 
Tanzanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the article was aimed at the GDR and the Soviet 
Union.445 
Taken together with the interview with Hebich on 5 July, the ‘Hands Off’ episode demonstrated 
Nyerere’s fundamental animosity towards the GDR. He resented its presence in Zanzibar, which 
was a destabilising factor in fragile intra-union relations. Further, the German question itself and 
the difficulties of resolving the dilemma within the framework of non-alignment deprived Tanzania 
of much-needed aid – a problem which Nyerere seemed now more inclined to blame on East 
Berlin than on Bonn. According to the Soviet embassy, Nyerere had complained in government 
circles that ‘thanks to the GDR we have harmed our relations with the richest state in Europe’.446 A 
Stasi report on the ‘attitude of Tanzania towards the GDR’, compiled prior to von Hassel’s visit, 
recognised this problem. It observed that Nyerere had resolved that it was not in his interest to 
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raise the diplomatic status of the GDR in Tanzania, because of the inevitable Western backlash and 
the loss of Bonn’s economic aid.447 Whereas in 1965, Nyerere had acted on principle, a 
combination of the experience of the GDR’s ‘co-habitation’ with West Germany in Tanzania and 
the need for aid now pushed him away from East Berlin. 
The invasion of Czechoslovakia and its aftermath 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik was not the only attempt to recalibrate the glacial Cold War situation in Central 
Europe. In Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubček’s regime sought to meet rising domestic discontent 
with a programme of liberal reform. But the ‘Prague Spring’ of 1968 spiralled out of control, as the 
lifting of censorship led to calls for deeper democratisation. On the night of 20-21 August, a 
coalition of Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia. The Prague Spring was brought to a swift 
conclusion. 
The invasion of Czechoslovakia may have reasserted Soviet control over Eastern Europe, but it 
was a public relations disaster for Moscow. As Suri notes, ‘[w]hile Mao Zedong’s followers waved a 
“little red book” pledging power to the masses, the Kremlin could only offer the so-called 
“Brezhnev Doctrine” – a commitment to use force in defence of the political status quo.’448 The 
headlines and editorials in the Tanzanian press screamed outrage. On 23 August, a demonstration 
led by university students ended with stones being thrown at the Soviet embassy: among the 
protest’s leaders was Tanzania’s minister of state for foreign affairs, Chediel Mgonja. The 
government issued a tersely-worded statement condemning the invasion. ‘The Government of the 
United Republic of Tanzania opposes colonialism of all kinds, whether old or new, in Africa, in 
Europe, or elsewhere’, it concluded.449 
The Warsaw Pact’s well-oiled Dar es Salaam propaganda machines burst into action. The Soviet 
embassy received instructions from Moscow ‘to strengthen elucidative work’, ‘expose Western 
propaganda’, and explain the ‘underlying reasons’ for the invasion.450 Although the Swahili daily 
Ngurumo initially condemned the invasion, it soon switched back to its usual tune, dedicating pages 
to pro-Soviet material.451 The Czechoslovakian embassy, which stood beside the Dubček 
government, issued a series of information bulletins, Habari Katika Czechoslovakia (‘News from 
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Czechoslovakia’), which carried the defiant statements of politicians in Prague.452 Having kept a low 
profile immediately after the invasion, the GDR distributed pamphlets to government officials in 
September on the ‘Counterrevolutionary Developments in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic’.453 
A Chinese embassy bulletin carried a statement from Zhou Enlai, who compared the Soviet Union 
and Czechoslovakia to ‘fighting dogs’.454 
The Czechoslovakian crisis opened up many of the rifts that Hebich’s localised Ostpolitik had 
already tried to exploit in Dar es Salaam. Over a month after the invasion, Lessing informed East 
Berlin that there had been no contact between Yugoslavian and Warsaw Pact diplomats since 21 
August.455 This was more than a symbolic blow: the Yugoslav embassy had been an important 
source of local political intelligence for the GDR, given the shared non-aligned position of Belgrade 
and Dar es Salaam.456 Nicolae Ceauşescu’s Romania had not participated in the invasion. On arrival 
in Tanzania on 23 September, Bucharest’s new ambassador made a thinly-veiled attack on the 
Soviet Union, calling for respect for ‘independence, sovereignty, and non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of other states.’457 The Czechoslovakian chargé d’affaires maintained his support for 
the Dubček government and broke off contact with his Warsaw Pact colleagues. According to 
Lessing, he demonstrated an ‘extraordinary kleinbürgerlich-opportunistic’ attitude and did all he could 
to slander the other socialist states.458 These discords among the Eastern Bloc were believed to 
have been exploited by the West. In December, the Stasi concluded that ‘reactionary forces’ had 
used Tanzania’s position on Czechoslovakia to increase their influence over Nyerere and encourage 
greater cooperation with the West.459 
With the GDR’s stock at a low, Hebich made a fresh pitch for increased West German 
engagement with Tanzania. The invasion of Czechoslovakia, he wrote to the Auswärtiges Amt, had 
induced an ‘overdue correction in Tanzania’s stance towards the Eastern Bloc’, with consequences 
favourable to Bonn. Hebich set out the case for restarting a full capital aid programme: Nyerere was 
a strong, responsible leader, who had held to his position on the non-recognition of the GDR. The 
main barrier to improved relations with Tanzania was no longer the faltering Hallstein Doctrine, 
but Bonn’s stance on southern Africa – a problem aggravated by East German propaganda. He 
urged Bonn to spell out the West German attitude towards Portugal and South Africa more 
persuasively. ‘Nothing more should stand in the way of a full normalisation of economic and 
political relations’, he stated.460 
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Tanzania reconsiders its relations with the Eastern Bloc 
On 1 November 1968, Mhando replaced Mgonja as minister of state for foreign affairs. Mgonja 
was a personal favourite of Nyerere, but he had developed a reputation for incendiary outbursts. 
His behaviour during the Czechoslovakia demonstration, when he had led protestors over the wall 
of the Soviet embassy, proved an embarrassment too far. He was moved to the Ministry of 
Health.461 
Mhando was another Nyerere loyalist and his experience within the TANU leadership stretched 
back to the origins of the independence struggle. More significant, however, were his connections 
to the GDR. Between 1961 and 1963, Mhando had taught Swahili in Leipzig, where he had married 
an East German. On his return, he had served as the managing editor of the TANU newspapers, 
the Nationalist and Uhuru, and later of the trade union weekly, Mfanyakazi (‘The Worker’), which 
often carried GDR propaganda. According to the American ambassador, Mhando was a ‘crook’ 
with a ‘long history of communist contacts’, noting also that he had past associations with 
Kambona.462 The coldest response to the appointment predictably came from the West Germans: 
the GDR consulate-general reported that Hebich had not paid a courtesy visit to the new minister – 
and that Mhando’s response had been to ignore an invitation from the ambassador to dine at his 
residence.463 
The appointment of Mhando boosted the GDR’s hopes for improved relations with Tanzania. 
Horst Schlegel, the ADN correspondent, proved a valuable intermediary. ‘Comrade Schlegel has 
good connections with Mhando. He can call on him at any time without an appointment’, wrote 
Wolfgang Zielke, who was briefly head of mission following Lessing’s recall to East Germany in 
November 1968.464 In late November, Schlegel chanced on Mhando in a Dar es Salaam nightspot. 
‘Does it strike you that I am a friend of the GDR?’ asked Mhando. He invited Schlegel for an off-
the-books meeting. Through Schlegel, the consulate-general channelled a series of questions about 
GDR-Tanzanian relations to Mhando, who promised to put them before Nyerere. Mhando assured 
Schlegel that Tanzania sought deeper ties with East Germany and that an improvement of 
Tanzania’s relations with socialist states would naturally take place as the Czechoslovakian crisis 
faded from memory.465 
The damage done to the reputation of the socialist bloc in Tanzania by the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia does not seem to have been lasting, at least among government circles. By the end 
of the year, relations with Moscow had recovered sufficiently to permit a Soviet naval visit to 
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Tanzania – the first since the days of Tsarist rule.466 In December 1968, Nyerere informed the 
Hungarian ambassador that all Tanzanian ministers had been briefed that measures must be taken 
to improve relations with socialist states, because otherwise the goals of the Arusha Declaration 
could not be realised. He said that the response to the crisis in Czechoslovakia had been a 
demonstration of the underlying moral logic behind Tanzania’s foreign policy, but that case was 
now closed.467 Nyerere told Timoschenko that the reaction to events in Czechoslovakia ‘belonged 
to the past’ and that Tanzania was interested in an improvement in relations with Bloc. He intended 
to make a trip to Moscow in April or May 1969, having postponed the visit in September 1968.468 
Nyerere’s position here was consistent with the motif of his foreign policy: diversifying 
Tanzania’s sources of aid, so as to both maximise donor income in his drive to modernise its 
economy along the lines of Arusha socialism and also maintain his credibility as a non-aligned 
leader. These two strands of thinking – one economic, the other political – were mutually 
reinforcing. Nyerere was sensitive to claims that he was too sympathetic to China, especially after 
the huge TAZARA loan and the decision taken in February 1969 that, on the expiration of 
arrangements with Canada at the end of the year, Tanzania would accept military aid from Beijing 
alone.469 This alarmed observers in both the East and West. The CIA believed that the Tanzanian 
Ministry of Defence was especially pro-China. In January 1970, it cautioned that China’s growing 
role in the military ‘could eventually pose a serious threat to Nyerere’s hold on power or his use of 
it.’470  
Nyerere publicly dampened talk of Chinese political influence in Tanzania. In May 1969, he told 
an AFP reporter that ‘we are a stubborn people. The Chinese will learn that if they want to control 
us they will get into trouble.’471 Speaking in Dar es Salaam at a preparatory meeting ahead of the 
1970 Non-Aligned Conference, Nyerere noted that the rise of China had complicated the Cold 
War: ‘the so-called “Iron Curtain” has become less solid, and whether a “Bamboo Curtain” exists 
or does not exist, the People’s Republic of China does exist. The “Power Game” has become three-
sided, and those wishing to stand outside it have further complications to deal with.’472 Continuing 
to work with the Soviet Bloc was an essential aspect of a triangular balancing act between the three 
superpowers, while also keeping open channels of foreign aid. 
The appointment of Mhando was part of this strategy. According to one former Tanzanian 
diplomat, the new minister used his background to maximise aid connections with Eastern 
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Europe.473 It was on this basis that a GDR delegation sent to attend the anniversary of the Zanzibar 
Revolution in January 1969 perceived the olive branches offered by Nyerere and Mhando to the 
Bloc as being grounded in ‘tactical-pragmatic considerations’, rather than ideological inclination.474 
Later that month, Mhando told Schlegel that Nyerere had given the all-clear to the conclusion of 
government-level agreements between the GDR and Tanzania.475 Shortly afterwards, Mhando 
circulated a note to all Tanzanian ministries informing them of the decision.476 In April, Mhando 
arranged a meeting between Erich Butzke, the new East German consul-general,477 and Nyerere – 
the first audience the GDR had obtained with the president since August 1967. Although nothing 
of substance emerged from the interview, it was another indicator of the GDR’s rehabilitation, 
which owed much to Mhando’s cooperation.478  
These were the circumstances in which ‘China and the Devil Slaves’ appeared. ‘The inclusion of 
Stephen Mhando in the forgery is regarded as the first official reaction among imperialist circles to 
his appointment as minister of state’, wrote Schlegel.479 Butzke told Mhando that the pamphlet was 
clearly a West German production, like ‘Outlook from the Pamirs’. Mhando informed Schlegel that 
Nyerere himself regarded it as ‘nonsense’ and did not think the GDR was behind it.480 The only 
public word on the matter came from a TASS correspondent, who filed a story describing the 
pamphlet as a ‘provocation’ by West German ‘revanchists’.481 Investigations undertaken by 
diplomats in Dar es Salaam and State Department officials in the United States produced more 
questions than they did answers.482 The episode serves as a prime example of Dar es Salaam’s dirty 
Cold War propaganda wars and their complicating effects on politics in the city. 
‘No recognition by the backdoor’ 
Over the first half of 1969, the Grand Coalition in Bonn became increasingly divided over the 
direction of Ostpolitik in light of events in Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the GDR won a flurry 
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of diplomatic victories. In April and May, Iraq, Cambodia, and Sudan all announced their 
recognition of the GDR. Iraq and Sudan had already severed relations with West Germany due to 
Bonn’s support for Israel in the Six Day War of 1967, but the situation in Cambodia demanded a 
stronger response. Ultimately, Brandt’s split government chose to ‘freeze’ diplomatic relations with 
Phnom Penh, rather than fully break them.483 Buoyed with optimism, at a press conference in Dar 
es Salaam on 16 July, Butzke said that the key reason for the string of recognitions was Third World 
states’ realisation of ‘the undisputable reality that there are two sovereign German states.’484 
At the same time as Mhando was advancing the GDR’s cause in Tanzania, West Germany’s 
Afrikapolitik came under increased criticism in Tanzania. In September 1968, a consortium of firms 
known as Zamco came to an agreement with the Portuguese government to construct the Cahora 
Bassa dam, a massive hydroelectric scheme in northern Mozambique. The contract was signed a 
year later. Zamco included five West German companies and its credit was guaranteed by Brandt’s 
government. To African eyes, West Germany’s participation in the project confirmed its collusion 
with Portuguese colonialism.485 In April 1969, the OAU expressed its frustration over the 
intransigence of the white minority regimes in its ‘Lusaka Manifesto’, which criticised unnamed 
European states for supporting the Portuguese war effort.486 Addressing the UN in September, 
Mhando made a sweeping attack on Bonn’s military and financial aid to Portugal.487 
The low point in public relations between West Germany and independent Africa came in the 
aftermath of the Portuguese-backed mercenary invasion of Guinea in November 1970.488 Sekou 
Touré’s regime alleged that there had been a West German hand in the attack, which aimed to 
overthrow a government that was supporting the liberation movement in Guinea-Bissau. A West 
German inquest into the contents of a white paper issued by Conakry on the invasion found that 
the evidence it contained was ‘contradictory’, ‘obviously absurd’, and ‘ludicrous’. The report argued 
that the GDR had fabricated the West German connection to the mercenary operation to blacken 
Bonn’s reputation further.489 In Dar es Salaam, Hebich confronted the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
about the appearance of articles repeating such allegations in the Standard.490 Regardless of the truth 
behind the accusations, West Germany’s continued good relations with Portugal damaged Bonn’s 
standing in Africa. As Rui Lopes shows, Brandt’s government uneasily maintained its ties with 
Lisbon, wary that destabilising the unity of the NATO bloc would jeopardise the success of détente 
in Europe and thus prioritising Ostpolitik over Afrikapolitik.491 
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Yet while West Germany attracted bitter public criticism in Tanzania, the two states quietly 
worked to improve their relationship. As the Anerkennungdiplomatie crisis faded from memory and 
West Germany sought to develop its image in the Third World as a modern welfare state, a theme 
expounded by Brandt at Abidjan, Tanzania continued to explore the possibilities of renewed aid 
from Bonn. ‘You live in a rich country’, Nyerere half-joked with a group of West German 
journalists in April 1969, ‘and therefore it would be good if you could give us a little more of your 
money!’492 The following October, a team led by Jamal tagged a trip to Bonn onto the end of a aid-
seeking tour in Scandinavia. The delegation discussed the potential for West German aid for 
Tanzania’s second five-year plan, to be announced in 1970.493 
Jamal’s negotiation partner, Erhard Eppler, proved a key intermediary in re-establishing this aid 
relationship. Whereas Brandt subordinated West Germany’s Afrikapolitik to the overriding concern 
of Ostpolitik, Eppler prioritised the question of Third World development.494 In October 1969, the 
same month that Brandt became chancellor following the SPD’s strong performance in the federal 
elections, the West German government announced its adoption of the recommendations of the 
World Bank’s Pearson Commission as the basis of a new development policy.495 In contrast to the 
Auswärtiges Amt, Eppler’s Ministry for Economic Cooperation (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche 
Zusammenarbeit, BMZ) was critical of Bonn’s ties to Lisbon. In October 1970, Eppler used a 
German newspaper interview to condemn NATO’s policy towards Portugal. ‘How much longer 
will the Portuguese tail still be allowed to wag with the NATO dog?’, he said.496 During his first 
visit to Tanzania in 1969, Eppler was impressed by Nyerere’s vision of a self-reliant Tanzania. On a 
personal level, he struck up a close relationship with both Nyerere and Jamal. Thereafter, Eppler 
sought to increase West German aid to Tanzania. He recalled that at each federal budget, there 
would be a dispute between the BMZ and the Auswärtiges Amt: the latter demanded an increase in 
support for the Brazilian junta and a cut to aid to Tanzania; Eppler argued vice-versa.497 
However, the greatest barrier to the GDR’s recognition in Tanzania was not the latter’s 
resurgent relations with Bonn, but Nyerere’s own hostility to East Berlin. The president’s views of 
East German activities in Zanzibar were distinctly negative. Far from the islands being a showcase 
for ‘actually existing socialism’, by the end of the 1960s the Karume dictatorship presided over a 
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closed society devoid of political freedom and wracked by self-induced economic strife. The GDR’s 
development projects fell flat, especially a flagship housing scheme, which proved unsuitable for 
African purposes.498 The authorities also tired of the GDR’s over-assertive behaviour, preferring 
the more frugal and less pushy approach taken by China.499 ‘Through ineptitude, arrogance, and 
their own version of fiscal responsibility, they [the GDR] have largely brought about their own 
decline, although, no doubt, abetted by the Chicoms’, an American diplomatic report concluded 
June 1970.500 The GDR’s relations with Zanzibar reached a nadir days later, when the Karume 
regime expelled the East German consul.501 This soured relationship strengthened scepticism on 
the mainland about cooperation with the GDR. 
Nyerere was steadfast in his resistance to elevating the GDR’s diplomatic status. The Stasi 
gloomily reported that in leading political circles in Dar es Salaam, it was widely held that Nyerere 
had no readiness to recognise the GDR.502 In June 1969, Mhando wrote to Nyerere, suggesting that 
the GDR be invited to send a ministerial-level delegation to the Saba Saba trade fair, held annually 
in July to commemorate the founding of TANU. Mhando argued that following decisions taken by 
Cambodia, Iraq, and Sudan to recognise the GDR, the gesture would be a symbolic means of 
demonstrating the GDR’s ‘improved status’. Mhando passed Nyerere’s terse response to the East 
Germans. 
Steve: I am going by protocol. I want there to be no misunderstanding on the German matter. 
We do not recognise the GDR. Certainly, the day will come when we recognise it. I don’t know 
when. But at the moment we do not recognise it. What does ‘improved status’ mean? The 
decision over whether the GDR will be recognised or not will be taken in Tanzania and not in 
Cambodia or Sudan. And there will be no recognition by the backdoor.503 
Later in the year, on a tour of Eastern Europe, the reports which filtered back to East Berlin about 
Nyerere’s comments on the German question offered the GDR little encouragement. Playing to his 
audiences in Budapest and Moscow, Nyerere said that he supported the recognition of the GDR in 
principle, but did not want to be the first African state to do so.504 The Polish embassy in Budapest 
reported that Nyerere was also concerned about Tanzania’s present level of economic dependence 
on other states for aid. Seeking to placate Eastern European opinion, Nyerere therefore tied the 
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question of recognition to Tanzania’s own economic development, encouraging further aid.505 
More revealingly, in non-aligned Belgrade, Nyerere told Tito that there was no possibility of any 
change at the present time.506 
The contrasting fortunes of the two German states in Tanzania were demonstrated by a 
comparison of two ministerial visits to the country in early 1970. In March, Eppler paid a five-day 
visit, which took place against a backdrop of criticism of West German policy towards Portugal and 
South Africa. The previous month, the West German embassy had been forced to publicly defend 
itself against remarks made by Bhoke Munanka, a minister of state, when opening a meeting of the 
OAU Liberation Committee in Dar es Salaam. Munanka described West German participation in 
the Cahora Bassa scheme as a ‘slap in the face’ of Africa.507 Upon his arrival in Tanzania, Eppler 
was handed a bitterly-worded open letter to Brandt from FRELIMO.508 At a press conference, 
Eppler faced fierce questioning from local journalists.509 
Despite this onslaught, Eppler’s trip was a qualified success. Tanzania and West Germany 
agreed to establish a framework for regular bilateral consultations and Eppler made clear Bonn’s 
commitment to assist Tanzania with the implementation of the second five-year plan.510 He 
accompanied Nyerere in inaugurating an agricultural training and research centre, which had been 
supported by a $4 million West German grant.511 The Tanzanian authorities refrained from 
mentioning the issue of Cahora Bassa.512 In an emerging theme in his conduct of foreign policy, 
Nyerere sought to isolate pragmatic questions of aid from Tanzania’s belligerent anticolonial 
stances. While the West Germany’s public image continued to suffer in Tanzania, relations between 
the two countries deepened through the early 1970s via the partnership between Eppler and 
Jamal.513 
The following month, Otto Winzer, the GDR’s foreign minister, also visited Dar es Salaam. 
During his brief stay, he signed agreements on trade and technical cooperation. Facilitated by 
Mhando, they represented the first intergovernmental agreements between Tanzania and the 
GDR.514 Nyerere praised the GDR for its support for the liberation struggles in southern Africa. 
Winzer also met representatives of the liberation movements, who, according to a lengthy interview 
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he gave to the Standard, confirmed their appreciation for the GDR’s aid.515 Although the visit 
received little press in Tanzania, the East German state media gave it extensive coverage.516 
However, in terms of furthering the GDR’s overriding ambition in Tanzania – full diplomatic 
recognition – Winzer’s visit had no tangible success. Immediately before his arrival in Tanzania, 
Winzer had visited Mogadishu, where he had secured recognition of the GDR from Siad Barre’s 
pro-Soviet regime. West Germany subsequently refused to pledge any new aid to Somalia.517 The 
Standard cried foul, pointing out that while Bonn insisted on the separation of economic and 
political policies towards Portugal and South Africa, in Somalia it was using economic pressure for 
political ends.518 Yet the Tanzanian government remained unsympathetic to Winzer’s demands. 
According to the French ambassador, in a private meeting with Nyerere, Winzer had pleaded for 
recognition. The only response he received was Nyerere’s vague acceptance of a surprise invitation 
to visit the GDR, which did not come to fruition.519 
Prior to the GDR delegation’s arrival, Hebich had given a demarche to the Tanzanian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, in which he warned that any signal that Tanzania was preparing to recognise the 
GDR might disrupt relations between the two German states amid ongoing intergovernmental 
talks. The demarche also stated that since Brandt perceived the talks as an early step towards 
German reunification, by recognising the GDR, Nyerere would be harming the German people’s 
cause for self-determination. The dismissal of Mhando as minister of state for foreign affairs in 
October 1970 further weakened the GDR’s cause. The move was widely foreseen, since for some 
time Babu had attended OAU and UN meetings in Mhando’s place. The French ambassador gave 
several reasons for his departure, among them an alcohol problem and occasional ‘scandalous’ 
behaviour. Yet he noted that there were political reasons too: having initially been appointed to 
stabilise Tanzania’s relationship with Eastern Europe, Mhando had overstepped his remit, and now 
appeared a threat to Nyerere’s intention to build aid relationships across all superpower blocs.520 
Conclusion 
Brandt’s ambitions eventually ran into the constraints of the bipolar order in Europe. The Soviet 
Union was wary of loosening its control over the GDR, especially after the crisis in Czechoslovakia. 
West German Ostpolitik took a conservative turn and aimed at stabilising the Cold War system 
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rather than transforming it. The Moscow Treaty, signed by West Germany and the Soviet Union in 
August 1970, acknowledged the permanence of East-West divisions in Europe, including the inter-
German ‘frontier’. In the ‘Basic Treaty’ of December 1972, the two German states recognised each 
other’s sovereignty. 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik froze over the Cold War order in central Europe by representing a de facto 
Western acceptance of the status quo behind the Iron Curtain.521 But in finishing off the Hallstein 
Doctrine, it opened up new possibilities for both German states in the Third World. After the 
signing of the Basic Treaty, a deluge of Third World states immediately opened full diplomatic 
relations with the GDR. On 21 December 1972, Tanzania formally recognised East Germany.522 
However, to present this as a ‘victory’ for the GDR would be misleading: as William Glenn Gray 
concludes, ‘East Germany did not “win”; its rival threw in the towel.’523 
The GDR’s efforts to gain recognition from Tanzania were damaged by its own behaviour in 
the country. While Tanzania continued to support GDR membership at the UN, its shoddy aid 
programme and intrusive approach in Zanzibar discouraged Nyerere from testing the waters of full 
recognition. The GDR’s reputation was also tarnished by its associations – real and rumoured – 
with the ‘opponents’ of the Arusha Declaration. The GDR’s attacks on West Germany’s policy in 
southern Africa gained the sympathies of the radical press, but did little to advance its own cause. 
On the other hand, the West Germany’s more reliable offers of aid proved attractive. Once the 
aftereffects of the Anerkennungsdiplomatie dispute had worn off, West German development 
assistance returned as a major pillar of Tanzania’s external aid, facilitated by the close relationship 
between Eppler and Jamal. Brandt and Nyerere also established a strong understanding: both 
emerged as strong critics of north-south divisions and headed international commissions into the 
widening inequality gap.524 
The opening of Tanzanian-East German relations did not bring an end to the inter-German 
Cold War rivalry in Dar es Salaam. The propaganda wars continued to be a major worry for 
especially Western German diplomats. But the overriding Anerkennungsdiplomatie dynamic was no 
longer an issue. In Tanzania, the GDR strengthened its support for African liberation movements 
in the final stages of the fight against white minority rule. Freed from the constraints of the 
Hallstein Doctrine, West Germany could maximise its influence in the Third World as a donor 
state. Ultimately, the level diplomatic playing field created by spillover effects of Ostpolitik favoured 
West Germany, whose aid offers were superior to those of the relatively impoverished GDR. 
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Nyerere’s position on East Germany encapsulated his broader Cold War foreign policy, 
especially after the crisis years of 1964-65. His commitment to nonalignment pushed him into 
appointing Mhando as foreign minister, as a counterweight to fears that he was becoming too close 
to Beijing. But although this brought incremental gains for the GDR, Nyerere retained control over 
major foreign policy decisions. Juggling the implications of developments in Europe, such as 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, as well as in Tanzania, like the political 
fallout from the Arusha Declaration and the protest at the Soviet embassy, Nyerere thus maintained 
a steady course, true to his principles but pragmatic in intentions. 
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Chapter 4 
Oasis of liberation? FRELIMO in exile and the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane 
At around ten o’clock on the morning of 3 February 1969, Dr Eduardo Mondlane pulled up his car 
outside 201 Nkrumah Street, Dar es Salaam. The address housed the offices of FRELIMO, the 
guerrilla movement fighting Portuguese colonialism beyond Tanzania’s southern frontier. 
Mondlane was FRELIMO’s president. He collected his mail and drove to the beachfront villa of an 
American friend in the upmarket suburb of Oyster Bay. Mondlane preferred to work there, away 
from the noise and heat of Nkrumah Street. He sat down with coffee and sifted through his post. 
Unwrapping a parcel bearing stamps from Moscow, Mondlane saw that it was a rare French 
translation of the turn-of-the-century Russian Marxist, Georgi Plekhanov. He went to flip through 
the pages. When Tanzanian police arrived on the scene minutes later, they found Mondlane’s 
remains spattered across the room, ripped apart by a parcel bomb.525 
The liberation movements were the essential stimulus to Dar es Salaam’s emergence as a ‘Cold 
War city’, an aspect of the independence struggles in southern Africa which has been overlooked by 
historians. In contrast, Meredith Terretta’s study of Cameroonian nationalists and Jeffrey Ahlman’s 
work on Algerian, South African, and Zimbabwean exiles, have shown how the liberation 
movements which flocked to Accra after Ghana’s independence became enmeshed in local politics. 
According to Ahlman, the southern African exiles’ own experiences pushed Nkrumah into 
adopting a more radical foreign policy and away from his conviction in a ‘Ghanaian’ model of 
peaceful decolonisation.526 Rather focusing exclusively on the liberation movements, Terretta and 
Ahlman reveal how the experience of exile in Africa was a two-way interaction, shaping the politics 
of both freedom fighters and their hosts. 
Another fruitful approach adopted in several recent histories of contemporary Africa utilises 
assassinations as cracks through which to prise open the murky networks of transnational and 
international politics in the era of decolonisation. Investigative histories of the two highest profile 
deaths in the Congo Crisis – the murder of Patrice Lumumba and the mysterious plane crash which 
killed the UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld – have elucidated complex issues of 
contingency and agency that cross-cut narratives centred on the nation-state.527 Like Susan 
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Williams’ book on Hammarskjöld, this article does not offer a full explanation of Mondlane’s 
assassination. Rather, by setting FRELIMO’s struggle in the cosmopolitan political landscape of 
Dar es Salaam in the late 1960s, it shows how the movement was riven with tensions, caught up in 
Tanzanian affairs and the twin metadynamics of international affairs at the time, decolonisation and 
the Cold War. 
The liberation movements in Dar es Salaam 
‘Since Tanganyika became independent in December 1961, Dar es Salaam has become the main 
centre for African “liberation movements”,’ wrote a British diplomat in 1963. The city, as ‘the end 
of the escape route for refugees from South Africa and Mozambique, has become a hive of African 
nationalist activity and could pose a serious threat to the future of the remaining countries and 
territories of southern Africa still under white rule.’528 The array of liberation movements in the 
Tanzanian capital included those locked in struggle against Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa, 
plus a number of Malawian exiles, groups representing the Indian Ocean island colonies of 
Comoros and Seychelles, and a heterogeneous number of Afro-American activists. The OAU 
Liberation Committee headquarters was located in Dar es Salaam, where the port was a major 
conduit for arms arriving from the communist world and radical African states like Algeria. In 
training camps scattered around the country, guerrillas received training from the Eastern Bloc, 
China, and Cuba. Radio Tanzania also carried political programmes produced by the liberation 
movements and broadcast in vernacular across southern Africa.529 
The presence of the liberation movements in Dar es Salaam was the main attraction for the 
international press corps that became based in the city. The guerrilla leaders’ desire for global 
exposure meant they were willing interviewees, plugged into the city’s political networks, as the 
anecdote from Kapuściński which opened this thesis shows. ‘The steady news for a journalist in 
this interesting and important base was the work of the freedom-fighters’, recalled J. B. Thomson, a 
New Zealander who worked for the Standard and as a stringer for the Associated Press and 
Newsweek magazine.530 The liberation movements’ press releases were a staple of the local media, 
which carried their grossly exaggerated figures of enemy casualties. 
In Dar es Salaam, the liberation movement leaders mixed with representatives of foreign 
powers. The elevated status which they were accorded by the Tanzanian government meant that 
the guerrilla leaders were often invited to cocktail parties and embassy receptions. In 1965, the 
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British high commissioner told the Foreign Office that it would be ‘surprised to see the extent to 
which exiles and representatives of the various liberation movements circulate in diplomatic social 
circles here. They are to be seen at practically every National Day party or big reception.’531 
Towards Western diplomats, they acted more discreetly. ‘You had to keep it fairly low key because 
these liberation groups didn’t want to be seen talking to you too much, and they didn’t want the 
Tanzanian Government to become too concerned’, recalled one American official. The guerrilla 
leaders would therefore quietly slip into parties a few hours after they had started.532 
While Nyerere welcomed the liberation movements to Tanzania, their presence posed dangers 
to his government. The movements themselves could be fractious, destabilising local affairs. They 
also brought the risk of subversion by or direct reprisals from the forces of white minority rule. 
Following the mutiny in 1964, Nyerere limited the number of representatives per liberation 
movement in Dar es Salaam to four. Surplus officials, the British high commission reported, were 
to move to ‘a more remote place than the capital, where they would be less able to stir up trouble, 
and conversely, where foreign diplomats would be less able to subvert them.’533 Nyerere was 
concerned about the influx of arms into the country, especially when the communist powers 
delivered weapons directly to the movements, rather than through the coordinating body of the 
OAU Liberation Committee. As demonstrated by the case of Potlako Leballo and the Pan-
Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), explained in chapter 6, Nyerere’s opponents also made 
attempts to recruit disaffected guerrilla leaders into plotting against the regime. The Tanzanian 
attitude towards the liberation movements was therefore ambivalent. ‘Sometimes we were referred 
to as ‘revolutionaries’ and at others as “Wakimbizi” (refugees, or, more literally, runaways)’, recalled 
Ben Turok, the Africa National Congress (ANC) activist.’534 
Western alarm at the support which the liberation movements received from the communist 
world was heightened by the impoverished conditions in which their members often lived. With 
only a few exceptions, noted a British diplomat, the movements are ‘normally very short of money 
and have considerable difficulty in making ends meet. Their leaders often have only the clothes they 
stand up in and live in single rooms or squalid boarding houses.’535 The Canadian high 
commissioner described the groups as mostly ‘ineffectual coalitions of pathetic, half-educated exiles 
living off the charity of their African brothers and expending their energies largely in extravagant 
propaganda.’536 This rather jaundiced view of the liberation movements mirrored the tone of the 
more conservative Western press. Describing Dar es Salaam as ‘a pistol pointing at the heart of 
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African troubles’, a Sunday Telegraph correspondent portrayed an ‘African Beggars’ Opera 
spectacular’, in which ‘guerrillas from most troubled African States scheme together in little offices 
and jam the bars.’537 Interpreting local politics through equally crude Cold War assumptions, the 
Americans also feared the subversive effects of the liberation movements on Tanzania. ‘Nyerere 
came to power as one of the promising, British-trained African moderates’, set out the CIA in 
January 1967, ‘but his desire to re-make Africa around him is making him a captive of Communists 
and other extremists.’538 
FRELIMO in the Cold War world 
FRELIMO was created in 1962 from the merger of three separate Mozambican groups which had 
converged on Dar es Salaam in 1961: the Mozambique African National Union (MANU),539 the 
National Democratic Union of Mozambique (União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique, 
UDENAMO), and the African Union of Independent Mozambique (União Africana de Moçambique 
Independente, UNAMI). Nyerere was keen to prevent the fragmentation of the liberation struggle in 
Mozambique, especially as independent Congo fractured along ethnopolitical lines and the 
Zimbabwean liberation movement split into two rival organisations.540 FRELIMO was more than a 
fighting force: it provided relief for refugees from offices scattered across southern Tanzania; 
operated a school in Dar es Salaam, the Mozambique Institute; and produced a glossy propaganda 
brochure, Mozambique Revolution. Many contemporary observers believed that FRELIMO was the 
best organised of the Dar es Salaam-based liberation movements. In 1965, the Canadian high 
commissioner described it as ‘perhaps the only such organization in Africa which is now carrying 
out substantial operations designed to subvert and eventually overthrow a government under 
European control.’541 
President Eduardo Mondlane headed a twenty-man Central Committee. Born in Mozambique 
in 1920, Mondlane studied at university in Johannesburg, where he was expelled after a year, and 
Lisbon, before moving to the United States, where he obtained degrees from Oberlin College and 
Northwestern University.542 When Mondlane was elected the first president of FRELIMO in 1962, 
he was teaching Anthropology at Syracuse University. Shortly after, he resigned his position and 
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moved to Dar es Salaam with his white American wife, Janet, who organised the Mozambique 
Institute. 
Mondlane’s political outlook could be described as a form of grassroots socialism, attuned with 
a conservative pragmatism that recognised the pitfalls of global politics. Initially, he preferred a 
peaceful approach to independence, negotiated through fora like the UN. However, in the face of 
Portuguese intransigence, Mondlane decided there was little alternative to armed struggle. The war 
began on September 1964. Mondlane believed that victory over Portugal could be achieved only 
with the cooperation of the peasantry in liberated areas of northern Mozambique. This was owed in 
part to his understanding of both Mao Zedong and the experience of the Vietcong guerrillas.543 
Mondlane was adept in promoting FRELIMO’s cause by using the opportunities provided by 
the cosmopolitan surroundings of Dar es Salaam, especially the presence of the global media. ‘The 
most notable and refreshing African liberation figure I reported on was Eduardo Mondlane’, 
remembered Thomson. ‘He had his own press network and when he wanted particular cover he 
would use journalists from outside to ensure better, more broad acceptance and coverage.’544 
Mondlane’s engaging character and debonair style drew foreign admirers. An American doctor, 
who was well acquainted with Mondlane, recalled the scene at an Israeli independence day 
celebration held at the Kilimanjaro Hotel in May 1967.545 
Before we left I took notice of Eduardo. He was in his element, for he enjoyed the adulation he 
received and also the forum. Standing a head higher than almost everyone else, he was 
surrounded by admirers hanging onto his every word. […] That evening I did not join the 25 or 
30 people crowded around him, but his booming voice and precise rhetoric carried throughout 
much of the noisy gathering.546 
Largely due to Mondlane’s leadership, FRELIMO was the only Dar es Salaam-based liberation 
movement to receive aid from all three superpowers: he was an expert chameleon in attracting 
foreign support in the divided Cold War world. Other European states also made valuable 
contributions, especially the social-democratic governments in the Nordic countries. Initially, 
FRELIMO’s connections to the communist world were strongest with China, which Mondlane 
first visited in 1963.547 Chinese military instructors and arms soon began arriving for FRELIMO. 
Uria Simango, Mondlane’s deputy, was the closest of FRELIMO’s inner circle to Beijing. Simango’s 
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Maoist sympathies were well known. He was a familiar face at the Canton Restaurant, a short walk 
from the FRELIMO offices on Nkrumah Street.548 
As the 1960s wore on, FRELIMO developed stronger ties with the Soviet Bloc, at Beijing’s 
expense.549 This reflected a growing irritation among African states and guerrilla movements at 
China’s inflexible approach to bilateral relations – a trend to which the Tanzanian government was 
an exception. The Soviet Union harboured initial doubts about Mondlane’s ideological position and 
connection with the United States. It was more impressed with FRELIMO’s secretary for foreign 
affairs, Marcelino dos Santos, a genuine Marxist-Leninist.550 Like Mondlane, dos Santos had studied 
abroad. At the Sorbonne, dos Santos associated with groups of Francophone Marxists and radicals, 
including Aimé Césaire, Leopold Senghor, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Albert Camus.551 
After Mondlane’s requests to visit the Soviet Union in 1963 were rebuffed, a letter from dos 
Santos to the Soviet Union’s Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) produced a 
breakthrough. Mondlane travelled to Moscow in 1964 and 1966, returning on both occasions with 
promises of military aid and training. FRELIMO delegations also received aid from Czechoslovakia 
and East Germany. Over the course of the 1960s, the feeling rose in the Eastern Bloc that 
Mondlane was coming over to their cause. In November 1966, he met representatives of the 
GDR’s AAPSO in Berlin. The GDR concluded that Mondlane had moved to the left, under the 
steady influence of colleagues such as dos Santos and Samora Machel, an Algerian-trained 
revolutionary and FRELIMO’s director of military affairs. Mondlane complained to the East 
Germans about the treatment of a FRELIMO delegation in Beijing and China’s ‘divisive’ intentions 
in the Third World.552 Meanwhile, China began to support a rival organisation to FRELIMO, the 
Zambia-based Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique, 
COREMO).553 
The presence of the African liberation movements in Dar es Salaam posed a dilemma for the 
West. Washington and London expressed concern about their leftist inclination. Some cited this as 
reason enough for steering clear of the guerrillas altogether. Others argued that it was in the West’s 
interest not to lose touch with potential governments-in-waiting, to prevent them from slipping 
directly into the hands of Beijing or Moscow. ‘We do not wish to find ourselves entirely isolated 
from and out of sympathy with the rebel movements if and when they come to obtain a share in 
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power’, argued one Foreign Office official.554 In the case of FRELIMO, this problem was eased by 
Mondlane’s ability to strike a good rapport with Western diplomats. ‘Mondlane is one of the most 
cultured and intelligent Africans in Dar es Salaam – a potential Kaunda, Nyerere or Adu’, wrote the 
British high commissioner to Tanzania.555  
FRELIMO’s relationship with Britain and the United States was complicated by Cold War 
geopolitics. Unlike the pariah states of Rhodesia and South Africa, Portugal was a key NATO ally 
of Britain and the United States, especially given the strategic importance of the Azores air base. 
Encouraged by African leaders like Nyerere, whom he twice invited to the White House, in 1961 
President John F. Kennedy experimented with a more critical stance towards Portuguese 
colonialism at the UN and announced that Portugal’s use of NATO military hardware would be 
restricted to the northern hemisphere. In response, Salazar threatened to prevent the United States 
from renewing its soon-to-expire lease on the base. Kennedy backed down.556 
Nonetheless, Washington provided covert support for FRELIMO. While a student in the 
United States, Mondlane developed a lasting friendship with Wayne Fredericks, who became 
assistant secretary of state for Africa under the Kennedy administration.557 Via Fredericks’ 
introduction, in February 1963 Mondlane met Robert Kennedy, the attorney general, and Averill 
Harriman, under-secretary of state, in Washington. Both recognised that Mondlane represented the 
best chance for a negotiated settlement in Mozambique and a counterweight to more radical 
elements within FRELIMO. Aid was discussed: ‘fifty grand to keep the lid on his people and also 
stay on top’, as one official put it. Shortly after, the CIA channelled $60,000 to FRELIMO via the 
African-American Institute in New York. $99,700 followed from the Ford Foundation to the 
Mozambique Institute.558 Elsewhere in the United States, Mondlane courted support from various 
civil society groups, including the National Council of Churches, the National Urban League, the 
American Committee on Africa, and black colleges and universities across the country.559 
Despite FRELIMO’s openness to support from Beijing and Moscow, Western observers trusted 
Mondlane’s claims that he obtained arms from the communist powers simply because he could not 
do so from the West. ‘We would dearly love to use American, British and Belgian weapons’, 
Mondlane told Colin Legum of the Observer in 1967, but lamented that they were only available to 
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the Portuguese. ‘What are we supposed do’ he asked, ‘if, apart from the Africans, only the 
Communists will train and arm us?’560 In Washington, the National Security Council accepted this 
logic. At a 1967 meeting of the 303 Committee, which was responsible for overseeing the United 
States’ covert operations, former ambassador to Tanzania William Leonhart argued that Mondlane 
was ‘a force for moderation’ and that by supporting FRELIMO, ‘we would reindorse Mondlane’s 
pride and affection for the USA, buy some investment in stability for the movement and keep a 
better watch on the direction of struggle.’561 
Whereas maintaining public relations with the liberation movement leaders was impossible for 
the Western powers, the grey areas incumbent in political life in Dar es Salaam provided an 
environment for monitoring their activities. In 1964, the Foreign Office concluded that ‘links with 
the liberation movements’ were ‘valuable and useful’, as long as they were informal and discreet.562 
These contacts did not go unnoticed by Lisbon. In 1966, Salazar sent a letter to Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson, criticising the reception given to ‘terrorist chiefs’ by the British high commission in 
Dar es Salaam.563 But provided such liaisons remained discreet, Portugal had few grounds for 
complaint. Given Lisbon had no diplomatic representation in Tanzania, to do so would have 
acknowledged the presence of their subversive agents in its capital. 
The situation was more problematic for London when Mondlane visited Britain. The 
FRELIMO president was eager to meet his supporters among Britain’s anticolonial lobby. He made 
at least four trips to the country: twice in 1965, once in July 1967, and in March 1968. On the 
occasion of this final visit, the Portuguese ambassador wrote to the British foreign and 
commonwealth secretary, George Brown, even before Mondlane had arrived in London. Given the 
friendly relations between Britain and Portugal, ambassador Manuel Rocheta expected that ‘Her 
Majesty’s Government will not countenance the provision by any organisation in the United 
Kingdom of a platform for the conduct of subversive propaganda’ by someone who was 
responsible for ‘dastardly acts of terrorism’ in Mozambique.564 Rocheta was told that since the 
Mondlane had broken no laws, the British government would not interfere with his activities. 
Britain ‘had a long tradition of encouraging people to come and criticise our own Empire,’ Rocheta 
was reminded, and was ‘unlikely to change this practice.’565 After Mondlane’s arrival in London on 
6 March, Portugal’s foreign minister, Franco Nogueira, claimed that Mondlane was negotiating with 
the British government for the recognition of FRELIMO as Mozambique’s government-in-exile 
and expressed his ‘surprise and regret’ at Britain’s position.566 The Foreign Office did however 
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judge it worthwhile arranging a meeting with Mondlane: a significant decision, even if it was a 
secret encounter with a junior minister at a London hotel.567 
On 10 March, Mondlane suddenly cut short his planned two-week trip and returned to Dar es 
Salaam. An official at the Anti-Apartheid Association, which had organised the visit, told the Times 
that the reason ‘must have been something pretty urgent. He got this cable from Dar es Salaam and 
caught the first plane back.’568 
The reasons for Mondlane’s hasty departure soon became apparent.  While Mondlane canvassed 
for aid and political support overseas, FRELIMO appeared to be cracking apart from within. 
FRELIMO and its discontents 
Like many of the liberation movements, FRELIMO was an unhappy family. Its early years were 
plagued by splits, as the leaders of the parties which were subsumed into the unified movement 
under Mondlane resented their reduced status. By the late 1960s, the main opposition to Mondlane 
within FRELIMO was clustered around the figure of Lazaro Kavandame. He was a Makonde, an 
ethnic group which straddled the Mozambican-Tanzanian frontier. Waves of Makonde had 
migrated northwards into Tanganyikan territory over the preceding centuries, with influxes in 1922 
and 1933, as they fled exorbitant Portuguese taxes. Some were involved in the Tanganyikan 
independence struggle and later set up MANU – originally the Makonde African National Union. As 
the forerunners of FRELIMO, MANU’s members felt slighted at their displacement by the likes of 
Mondlane and dos Santos, who were from southern Mozambique.569 
Class differences mapped onto these ethnic divisions. Most Makonde were poorly educated: 
Kavandame did not speak Portuguese. Many held low-paid jobs on sisal plantations in Tanzania. 
The Central Committee leadership, on the other hand, was generally well educated. Some of its 
members had studied overseas. Unlike other, poorer liberation movement leaders, Mondlane lived 
in comfort in Dar es Salaam’s upmarket suburb of Oyster Bay. This drew criticism from 
FRELIMO’s rank-and-file, who lived in crowded dormitories or training camp barracks. 
‘Mondlane’s dogs eat better than we do’, grumbled one member. This image was not helped by 
Mondlane’s American connections or his intellectual demeanour.570 
However, this class divide did not produce a more revolutionary approach among the Makonde. 
Rather, while Mondlane, dos Santos, and Machel increasingly stressed the need for a ‘People’s War’ 
and the social transformation of the liberated territory, Kavandame and the so-called ‘Council of 
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Elders’, which represented a rival authority to the Central Committee, espoused a narrow, racially-
defined nationalism which saw the elimination of white rule in Mozambique as an endgoal in itself. 
They were deeply hostile to white members of FRELIMO, like Janet Mondlane. Dos Santos – a 
mestiço with a white, Jewish, South African wife – also fell under suspicion. The dual forces of 
socialism and nationalism, which had glued together so many other liberation coalitions elsewhere 
in Africa, were thus uncoupled. 
Mondlane’s connections with the United States were subject to continual rumour in Dar es 
Salaam, a city rife with anti-American animosity, whipped up by the radical press. In May 1967, a 
member of the Liberation Committee told a Polish diplomat that he was convinced Mondlane was 
working for the Americans.571 These rumours were encouraged by the embarrassing case of Leo 
Milas, who was FRELIMO’s first publicity secretary, having been invited to Tanzania from the 
United States by Mondlane. He was expelled from the movement in August 1964, after Mondlane 
found that he was actually an American, named Leo Clinton Aldridge.572 
These differences were drawn upon by rival leaders to further their own personal interests. 
Kavandame’s rejection of social revolution in liberated Cabo Delgado stemmed mainly from his 
own investment in the status quo. He and the chiefs working underneath him ran the province 
much like the Portuguese had done, extorting produce from the peasantry and, with the connivance 
of the local Tanzanian authorities, taking a cut from cross-border trade.573 At the same time, 
FRELIMO’s military campaign in Mozambique stalled. After making initial inroads in 1964-65, a 
Portuguese counteroffensive pushed back the guerrillas. FRELIMO fighters found it difficult to 
hold on to liberated territory. Despite the publication of wildly exaggerated Portuguese defeats and 
casualties in the Tanzanian press, the number of FRELIMO dead and lack of progress contributed 
to the growing resentment towards Mondlane.574 
As Michel Cahen cautions, historians should not seek to explain the crisis that followed via strict 
categories. He notes that issues of class, ethnicity, and ideological stances towards the Cold War 
powers all contributed to schisms, aggravated by the ‘internal democratic centralism’ that prevented 
public disagreement among the FRELIMO cadres. There was not a ‘simple crisis’, but rather 
‘tensions at the crossroads of numerous, varied factors, without the possibility of democratic 
control.’575 These splits did not go unnoticed by the Portuguese, nor by other foreign powers with a 
stake in FRELIMO. In mid-1967, the Portuguese secret police (PIDE) reported that Chinese 
agents were cultivating an opposition faction to Mondlane among Mozambican workers of 
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Makonde background at the Friendship Textile Factory, a Chinese-funded scheme in the Dar es 
Salaam suburb of Ubungo.576 
Furthermore, the same international media circuits which Mondlane skilfully exploited to 
publicise FRELIMO’s cause could also be used as cover for Portuguese-sponsored subversion. The 
E. D. O’Brien Organisation was a London-based public relations firm, with connections to the 
right-wing press and Conservative ‘Monday Club’ politicians, which was hired by the Estado Novo to 
brighten Portugal’s image in Britain. It was founded by Edward Donough ‘Toby’ O’Brien, a former 
Daily Telegraph journalist who had worked on British anti-Nazi propaganda efforts during the 
Second World War. While its main objective was ostensibly to encourage tourism to Portugal, it 
also had more subversive purposes. In 1965 and 1967, Patrick Orr, a British freelance journalist, 
twice travelled to East Africa on behalf of the O’Brien Organisation. During his first trip, Orr 
successfully ‘gained a measure of Mondlane’s confidence’ and also made a contact, a European 
woman who worked for a typing agency in Dar es Salaam, who was disgruntled at having to 
process FRELIMO publications, despite having ‘no love for Mondlane and his gang.’577 In mid-
1967, Orr travelled to Mozambique, which led to a number of articles in the British media 
‘disproving’ Mondlane’s claims to control a fifth of the country and stressing the extent of 
communist influence in FRELIMO.578 The extent to which these activities had any success is 
difficult to ascertain, yet they demonstrate how FRELIMO’s enemies, both in Lisbon and among 
supporters of white minority rule elsewhere, could use Dar es Salaam’s media networks for 
intelligence-gathering purposes. 
The crisis of 1968 
These tensions spilled over into open unrest in 1968. Mondlane’s hasty return to Dar es Salaam 
from London was prompted by trouble at the Mozambique Institute. At the centre of the crisis was 
Mateus Gwenjere, a Roman Catholic priest. Mondlane initially supported Gwenjere when he fled to 
Tanzania as a refugee from Mozambique in August 1967. Gwenjere was fast-tracked into 
FRELIMO’s leadership and represented the movement at the UN General Assembly. ‘Well, we 
were cooking our own goose’, Mondlane ruefully reflected in a retrospective letter to George 
Houser, a friend and head of the American Committee on Africa, an anticolonial pressure group.579 
Gwenjere began openly to criticise FRELIMO’s education policy. He tapped into discontent at 
the Mozambique Institute regarding the lack of scholarship opportunities to study abroad and the 
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leadership’s insistence that students spend time fighting at the front, to foment opposition to 
Mondlane. Encouraged by Gwenjere, the students called for the removal of the Institute’s white 
teachers. The ensuing stand-off resulted in the temporary closure of the Institute and reached a 
climax when a FRELIMO party, including Machel, raided the student dormitories on the night of 6 
March.580 
Weeks later, FRELIMO was convulsed by more violence. On 6 May, a group of Mozambicans 
forcibly closed the FRELIMO offices at 201 Nkrumah Street. When FRELIMO’s leadership 
succeeded in getting the offices reopened on 8 May, the following day the group of Makonde 
returned, armed with clubs and machetes. In the ensuing violence, one member of the Central 
Committee was fatally wounded. At the time, Mondlane was in Mozambique with representatives 
of the Liberation Committee. 
At a press conference, Simango blamed the unrest on underground Portuguese activities. He 
claimed that he did not recognise any of the eighteen men arrested and that none was a FRELIMO 
member.581 In a public statement on 26 May, Mondlane largely concurred: two of the men were 
former members who had deserted FRELIMO over a year ago, the rest were unknown to the 
leadership.582 These claims were rejected in a letter from the Makonde-dominated FRELIMO 
‘Council of Elders’, printed in the Tanzanian trade union newspaper Mfanyakazi. The letter accused 
Simango of conspiring against Mondlane, but then of shying away from cooperation with the 
Elders when they sought his cooperation in forcing new presidential elections. It also criticised 
Mondlane’s ‘contemptuous designs’ in refusing to work with the Elders and reopening the office.583 
 Gwenjere was also at the heart of this latest disturbance. In a letter to Houser, Mondlane stated 
that Gwenjere had lobbied the Tanzanian civil service and the Liberation Committee to shut the 
FRELIMO offices and order elections. When this proved unsuccessful, Gwenjere encouraged 
members of his church, who were mostly Makonde, to first close the offices and then attack the 
reopened premises. After the fracas, the Tanzanian government arrested a number of Mozambican 
refugees in Dar es Salaam, among them Gwenjere, with the intention of removing them from the 
capital.584 On 27 May, a Portuguese informer in Tanzania reported that ‘at any moment now, there 
will be an attempt on the life of Dr. Mondlane to assassinate him. He will be extremely lucky if he 
escapes or save [sic] his life from this attempt.’585 
In these circumstances, Mondlane bowed to Kavandame’s demands that FRELIMO hold a 
Special Congress in July, at which Kavandame and Gwenjere hoped to topple the leadership. 
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Kavandame wanted it to be held in southern Tanzania, where his support base was strongest. 
Instead, Mondlane decided to hold the meeting on liberated Mozambican soil. Fearing an anti-
Makonde plot, Kavandame and his supporters boycotted the Congress, at which Mondlane and dos 
Santos strengthened their positions. The former was re-elected president, beating Simango in a 
secret ballot. The Congress passed a programme that transformed FRELIMO into a more 
centralised ‘vanguard party’.586 
Portugal sought to exploit this crisis within FRELIMO. According to a report produced in 1973 
by the Italian secret services, between June 1968 and October 1969 Robert Leroy carried out a 
series of interviews in East Africa, including with Mondlane, dos Santos, and Gwenjere. Leroy was 
purportedly a journalist, but in reality worked for an organisation named Aginter Press.587 
Ostensibly a publishing house, Aginter provided cover for guns-for-hire and far-right extremists 
bent on protecting Portugal’s Estado Novo through violent means. Aginter was connected to 
Operation GLADIO, NATO’s stay-behind network of sleeper cells in western Europe after the 
Second World War. Originally intended to coordinate resistance in the event of a Soviet invasion, 
GLADIO instead became associated with groups that carried out false-flag terrorist attacks across 
Europe, which were blamed on left-wing extremists in order to whip up anti-communist sentiment 
and bolster conservative governments.588 Leroy’s work in Tanzania was part of Operação Zona Leste, 
a series of Aginter interventions against Portugal’s enemies in Africa. An Italian intelligence officer 
told journalist Frederic Laurent that ‘Leroy’s job of intoxication consisted of giving false 
information to the leaders of FRELIMO and of creating discord among them by playing on their 
personal rivalries’.589 
Concerned by the splits within FRELIMO, Nyerere made a rare direct intervention into 
liberation movement politics. In August he brought Mondlane and Kavandame together in Mtwara, 
southeastern Tanzania, but the latter refused to compromise. Instead, Kavandame pushed ahead in 
his attempt to set up a rival Makonde nationalist movement. He was deluded enough to think that 
Nyerere would support him, on the grounds that Tanzania was already providing assistance for the 
Biafran separatists in Nigeria. In December, Paulo Kankhombe, a FRELIMO representative sent to 
implement the reforms agreed on in July, was murdered in Cabo Delgado. On 3 January 1969, the 
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FRELIMO Central Committee suspended Kavandame from his duties as provincial secretary.590 
Kavandame responded, with the backing of the TANU regional chairman in Mtwara, by calling for 
further talks among the leadership and for Mondlane to stand trial.591 
Mondlane’s enemies in Tanzania 
These divisions within FRELIMO were not purely a Mozambican affair, but also involved 
Tanzanians pursuing their own agendas in destabilising Mondlane’s position. Given FRELIMO’s 
dependence upon Tanzania as a base from which to train troops and direct its war effort, the 
relations between the movement’s leadership and the Tanzanian government were an essential 
factor in Mondlane’s ability to hold his movement together. But the longer the liberation 
movements were based in Dar es Salaam, the more they became ‘domesticated’ and entangled with 
local political frictions. In FRELIMO’s early years, Mondlane was able to fall back on his good 
relations with the Tanzanian leadership, especially Nyerere and Kambona, to remove dissident 
members.592 In 1967, he told Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru, the director of Kivukoni College, 
TANU’s ideological school in Dar es Salaam, that FRELIMO was ‘very close to President Nyerere, 
we are very close to Rashidi Kawawa. When we have any problem, we go to them, and our 
problems are solved.’593 Kawawa’s Second Vice-President’s Office was responsible for the 
liberation movements’ security. But after Kambona fled into exile in 1967, those Tanzanians tasked 
with overseeing the guerrillas’ security were less inclined towards Mondlane. 
Among these officials was Lawi Sijaona, who was tasked with refugee matters as minister of 
state in Kawawa’s office. A British pen-portrait described Sijaona as ‘a vigilante, fanatical and 
lacking in humour’.594 Like Kavandame, Sijaona was of Makonde background – a reminder of the 
artificiality of the colonial border at Tanzania’s southern frontier. As the Portuguese military 
governor reported from Mozambique just days before Mondlane’s assassination, a ‘crisis which was 
initially an internal FRELIMO issue seems to have been generalised by Makonde connections.’595 
Hostile to Tanzania’s Asian commercial class, Sijaona shared Kavandame’s antipathy towards 
Mondlane on the same anti-white, racial grounds.596 The American embassy also believed that 
Sijaona resented the manner in which Mondlane frequently bypassed him in preference for dealing 
directly with Kawawa.597 
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Sijaona divided his time between his ministerial responsibilities and his role as chairman of the 
TYL, which became closely associated with Maoist practices. Its ‘Green Guards’, wearing shirts in 
the TANU colours, were consciously modelled on their Chinese counterparts. Sijaona himself had 
visited China as early as 1963 – before the establishment of Beijing’s close relationship with 
Tanzania – and accompanied Nyerere on another trip in 1968.598 These sympathies gave him 
common ideological ground with Simango, who was reportedly dissatisfied at FRELIMO’s 
deepening relations with the Soviet Bloc. 
Sijaona and senior civil servants in Kawawa’s office actively sought to undermine Mondlane. 
After the trouble at the Mozambique Institute, Mondlane attempted to clear rebellious students 
from the school by ordering its closure and for the students to be sent to rural camps. In Kawawa’s 
absence, Sijaona countermanded Mondlane’s order – until Kawawa returned and overruled his 
deputy.599 Similarly, on 29 May the Tanzanian government expelled three white Portuguese teachers 
from the Mozambique Institute and gave them three days to leave the country. A FRELIMO 
official told the East Germans that the decision was again taken in the absence of Kawawa, 
suggesting the hand of Sijaona. On this occasion, when Kawawa returned, he did not overturn the 
order, but merely extended the deadline for the teachers’ departure.600 According to Helder 
Martins, a white Portuguese doctor and FRELIMO’s director of health services, who was among 
the expelled teachers, Sijaona was closely associated with Gwenjere. Martins further alleges that 
Sijaona and Gwenjere were supported by the West German embassy in Dar es Salaam, seeking to 
counter East German influence over FRELIMO. In August, Mondlane himself told the GDR 
consul-general that Gwenjere had close relations with a junior West German diplomat in the city.601 
The very institution that was supposed to provide Mondlane’s security deliberately failed to do 
so. On 26 April, despite opposition from Sijaona, Mondlane won Kawawa’s agreement for a round-
up of FRELIMO deserters and dissidents in Dar es Salaam. However, these measures were never 
implemented.602 Subsequently, an embarrassed Kawawa was forced to defend his office against 
accusations made in Mfanyakazi that the attack on the FRELIMO headquarters could have been 
prevented by adequate police protection.603 In October, Mondlane told British officials in London 
that he believed Sijaona had known about the attack in advance – a not unlikely suggestion, given 
 
598 Hart to Holmes, 6 June 1969, UKNA, FCO 31/434/18; Brennan, ‘Youth’, 210-11; Lal, ‘Maoism’, 110. 
599 Burns to State Dept, 28 March 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN. 
600 Müller, 5 June 1968, BA, SAPMO, DZ 8/163. 
601 Helder Martins, Porquê Sakrani? Mémorias dum medico duma guerrilha esquecida (Maputo: Editorial Terceiro 
Milénio, 2001), 350; Jesus, Eduardo Mondlane, 314. I found no corroborating evidence in the West German 
archives. 
602 Burns to State Dept, 9 and 10 May 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2515, POL 13 TANZAN. 
603 Müller, 5 June 1968, BA, SAPMO, DZ 8/163. Kawawa subsequently attacked Mfanyakazi in parliament for 
false reporting. He questioned why the weekly newspaper had published this particular edition on Friday 
rather than Saturday as usual and criticised it for using a Tanzanian police source, rather than the Ministry of 
Information. ‘Mfanyakazi taken to task by Kawawa’, Nationalist, 11 May 1968, 1, 4. 
Oasis of liberation?   
 128 
the Makonde ethnic background of both the minister and the assailants.604 Mondlane also informed 
the East German consul-general that an internal Tanzanian investigation had found that many of 
the false accusations about him emanated from the Second Vice-President’s Office, alleging that 
Sijaona was collaborating with the Chinese.605 In a retrospective after Mondlane’s death, the GDR 
regretted the presence of ‘reactionary elements’ within the Tanzanian state apparatus, including 
Sijaona and George Magombe, the executive secretary of the OAU Liberation Committee.606 
Similarly, two days after the assassination, Czechoslovakian intelligence reported that ‘[s]ince 
December 1967, Tanzania has unleashed a systematic campaign to paralyse the progressive 
FRELIMO leadership’, naming Sijaona among the culprits.607 Sijaona and Magombe oversaw the 
failed talks between Mondlane and Kavandame in Mtwara in August 1968, suggesting that the 
former still – at that point – retained Nyerere’s trust.608 
In October, Sijaona was moved from the Second Vice-President’s Office in a cabinet reshuffle. 
Mondlane claimed to the British that this was the result of his petitioning of Sijaona’s superiors.609 
This may have played its part in Nyerere’s decision to move Sijaona to the less politically-charged 
position of minister for health, but there were other motives, as set out in the following chapter. 
Nyerere had tired of Sijaona’s antics as chairman of the TYL, especially his involvement in a 
raucous demonstration against the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
Parallel to the obstructive activities of the Second Vice-President’s Office, radicals among the 
Tanzanian press seized on the unrest in FRELIMO to make a series of attacks on Mondlane. The 
day after the fight at 201 Nkrumah Street, a Nationalist editorial contemplated the reasons behind 
the divisions within FRELIMO and other liberation movements. It criticised ‘some leaders’ for not 
respecting individual members. ‘As a result of such non-observance of the constitutional rights of 
ordinary members,’ it stated, ‘conferences are never called to allow for members to exercise their 
right to choose their leaders or to endorse their trust in the existing ones.’610 On 27 May, the 
newspaper carried extracts from a speech made in Dar es Salaam by President Karume. At a rally to 
mark Africa Liberation Day, Karume criticised the guerrilla movements for being more 
preoccupied with issuing news bulletins than liberating their territory. He called on their leaders to 
reject the bribes of ‘the very imperialists we are fighting’ and desist from befriending people whom 
they ‘fully well knew were enemies’.611 
In response to Karume’s warnings, the Nationalist delivered a brutal attack on the liberation 
movements. It accused certain unnamed leaders of living ‘luxuriously in air conditioned bungalows 
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in independent African countries at a time when their own people are suffering from untold 
colonial cruelties.’ Like Karume, the newspaper claimed that the freedom fighters were fraternising 
with their ‘imperialist’ enemies.  ‘It is not rare in Dar es Salaam for example to see a freedom fighter 
locked in heavy drinking bouts with strange faces of white men’, it continued, warning that ‘our 
brothers should be extra careful about such guises which the agents of the enemy may employ, 
through drinks, diplomatic parties or cheap bribes.’612 This attitude towards the liberation 
movements predated the unrest in FRELIMO in 1968: the previous December, the Stasi noted that 
the guerrillas were ‘increasingly seen as “salon parasites” [Salonschmarotzer] in Dar es Salaam.’613 Such 
latent feeling was brought to the boil by the violent incidents concerning FRELIMO. 
The extent of the opposition to Mondlane among the Tanzanian establishment was revealed 
again when, on 23 November, the Nationalist reported on a visit he had made to Nairobi. It claimed 
that, at a private dinner there, Mondlane had briefed a group of Americans, who were in Kenya to 
attend the Ford Foundation-sponsored ‘American-African Dialogue’ meeting. Some of them had 
connections in the State Department. The Nationalist repeated rumours that the CIA had penetrated 
FRELIMO. Mondlane claimed that he had been in Kenya to meet President Kenyatta and had met 
the Americans by chance.614 
Information passed to the British high commission in Dar es Salaam by a Zimbabwean 
liberation movement leader, who had spoken to Mondlane on his return flight from Nairobi, 
suggested that Mondlane’s discussion with the Americans was more organised than he admitted.615 
The group had included Wayne Fredericks, who had left the State Department the previous year. 
Fredericks observed that Mondlane seemed frustrated by the splits within FRELIMO and the lack 
of pressure put on Lisbon by Washington over the colonial question.616 
Regardless of Mondlane’s honesty about his dealings in Nairobi, the Nationalist’s selective use of 
information was another demonstration of its hostility towards him. The article was written by Nsa 
Kaisi, described by the American embassy as the Nationalist’s ‘leading Marxist true believer’. While 
condemning Mondlane’s meeting with the Americans, Kaisi neglected to mention that Joseph 
Nyerere, brother of the president, had also been in attendance. It was also odd that the Nationalist 
had based its article on a story from the Daily Nation, a Kenyan newspaper which had been banned 
in Tanzania the previous month, having long been attacked by the Nationalist as a vehicle of 
‘imperialist’ propaganda.617 
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Houser, who attended the meeting in Nairobi and then travelled onwards to Dar es Salaam, 
noted in a letter to the editor of Newsweek magazine that the incident and the Nationalist reports had 
produced ‘a great deal of flak’. Houser spoke to President Nyerere about the situation. Nyerere 
considered the Nationalist’s articles ‘ridiculous’, but added that ‘we don’t censor everything that goes 
into the paper.’618 Private criticism of Mondlane was heard elsewhere in government circles. In 
December, the minister of state for foreign affairs, Stephen Mhando, told Horst Schlegel, the ADN 
correspondent, that Mondlane should fight in Mozambique rather than ‘sitting around in Dar es 
Salaam’. He said that the Nairobi meeting confirmed Mondlane’s close proximity to the United 
States.619 Mondlane’s continued associations with Western diplomats in Dar es Salaam did not help 
his cause. While the East Germans acknowledged that Mondlane and FRELIMO were moving 
closer to the Eastern Bloc, they noted he maintained close relations with American diplomats, 
especially an attaché, Philip Potter – who was a CIA agent.620 
With FRELIMO fractured, its Tanzanian hosts distrustful or even openly hostile towards him, 
and Dar es Salaam agog with gossip, Mondlane began to fear for his safety. He was rumoured to 
have asked Nyerere in mid-December to expel Gwenjere from Tanzania in connection with the 
murder of Kankhombe. According to the French embassy, Nyerere flatly refused. A number of 
Gwenjere’s supporters were arrested, however, and when the priest approached to police to request 
their release on 28 December, he too was placed under detention, though all were released on 6 
January.621 
In mid-January, Portuguese intelligence in Mozambique reported that the crisis inside 
FRELIMO was worsening due to the conflict between Kavandame and Mondlane. They observed 
that Dar es Salaam was ‘swarming with people from all around, completely out of control and 
causing the FRELIMO leadership serious concerns.’622 Amid this unrest, Mondlane travelled to 
Khartoum, where he attended a ‘Conference of Solidarity with the Patriots of South Africa and the 
Portuguese Colonies’, organised by the Soviet AAPSO. As the headquarters of all six liberation 
movements involved, Dar es Salaam would have been the natural venue for the conference, but 
Tanzania refused to be involved due to its close relationship with China. Mondlane’s participation 
in the meeting, at which Chinese representatives were distinctly unwelcome, suggested the 
severance of his ties with Beijing.623 
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On 1 February, Mondlane met officials from the Second Vice-President’s Office. He expressed 
concern about the threat posed to him by Kavandame and his Tanzanian supporters, especially 
Sijaona.624 
Two days later, Eduardo Mondlane was dead. 
Who killed Eduardo Mondlane? 
The Tanzanian Criminal Investigation Department (CID) took up the murder case. It soon 
identified the Soviet stamp on the parcel as a forgery.625 The remnants of the device – plus two 
other identical bombs encased in further Plekhanov volumes, addressed to dos Santos and Simango 
in the following weeks and intercepted by the police – were sent to London for analysis by Scotland 
Yard. Through Interpol, they found that the batteries in the detonators had been manufactured in 
Osaka, Japan, and sold by a firm in Lourenço Marques (present-day Maputo). The police believed 
that the bomb had been constructed in Mozambique and then inserted into Mondlane’s mailbag by 
a FRELIMO member in Dar es Salaam.626 
The assassination has never been satisfactorily explained. Despite concluding its investigation in 
May 1969, the CID kept silent for three years. In February 1972, Radio Tanzania announced that 
the police knew who had killed Mondlane, but refused to name him, as he was a Portuguese 
resident in Mozambique.627 David Martin published a story in the Observer, which used insider 
information from the Tanzanian police to establish the technical specifics involvement in the 
bombing. Again, no culprit was revealed.628 
More recently, historians have blended oral testimony with archival research to address the 
unresolved crime.629 Yet no smoking gun has been found. As Duarte de Jesus observes, both the 
Soviet Union and China might have had vested interests in eliminating Mondlane, as the moderate 
tip of a movement lurching to the left.630 A British embassy official in Moscow noted that ‘the 
Russians may not be altogether sorry to lose Dr. Mondlane’, given his connections with the United 
States and the likelihood of him being succeeded by a more radical figure. But as the official then 
pointed out, Mondlane’s presumed successor as vice-president, Simango, was more inclined to 
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Beijing than Moscow.631 As we have seen, there were already suspicions that the Chinese had 
sought to foment discontent among Makonde workers in Dar es Salaam. However, the broad 
consensus is that the plan was hatched by the Portuguese, with the collaboration of Africans to 
transport the bomb to Tanzania. 
Lisbon was taken off guard by the assassination. An Overseas Ministry report concluded that 
although the turmoil arising from Mondlane’s death represented a short-term advantage to 
Portugal, the long-term consequences of a more revolutionary FRELIMO were far more 
disadvantageous.632 The Financial Times’ correspondent in Lisbon noted that ‘while there was 
obviously no sorrow felt about the rebel leader’s death, there was also trepidation about possible 
implications.’633 One Portuguese intelligence source in Lourenço Marques told the American consul 
of a fear that an extremist turn within FRELIMO might lead to the beginning of a terrorist 
campaign against the urban population of Mozambique.634 
The PIDE also distanced itself from the crime. An internal report did not try to disguise the 
PIDE’s distaste for Mondlane as Washington’s ‘pretty boy’, whose ‘sandcastle’ had been 
undermined by ‘sly’ Chinese diplomacy. It concluded that the responsibility for his death – together 
with the unrest within FRELIMO over the previous year – lay entirely with Beijing.635 The report is 
characteristic of the lens through which the PIDE interpreted politics in Tanzania, blurred by 
clumsy Cold War brushstrokes, as Cahen notes.636 In a conversation with a French diplomat in 
Lourenço Marques, the director of the PIDE in Mozambique speculated about the possible 
perpetrators, including the CIA, China, disaffected Makonde, and a fantastic conspiracy involving 
Nyerere and Hastings Banda, the Malawian president. ‘To this list, you may add the Portuguese, si 
vous les voulez’, he remarked, conscious that Portugal would be the prime suspect.637  
Even if we accept this denial as genuine, the absence of ‘official’ PIDE participation does not 
preclude the involvement of Portuguese agents, via the clandestine Aginter Press network. As the 
British high commissioner in Dar es Salaam recognised, ‘it is not unknown for PIDE to indulge in 
un-coordinated activities and not always with the greatest consideration being shown to Portuguese 
national interests.638 Several sources have claimed that the bomb was assembled by Casimiro 
Monteiro, a Goan-born explosives expert and Aginter operative. Monteiro had fought for Franco 
during the Spanish Civil War, for Hitler with the Division Azul on the Eastern Front, and murdered 
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the Portuguese opposition leader Humberto Delgado in Spain in 1965. He later assisted the anti-
communist Mozambique National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana; RENAMO) against 
FRELIMO in post-independence Mozambique’s civil war. Monteiro was first named as a 
participant in the assassination plot by Martin in 1975. This has been corroborated by two PIDE 
agents and a Rhodesian intelligence officer, though there remains scepticism as to whether their 
stories can be trusted.639 Aginter also had connections with Jorge Jardim, a Mozambique-based 
businessman who enjoyed a strong relationship with Salazar himself. Although Jardim himself 
denied all responsibility, the editor of the Notícias da Beira noted he was present in the newspaper’s 
office on the day of Mondlane’s assassination and waited several hours for ‘important news’ to 
arrive.640 
The question of Mozambican involvement also remains unclear. The logistics of delivering the 
bomb from Lourenço Marques to Dar es Salaam must have required some African collaboration. 
However, no consensus has emerged. Substantial space would be needed for a full exploration of 
the multifarious allegations and refutations that continue to mark a sub-strand in the memory wars 
entangled with Mozambique’s post-independence travails.641 
The CID’s prime suspect was Kavandame. The CID chief for the Coast Region, Edward 
Manikam, told the American embassy that, while conducting investigations a week after the 
assassination, he had encountered Kavandame in Mtwara, where the Mozambican was sheltered by 
the local TANU chairman. In response to Manikam’s questions, Kavandame gave inconsistent and 
incomplete answers.642 In March, he defected to the Portuguese. The other main suspect was 
Silvério Nungu, an official at FRELIMO’s headquarters with access to Mondlane’s mail. Arrested 
by the Tanzanian police while also trying to defect to Mozambique, Nungu officially died of a 
hunger strike in prison. Simango later claimed he was executed.643 
Aginter Press documentation uncovered by Italian intelligence implicates Simango in 
Mondlane’s assassination.644 Simango denied any involvement, claiming that he had come perilously 
close to opening the book, only to notice that it was in French, a language he could not read.645 
Suspicion of Simango largely stems from his activities after the death of Mondlane. Under 
FRELIMO’s constitution, the vice-president should have taken over the leadership of the 
movement. However, doubts about Simango’s loyalty led the Central Committee to establish a 
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‘Council of the Presidency’ in April 1969, in which he shared power with dos Santos and Machel. 
The latter pair developed into a stronger faction. In November, Simango published a pamphlet 
entitled ‘Gloomy Situation in FRELIMO’ which accused Machel and dos Santos of murder, 
tribalism, and nepotism, and demanded they resign and be put on trial. Simango was expelled from 
FRELIMO and subsequently joined COREMO. In May 1970, the Central Committee abolished the 
triumvirate and appointed Machel as president, with dos Santos as vice-president. After 
Mozambique gained its independence in 1975, Simango was brought before a kangaroo court. At a 
show trial in Nachingwea in southern Tanzania in April 1975, he was forced to read a ‘confession’ 
of his guilt at betraying FRELIMO. Simango was sent to a ‘re-education camp’ and eventually 
murdered in 1978 to prevent him from falling into the hands of RENAMO rebels in 
Mozambique.646 
Few members of FRELIMO’s leadership have escaped suspicion. Oscar Cardoso, the former 
head of PIDE, has accused Joaquim Chissano (then chief of security for FRELIMO, later president 
of Mozambique) of collaborating with Monteiro.647 In his memoirs, Mondlane’s secretary, Sérgio 
Vieira recounts a grand conspiracy in which the parcel-bomb was transferred to Dar es Salaam via 
Portuguese agents in Malawi and Mozambicans in Tanzania, including Nungu and Gwenjere. Vieira 
also claims that Kavandame and Simango knew of the assassination plan in advance.648 Martins 
places Gwenjere at the centre of the plot, but asserts that it was only made possible by co-
conspirators inside FRELIMO.649 
Finally, there is the question of Tanzanian complicity. The fact that the inquiry into Mondlane’s 
death was carried out under the auspices of the Second Vice-President’s Office raises doubts about 
its transparency. Martins believes that Sijaona was ‘undoubtedly’ involved.650 According to 
Manikam, the CID was assisted in its investigation by the Chinese, who were opposed to Mondlane 
and friendly with Sijaona.651 The potential implication of senior members of Tanzania’s state and 
security apparatus may also explain why the CID’s findings have never been released. 
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Conclusion 
In The Struggle for Mozambique, published posthumously in 1969, Mondlane warned against the 
dangers of factionalism within FRELIMO. The enemy, he argued, 
may use a member of the main organization to try to spread dissent, so as to bring over a 
section of the membership. The complexities of motive behind divisive conduct makes it the 
more difficult to guard against: individual neuroses, personal ambitions, real ideological 
differences are muddled up with the tactics of the enemy secret service.652 
Mondlane’s assessment was more astute than much of the scholarship about him. The early 
historiography of contemporary Mozambique portrayed FRELIMO as waging a bold struggle 
against its internal and external enemies. These histories, usually written by scholars sympathetic to 
FRELIMO’s ideological cause, especially after its full conversion to Marxism-Leninism under 
Machel, often lionise the figure of Mondlane and glorify the revolution.653 They do not deny the 
schisms within the movement, but integrate them into a heroic narrative, which mirrors official 
discourse propounded by FRELIMO after independence. In this, the progressive proto-state led by 
first Mondlane and then Machel overcomes Kavandame’s backward, parochial tribalism, then joins 
forces with the oppressed peasantry of Mozambique to drive out the Portuguese colonialists.654 
Similarly, scholarship on Tanzania’s role in southern Africa’s liberation struggles tends to eulogise 
Nyerere as an anticolonial visionary and omit references to local involvement in schisms within the 
movements.655 
Building on more recent scholarship which questions these obfuscating binaries and Marxist 
teleologies, this chapter has demonstrated how the micropolitics of FRELIMO in its Dar es Salaam 
exile was rife with splits and tensions. These did not only take place within the movement’s 
leadership, but overlapped with centrifugal dynamics among a range of local actors in the ‘Cold 
War city’. While Mondlane skilfully used Dar es Salaam’s position as a centre of international 
political activity in sub-Saharan Africa to attract material aid and public support, the same 
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environment was used by FRELIMO’s enemies to subvert the movement. Despite having the 
backing of Nyerere, there were limits to the security this provided. Tanzanian politicians and 
journalists, sharing ideological, racial, and ethnic affinities with Mondlane’s opponents, attacked 
FRELIMO’s leader, eroding his support base. As the following chapter shows, the forces which 
drove Tanzanian opposition to Mondlane’s leadership were part of a broader set of political 
dynamics, which sought to appropriate Cold War developments elsewhere in the world to a 
campaign of national mobilisation. At the same time in 1968 that Makonde dissidents were 
ransacking the FRELIMO offices, students and youth were engaged in their own struggles against 
superpower imperialism on the streets of Dar es Salaam. 
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Chapter 5 
Tanzania’s ‘68: press, protest, and the Dar es Salaam public sphere 
‘Many astrologers have predicated a near-doom for the world in 1968’, wrote ‘Pressman’ in his first 
Nationalist column of the new year. He listed a lengthy series of crises: the economic exploitation of 
the developing world, the war in Indochina, liberation struggles in Africa, and the conflict in the 
Middle East. ‘When the astrologers make their dismal forecasts what they are really saying is that a 
clash between the people and imperialism (and its lackeys) is drawing nearer and nearer. One does 
not need to be an astrologer to make this prediction’, concluded Pressman – nom de plume of A. M. 
Babu.656  
The events of the year which followed might even have surprised Babu himself. 1968 was the 
year of the protest. From Berkeley to Berlin, Cairo to Kinshasa, students and youths took to the 
streets. While their demands were diverse, their anger shared a common target: an unjust global 
status quo, dominated by the superpowers, secured by their allies, and upheld by ruling elites. In 
Dar es Salaam, the escalation of the conflict in Indochina and the Soviet-led invasion of 
Czechoslovakia provoked mass demonstrations and furious newspaper editorials. Analysing these 
protests enables an exploration of the dynamics of Dar es Salaam’s public sphere, which brought 
together internationalist rhetoric with the imperatives of nation-building, embedded in internal 
rivalries among the Tanzanian elite. 
For some time, the historiography on ‘1968’ remained strikingly underdeveloped. As Arif Dirlik 
argues, the events of the year became discredited, ‘partly because of their own degeneration into a 
mindless radicalism in the face of political repression that allowed few alternatives, and partly 
because the victory of global capitalism has successfully recast in a negative light the efforts of an 
earlier age to hold it in check.’657 However, working through paradigms of global and transnational 
history, scholars recently have embarked on a serious reassessment of the 1960s. Their work 
stresses the interconnected nature of the protest movements, which drew upon shared imaginaries, 
symbols, and world-views to challenge established authorities.658 While ‘1968’ may still first conjure 
to mind images of Parisian barricades or tanks in Prague, historians now recognise the central role 
occupied by the so-called ‘Third World’ in the protest movements. This was not confined to the 
conflict in Vietnam, but involved broader critiques of the widening socioeconomic gulf between 
the West and the post-colonial world. But the ‘Third World’ did not exist solely in the protestors’ 
imaginations. In West Germany, for example, African, Asian, and Latin American students were 
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important agents in propelling Third World causes into the public sphere, to demonstrate how 
political capital could be made from transgressive demonstration.659 Moreover, protest was not 
confined to Europe and North America, but took place across the Third World itself, including 
post-colonial Africa.660 
Although historians often make reference to the global or transnational dimensions of 1968, 
they tend to do so passively rather than critically. As Victoria Langland argues in her study of 
student protest in Brazil, historians ‘have tended toward noting the international context without 
integrating it into the local narrative of 1968’. She therefore calls on historians to ‘examine how 
contemporaneous beliefs, fears, and suspicions about such connections affected the course of local 
events’.661 Heeding Langland’s advice, this chapter analyses Tanzania’s experience of the long ‘1968’ 
to demonstrate how distant events were understood locally and enlisted into TANU’s nation-
building project. 
The common denominator of most studies of the 1960s consists of a confrontation between 
entrenched government and a discontented radical movement in search of an alternative future. 
While the former were usually successful in retaining control, they did so only through the 
employment of violence.662 The early work on sub-Saharan Africa points in the same direction. In 
1969, calls for university reform in Congo were brought to a bloody halt when the army shot dead 
scores of protestors in Kinshasa.663 That same year, Ethiopian students mobilised against Emperor 
Haile Selassie. Despite a government crackdown, the protestors of 1969 became the Marxist-
Leninist student groups which were instrumental in toppling the imperial regime five years later.664 
In Tanzania, the opposite occurred. Far from challenging the government, the protestors who 
took to the streets and far-left journalists writing in local newspapers proclaimed their dedication to 
TANU and the Arusha Declaration. Working through party structures, an internationalist critique 
of superpower interventions in Czechoslovakia and especially Vietnam was channelled towards the 
need for self-reliance and vigilance: youth mobilisation against ‘imperialism’ and ‘neocolonialism’ 
represented a commitment to, rather than a rejection of, the TANU regime. While there were 
pockets of student discontent, they were small-scale and successfully portrayed by the government 
as attempts to disrupt the ujamaa revolution. However, like the power struggles which followed the 
Arusha Declaration and preceded Mondlane’s assassination, the mobilisation of youth and the act 
of protest in Tanzania were enmeshed in local political networks. While radicals and demagogues 
were at certain times useful for Nyerere, at others they overstretched their remit. When youth 
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groups or journalists challenged Nyerere’s authority or risked damaging Tanzania’s international 
image, the president moved decisively to remove potential rivals and extend state control over the 
media. 
Arusha socialism, vigilance, and the TANU Youth League 
Historians of post-colonial East Africa have recognised that youth, just like gender, ethnicity, and 
class, represents a fruitful analytical prism for understanding processes of social and political 
transformation after independence. Gary Burgess and Andrew Burton argue that the recruitment of 
youth by patriarchal states was a vital component of their nation-building projects. However, the 
transformative effects of decolonisation and rapid urbanisation destabilised existing generational 
relationships, resulting in struggle between nationalist elites and the youths they sought to 
conscript.665 Andrew Ivaska shows how cultural conflict played out in Dar es Salaam not only 
between the TANU state and young Tanzanians, but also among youth groups possessing 
contrasting conceptions of a post-colonial modernity.666 Burgess identifies similar cultural frictions 
in Zanzibar, noting the emphasis that the ASP placed on disciplining a revolutionary youth through 
the promotion of a nationalist ethic.667 
On the mainland, over the course of the 1960s the TYL came to occupy a central position in the 
party-state’s nation-building practices and efforts to root out enemies of the taifa. The TYL was 
established in 1956, as not only a means of enlisting young Tanzanians in the liberation campaign, 
but also to provide a mechanism for exerting top-down control over them. After independence, the 
movement assumed key security functions within the state apparatus. In 1963, the government 
wound up the colonial Special Branch security forces. The more informal structures which replaced 
it were manned by inexperienced TYL cadres. When the Tanganyika Rifles were disbanded after 
the mutiny of 1964, recruits to the new TPDF were scrutinised by the TYL.668  
The Arusha Declaration continued this practice of foregrounding the youth as key actors in 
Tanzania’s national revolution. Thousands of young Tanzanians undertook marches from across 
the country to Dar es Salaam in support of Arusha socialism. On the first anniversary of the 
Declaration in 1968, TYL cadres returned to the capital for an inaugural ‘National Youth Festival’, 
at which they played sports fixtures and were addressed by senior party figures. The Nationalist 
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lauded the TYL’s commitment to the nation. It acclaimed the youth’s refusal ‘to be taken in by the 
stupid machinations of corrupt political mercenaries who had wanted to subvert them’.669 The 
youth were both the embodiment of the principles of ujamaa and the force through which the 
revolution was to be realised. 
This adulation contrasted sharply with the disappointment shown at the students who had 
protested at the government’s decision to make participation in non-military National Service 
compulsory for university graduates in October 1966. At State House, the students had read out 
their petition of demands to Nyerere, who responded angrily by rusticating 412 demonstrators, 
including around two-thirds of the Tanzanian student body. Various TANU bodies, including the 
TYL, organised counterdemonstrations in Dar es Salaam. The Nationalist stated that Tanzania ‘will 
be built by steeled youths, vigilant and dedicated to hard work, nursed in the problems of their 
country.’670 Soon afterwards, a TYL branch was set up at the university, as the government 
tightened its control over the student body. 
As Ivaska shows, the TYL played a central role in the marshalling of urban space in Dar es 
Salaam during the 1960s. Outwardly the TYL modelled itself on Chinese practices: its uniformed 
members were known as ‘Green Guards’ and many adhered to Maoism, at least on the level of 
crude sloganeering. But this worldview represented less an internationalist streak in the TYL’s 
outlook than an attempt to appropriate the language and symbols of the Chinese experience to 
Tanzania’s national revolution. As Nyerere sought to anchor ujamaa socialism in the rural 
communitarianism of a romanticised African past, the TYL sought to defend the traditional values 
of the ‘national project’ against the decadent cosmopolitanism of Dar es Salaam.671 Switching the 
focus from the cultural to the political plane, this chapter demonstrates how distant Cold War 
interventions were understood, digested, and reapplied within a national frame of reference. 
Working in conjunction with the ideologues on the editorial staff of the Nationalist, student and 
youth demonstrators seized on examples of imperialism abroad to reaffirm their commitment to 
the Tanzanian nation. 
Vietnam 
On 16 October 1967, Nyerere delivered a major foreign policy address to the TANU National 
Conference at Mwanza. After setting out the basis of Tanzania’s non-aligned foreign policy, the 
president turned to the conflict in Vietnam. Nyerere described Vietnam as ‘probably the most 
vicious and all-enveloping war which has been know to mankind’. ‘The USA must recover from the 
delirium of power’, he said, ‘and return to the principles upon which her nation was founded.’ 
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Nyerere called for an ‘immediate and unconditional’ end to the American bombing of North 
Vietnam and for a peace settlement on the basis of the Geneva Agreements of 1954.672 
While Nyerere had never hidden his views about the Vietnam war, his Mwanza speech 
represented an unusually vocal intervention. As a figure commanding significant respect across 
Africa, Nyerere’s shift in tone concerned the American embassy. At a lunch gathering, diplomats 
from Australia, Britain, Canada, and the United States suggested potential options for pushing 
Nyerere to take a more amenable line. These included the use of Singapore’s prime minister, Lee 
Kuan Yew, as an intermediary and encouraging Malaysia to open an embassy in Dar es Salaam as a 
counterweight to Chinese, North Korean, and North Vietnamese influence and propaganda.673 
For the United States’ enemies in Tanzania, Vietnam was fertile territory. Although attacks on 
states with which Tanzanian government had friendly relations had been banned in 1966, the rules 
were enforced unevenly. In November 1967, a touring Chinese dance group had given a 
performance of a politically-inspired ‘ballet’, which depicted the ‘heroic Vietcong’ triumphing over 
‘American aggressors’. ‘The patron of the group was obviously Kawawa, whose Chicom proclivities 
are generally recognized’, wrote John H. Burns, the American ambassador.674 The following month, 
Burns complained to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the North Vietnamese were allowed to 
show anti-US ‘atrocity films’ at the university, while Tanzanian censors had prevented USIS from 
showing an information film about the historical context of the conflict.675 These incidents 
accompanied a steady drip of printed Chinese and North Vietnamese propaganda. After the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs made no discernible effort to clamp down on the flouting of its own 
ban, Burns raised the issue with Nyerere himself. Nyerere acknowledged the problem and said that 
the perpetrators would continue to be admonished, although he accepted this had hitherto made 
little impact.676 It was clear that the government could (or would) do little about the situation, in 
part because officials responsible for the policing of propaganda were prepared to turn a blind eye 
to the activities of Beijing and its allies. 
By this time, Nyerere had extended a hand to the United States in his own peacemaking efforts. 
On 2 January 1968, he wrote directly to President Lyndon B. Johnson. In conciliatory tones, 
Nyerere conveyed the dangers of escalating conflict in Southeast Asia and his belief that North 
Vietnam genuinely desired peace. Nyerere called on the United States to live up to the responsibility 
which superpower status conferred upon it. ‘No one really doubts that American could bomb 
North Vietnam out of existence and exterminate all of its people’, he wrote. ‘The real question now 
is whether the United States of America is powerful enough to be able to talk with the small nation 
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which has defied it, and bring those talks to a conclusion which means peace for the unhappy 
Vietnamese people and relief to the rest of the world.’677 
Nyerere’s olive branch caught Washington by surprise. Burns had assumed that Nyerere’s 
previous silence on Vietnam stemmed from the ‘tacit recognition that there was by now nothing 
either [side] could say to change the other’s mind’ on the issue. He thought that the letter contained 
an implicit offer from Nyerere to act as an intermediary. With the Sino-Tanzanian relationship at its 
height, Nyerere’s ‘credentials in communist Asia’ seemed to the ambassador an asset worth 
pursuing.678 Burns pressed Washington to send a special spokesman to Dar es Salaam to deliver 
Johnson’s response in person to Nyerere, arguing that the latter had ‘set the stage for an exchange 
which could have a lasting impact on our understanding with him and our future relations’.679 
However, Dean Rusk, the secretary of state, deemed a written reply from Johnson sufficient.680 
Johnson’s letter recapitulated Washington’s position in Vietnam: it was willing to end the bombing 
campaign and pursue peace talks if there were sufficient guarantees that the North Vietnamese 
would not exploit a truce to its military advantage.681 
On receipt of Johnson’s letter on 19 January, Nyerere immediately summoned Burns. Nyerere 
revealed that the previous month he had written to Pope Paul VI, after hearing that Johnson would 
visit the Vatican en route from Saigon to the United States. Making reference to conversations held 
with a North Vietnamese diplomat in Dar es Salaam, Nyerere told the Pope of his belief that Hanoi 
was genuinely committed to ending the war, in the hope that this would influence Paul VI in his 
discussions with Johnson.682 (The record of the meeting in Rome on 23 December shows that 
Nyerere’s advice fell on deaf ears: the Pope warned Johnson that North Vietnam would not cease 
its military activities while it retained the support of great powers.)683 In a further exchange of 
letters, both presidents largely restated the positions they had previously set out.684 This short-lived 
diplomatic opening had no lasting consequence. However, it demonstrated Nyerere’s commitment 
to constructive diplomacy and a sympathetic, if firm, understanding of the American position in 
Indochina – in stark contrast to the stance taken by protestors on the streets of Dar es Salaam and 
the Nationalist’s radical journalists. 
For protestors across the world in 1968, Vietnam represented the anti-imperial cause par 
excellence: a poor but defiant Third World people, fighting a war that stemmed directly from its 
anticolonial liberation struggle against the armies of the world’s most formidable superpower. Ho 
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Chi Minh became an icon of global revolution. Students in Western Europe and North America 
looked to Vietnam for inspiration in their own domestic struggles. In Tanzania, a post-colonial 
Third World state, the response to the suffering in Indochina was cast not just sympathetically, but 
also empathetically. 
There were strong institutional connections between the Tanzanian government and 
Vietnamese representatives. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam maintained a diplomatic mission 
in Dar es Salaam, which was given full embassy status in 1970.685  Local newspapers carried front-
page photographs of visiting Vietnamese delegations, accompanied by soundbite quotations from 
Tanzanian officials. ‘The people of Tanzania are immensely encouraged by the staunchness and 
bravery of the Vietnamese people in standing as the greatest pillar of liberation in modern times’, 
read a message from TANU to Ho during ‘Solidarity with Vietnam Week’ in March 1968.686 In 
May, Tanzania welcomed the North Vietnamese vice-minister for foreign affairs, Hoang Van 
Loi.687 A visiting North Vietnamese trade union delegation received a $2,800 donation from its 
TANU-affiliated counterpart.688 
In 1968, the situation in Vietnam was rarely absent from the pages of the Nationalist. The 
newspaper’s stable of radical and Marxist journalists ensured a regular flow of bitterly anti-
American editorials. Following the Tet Offensive, Babu proclaimed the imminence of ‘a complete 
American defeat in Vietnam’, which would represent ‘the end of America’s imperialist arrogance’.689 
In March, Nsa Kaisi wrote a vitriolic feature article acclaiming the ‘heroic struggle’ of the Vietcong 
and condemning the ‘most criminal war of aggression in history waged by the United States 
imperialists against the Vietnamese people’.690 
These frequent attacks on the United States’ policy in Vietnam drew the American embassy’s 
ire. On 31 March, still reeling from the shock of the Tet Offensive, Johnson announced the de-
escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam. Nyerere commented that, while hardly the total 
cessation that he sought, this was at least ‘something’.691 Caught between following the president’s 
line and its own more hostile inclinations, the Nationalist declined to pass editorial comment. 
Instead, it published a photograph of Johnson wishing farewell to troops departing San Francisco 
for Vietnam, accompanied by a particularly graphic caption which claimed that Johnson had 
shown [sic] more death and tears around the world than any other American or imperialist head 
of state in post war history. Under his leadership the American aggression attained new heights 
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and Pentagon steel heads trampled on the sovereignty of several millions of the people of Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. Faced by an inevitable ignominious defeat of his policies at home and 
abroad, Mr. Johnson announced over the week-end, while shading [sic] crocodile tears, that he 
“is not going to stand for re-election” for the American Presidency, above grim faced Johnson 
is saying goodbye to his dead warranted Vietnam bound aggression troops.692 
The American embassy decided to challenge the government over this unfavourable coverage. 
Setting out that since the Nationalist was an official TANU publication and Tanzania was a one-
party state, and that Nationalist was therefore a government newspaper, the United States submitted 
a note to the Foreign Ministry on 16 April, seeking clarification regarding whether the caption 
accompanying the photograph of Johnson reflected government policy.693 Although the embassy 
received what Burns described as a ‘testy, unresponsive note’ in reply, he also observed a near 
silence over Vietnam in the weeks which followed. The American embassy received word that 
Nyerere himself had intervened in the situation, ordering the press to avoid Indochina while 
delicate talks took place to determine the venue of a peace conference.694 
Tanzania’s youth also made regular gestures of solidarity with the Vietnamese. On 20 April, the 
TYL donated 634 cartons of tinned beef to the ‘youth and people of Vietnam’ in their ‘just struggle 
against imperialist aggression’. The TYL chairman, Lawi Sijaona, said that the contribution denoted 
‘the will and determination of the Tanzanian Youth to support the youth and the people of 
Vietnam in their just struggle’.695 Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru, who became the TYL’s secretary-
general in 1970, recalled how he had close relations with the North Vietnamese diplomats in Dar es 
Salaam. ‘I learned quite a lot about the Vietnamese and the way they were facing the giants of the 
world – the Americans’, he told me. ‘We were opposed to American aggression in solidarity with 
the Vietnamese people’.696 
On 20 July, the TYL held a march in Dar es Salaam to mark the fourteenth anniversary of the 
signing of the Geneva Agreement, the first public demonstration since the students’ protest in 
1966. It was organised by the University College branch of the TYL, encouraged by Mkapa, and led 
by its chairman, Juma Mwapachu. Between 100 and 150 Tanzanians participated in the 
demonstration, which first listened to speeches outside the American embassy. They waved 
placards bearing slogans such as ‘In every grave will rise a raging ricefield’, ‘Johnson assassin’, ‘Long 
live Uncle Ho and the heroic people of Vietnam’, and ‘Marekani washenzi’ (‘Americans are savages’). 
A TYL delegation asked to meet Burns. The ambassador refused to do so in the presence of 
what he described as ‘a Roman Circus presentation’ of reporters, photographers, and sound men, 
and so the demonstrators settled on delivering their ‘Note of Protest vs U.S. Imperialist Aggression 
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in Vietnam’ to a junior diplomat. The note called for the unconditional withdrawal of ‘Yankee and 
their satellite troops from South Vietnam’, condemned the use of napalm, and ‘utterly abhorred the 
bestiality and callousness like castration, disembowelment, cutting of [sic] women’s breasts 
committed in the name of American democracy and western civilisation.’ Singing songs in praise of 
Ho and Nyerere, the protestors departed for the North Vietnamese mission, where they handed 
over a note of solidarity declaring that ‘the Vietnamese fight was their fight’ and that ‘the Tanzanian 
youths would not hesitate to volunteer when called upon by the youths of Vietnam.’697 
Czechoslovakia 
A month later, the protestors were back on the streets of Dar es Salaam. This time they directed 
their anger not at Washington, but at Moscow. The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia on 
the night of 20-21 August sparked outrage around the world. Hitherto largely preoccupied with 
struggles in the Third World, the ’68 demonstrators now recast their spotlight of protest onto the 
Soviet Union. Having loudly proclaimed itself the enemy of imperialism, Moscow’s crushing of the 
Prague Spring suggested it was no less a neoimperial power than the United States and its allies. As 
an editorial in the Standard reflected, ‘had the Soviet leaders been agents of Western imperialism 
they could hardly have done a better job of demolishing the Moscow image.’698 
The Tanzanian government’s response to the invasion, as quoted in chapter 3, was stern, 
accusing the Soviet Union of acting as an imperialist power and showing complete disregard for the 
UN Charter. Nyerere himself wished to go beyond this simple statement, but recognised the danger 
of a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, especially given the suspicions regarding Dar es 
Salaam’s relationship with China. In June 1968 in Beijing, he had restated his admiration for Mao 
and China’s socialist transformation. Nyerere asserted that he had ‘no reason to believe that 
friendship between Tanzania and China will not continue indefinitely, and grow stronger as time 
passes.’699 At a banquet held in Nyerere’s honour, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai outraged Eastern 
Bloc diplomats by remarking that Moscow and Washington had invented ‘nuclear colonialism’. 
Representatives of the Soviet Union, other Warsaw Pact states, and Mongolia walked out of the 
dinner in protest.700 
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Back in Dar es Salaam, on the morning of 23 August, student groups assembled outside the 
Soviet embassy. They were joined by members of other TYL branches, including Lawi Sijaona and 
Chediel Mgonja. Sijaona was a minister of state in the second vice-president’s office and also the 
chairman of the TYL. Mgonja was the minister of state in the president’s office, with responsibility 
for foreign affairs. Over 2,000 people attended the demonstration. This, the American embassy 
reported, made the Vietnam protest in July look like ‘something that took place in a phone booth’. 
The protestors chanted and waved placards emblazoned with slogans such as ‘To hell with the 
Warsaw Pact’ and ‘Russians are Hitler’s hench men’. Student leaders read out speeches. Then the 
demonstration took an unexpected turn. Led by Sijaona and Mgonja, protestors jumped over the 
walls of the compound. They pelted the building with torn-up scraps of Soviet propaganda and 
thrust a note of protest through a steel grill to the diplomats holed up inside. Stones were thrown 
and there were reports of smashed windows. In a brief moment of alarm, the protestors pounded 
on the roof of a car bearing diplomatic registration plates and carrying the Soviet flag, which had 
chosen an unfortunate moment to pass through the embassy gates. The East German consulate-
general expressed its concern that, despite the presence of the police, the protestors were allowed 
to remain inside the embassy walls for so long, and little attempt was made to stop the barrage of 
paper and stones. After twenty minutes, the crowd moved on to the nearby Czechoslovakian 
embassy, where the chargé d’affaires gratefully accepted a letter of solidarity.701 
The ideological challenge posed by the Soviet intervention to progressive politicians and 
intellectuals around the world was most strongly felt by doctrinaire communists, given Moscow’s 
claims to have intervened in Czechoslovakia in defence of Marxism-Leninism. Salim Msoma, a 
university student, recalled the ‘confusion and bewilderment’ felt among his contemporaries, many 
of whom were uncertain at participating in the demonstration.702 On the day of the protest, the 
radical University Students African Revolutionary Front (USARF) called the invasion a ‘revisionist 
betrayal of international socialism as envisaged by Karl Marx and Lenin’. A statement signed by 
Yoweri Museveni, the USARF chairman and future president of Uganda, argued that ‘the 
revisionist clique in Moscow has been steadily corroding the fundamental tenets of Marxism-
Leninism’. ‘Russian aggression: the highest state of imperialism’, read one placard, paraphrasing 
Lenin.703 These views were echoed in the Nationalist by Babu, who accused the Soviet Union and its 
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allies as ‘proceeding from a deep-seated and dangerous conception’ that they were ‘the appointed 
defenders of socialist development if not in the world, then in Eastern Europe.’704 
The Tanzanian press reacted bitterly to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It presented the 
situation as analogous to the Biafra conflict in Nigeria. Earlier in the year, Nyerere had taken the 
surprising step of recognising the Biafran separatists, who were engaged in a civil war against the 
Federal Military Government. The support provided by Moscow to Lagos was therefore a pre-
existing bone of contention in Tanzania’s relations with the Soviet Union. The demonstrators of 23 
August made the comparison explicit. ‘What are the Russians looking for in Biafra?’, asked one 
placard. ‘Hands off Biafra, down with Russian aggression’, read another. Babu preferred to 
highlight London’s role in supporting Lagos. Describing the British intervention as resulting in ‘the 
virtual genocide of a people’, Babu reminded his readers that ‘as we shudder at the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia let us not forget the indirect invasion of the Biafran people.’705 Editorials in the 
Nationalist also made reference to the ‘traitor’ Moïse Tshombe, who had led the Katangese 
secession in Congo, and the dead Lumumba.706 Czechoslovakia, a European crisis with global 
resonance, was thus ‘Africanised’ and closely tied to the provocative foreign policy adopted by the 
Tanzanian government. 
More generally, the Czechoslovakian crisis was presented as symptomatic of a global pattern of 
superpower imperialism. The press drew explicit parallels between the superpowers’ interventions 
in Indochina and Czechoslovakia. On 24 August, a Nationalist editorial reminded readers that ‘this is 
not the first time that an aggressor has tried to camouflage his act in vain distortion’.707 Babu wrote 
that ‘[t]he horror of intervention in Czechoslovakia should remind us of the continuing horror and 
the larger scale of destruction of property, extermination of human life, and abuse of the dignity of 
a people, which describes the American oppression and occupation of Vietnam.’708 Two months 
later at the UN General Assembly, Paul Bomani, the minister for economic affairs and 
development planning, followed an attack on the United States in Vietnam with an equally scathing 
verdict on the invasion of Czechoslovakia.709 
In contrast, Nyerere’s response to the invasion was characterised by the same calmness which 
he had shown in his dialogue with the United States over Vietnam. On 24 August, Moscow 
instructed the Soviet embassy in Dar es Salaam to approach Nyerere and inform him about the 
‘difficult decision’ which it had been forced to take in intervening in Czechoslovakia. The following 
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day, Nyerere received the Soviet chargé d’affaires, G. A. Samsonov, and the counsellor, Arkadi 
Glukhov. While Samsonov explained the Soviet rationale, Nyerere listened in silence. Glukhov 
described how Nyerere seemed shocked, but contained his ‘strong feelings’ through ‘extreme self-
control’. While he rejected the Soviet explanation, citing the overriding authority of the UN Charter 
and the principle of national sovereignty, Nyerere remained cool.710 
The next morning’s edition of the Nationalist ran a leader entitled ‘Pity the ambassador’. 
Diplomatic observers at the time detected the hand of Nyerere himself in the editorial, a fact later 
confirmed by the Tanzanian ambassador to Moscow.711 Without naming states or individuals, it 
sympathised with the ‘poor Ambassador’, whose duty it was to convey to his host government the 
views of his own, no matter how preposterous. ‘If his Government tells him it has decided that in 
future the sun will rise in the West and set in the East then he must go solemnly to the Head of his 
host Government and report the decision’, it sardonically stated. While references were also made 
to Vietnam and Rhodesia, the editorial was clearly aimed at the Soviet Union. The demonstration at 
the Soviet embassy had embarrassed Nyerere, as explained below. The article was therefore a 
message to Moscow, bitterly mocking its ‘indefensible’ party line, while taking the heat away from 
the ambassador. An anti-Soviet demonstration by NUTA, the party-affiliated trade union, planned 
for 27 August, was also called off.712 As chapter 3 showed, relations between the Soviet Union and 
Tanzania quickly recovered, because of Nyerere’s concern not to alienate potential aid donors nor 
appear too close to Beijing. 
Internalising the international struggle: anti-imperialism and nation-building 
As the growing body of historiography on ‘1968’ shows, demonstrators and activists were inspired 
by developments in the Third World. Yet they understood these events through local experiences 
and reapplied the lessons they learned from them in local contexts. In Western Europe, protestors 
expressed their anger not only at their own governments’ complicity in what they believed to be 
neocolonial interventions in the Third World, but also used these same critiques to attack the status 
quo at home. In Tanzania, the same dynamics of understanding, appropriation, and redeployment 
took place – minus the anti-government animus. The Tet Offensive and the end of the Prague 
Spring were contextualised and presented in terms relevant to Africans. Moreover, Tanzanian youth 
leaders and intellectuals interpreted distant superpower interventions in terms that fed into the 
language of ujamaa and nation-building. 
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At face value, the language of the TYL suggested a movement committed to socialist, anti-
imperialist internationalism. The Tanzanian youth frequently emphasised that the shared 
neocolonial enemy gave them a common cause with the Vietnamese. Opening an exhibition of 
photographs on the conflict in June 1968, Sijaona stated that ‘[w]e believe that imperialism is a 
global phenomenon. The struggle against it is and must therefore be global. Vietnam is only one 
theatre where this struggle is going on.’713 Similarly, TANU’s external affairs secretary told a visiting 
North Vietnamese delegation that ‘no matter what distance separates our two countries and two 
peoples, your struggle is our struggle’.714 
 However, this internationalist rhetoric was channelled into more parochial concerns. The 
invocation of imperialist threats elsewhere was consistently cited as evidence that Tanzanians must 
close ranks against the enemies of the ujamaa revolution. Tanzanian commentators depicted the 
country’s socialist project as under threat from not only external enemies, but also their internal 
collaborators. ‘We are at war says the Arusha Declaration,’ wrote Babu in January 1968, ‘and we 
must show in our work that we are engaged in a war against exploiters of all shades and their 
accomplices.’715 Addressing a TYL meeting in September, Sijaona called on its members ‘to 
frustrate the devilish machinations of the neo-colonialist agents who want us to deviate from the 
correct line of the Arusha Declaration and return to the era of “man-eat-man”’.716 
The resurfacing of Kambona in London in January 1968 was presented by the Tanzanian press 
as a prime example of the ‘imperialist enemy’ at work. The reaction from the party press in Dar es 
Salaam was predictable: ‘This Man is a Liar’, led the banner headline in the Nationalist.717 Babu drew 
connections between Kambona and a wider ‘imperialist’ offensive against Arusha socialism. ‘Last 
week saw a desperate attempt by a former Tanzanian Minister at diverting the course of a [sic] 
socialist development in this country’, he wrote. ‘This attempt to confuse the people by a mere 
imperialist lackey should serve to heighten the revolutionary consciousness of the workers, 
peasants, students and civil servants.’718 
Czechoslovakia and Vietnam were therefore portrayed as a national call-to-arms for Tanzanians 
to defend the ujamaa revolution. Local polemicists called for ‘vigilance’, which became a nation-
building watchword. On 26 July 1968, Karume cautioned a group of National Servicemen about 
the dangers posed by imperialists, who sought to corrupt the minds of Tanzania’s youths. The 
Nationalist threw its support behind the vice-president’s warning. It claimed that ‘nearly all 
bookshops and bookstalls in Tanzania and other African countries are flooded with reactionary 
anti-people magazines, books and other propaganda materials intended for poisoning the minds of 
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the youth’. After citing examples of the neocolonial hand at play elsewhere in the world – Cuba, 
Vietnam, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola – the article concluded that it was ‘the revolutionary 
duty of each and every Tanzanian youth […] to totally repudiate imperialist subversion wherever it 
rears its ugly head.’719 Similarly, the Nationalist responded to the invasion of Czechoslovakia by 
declaring it ‘another warning to the people of Tanzania’ that they must be ‘vigilant’ and should not 
‘relax guard because some [peoples and nations] have asserted their friendship and solidarity.’720 
Interpreting Cold War interventions as acts of imperialism, radical Tanzanians articulated a 
worldview that provided further evidence for the need for self-reliance, as a defence against 
neocolonial predation. 
Paradoxically, the internationalist rhetoric that enabled these connections between Cold War 
crises elsewhere and ujamaa socialism was representative of an inward turn in Tanzania’s political 
outlook. As Priya Lal recognises, while Nyerere continued to play a prominent role on the world 
stage, his internationalist concerns were displaced by nationalist priorities. ‘In a world in which 
African countries held the status of second-class citizenship’, she writes, ‘Nyerere and his TANU 
colleagues became increasingly preoccupied with protecting whatever fragile scraps of sovereignty 
Tanzania did possess – from within as well as without.’721 It is striking that in terms of numbers, the 
largest protest of 1968 was brought about not by distant superpower interventions, but a threat 
much closer to home. In September, claims made by Malawi’s president, Hastings Banda, to 
segments of Tanzanian territory brought 10,000 protestors onto the streets of Dar es Salaam, 
though the rhetoric of the demonstrators again tied the issue to a broader ‘imperialist’ enemy.722 
The consequential authoritarian shift in Tanzania’s domestic policy included the consolidation 
of the TYL, which fiercely defended a Tanzanian ‘national culture’ and was hostile to foreign 
influence in the country. When in December 1968 the University Students’ Union tried to arrange a 
Pan-African Students Conference in Dar es Salaam, the Nationalist accused it of challenging the 
TYL’s ‘exclusive right and power to speak for the entire youth of the nation in both internal and 
international affairs’. ‘Those who oppose this fact are enemies of the Tanzanian Youth’, the 
newspaper stated, ‘and the youth will not hesitate to smash them.’723 
The state-backed dominance of the TYL was confirmed by the experience of USARF. 
Encouraged by a constellation of radical academics, especially from outside of Africa, a small but 
vocal group of students formed USARF in November 1967. The organisation held seminars, teach-
ins, and reading groups; invited prominent leftist intellectuals, such as Samir Amin, Angela Davies, 
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and C. L. R. James to give lectures; and published a journal, Cheche.724 Although the basic causes of 
revolution and African liberation were common to both movements, USARF’s internationalist 
Marxism was at odds with the TYL’s nationalist commitment to ujamaa socialism. Jenerali 
Ulimwengu joined the university in 1969. He recalled that although in some areas of agreement, the 
two organisations ‘fused’ – for example, in the Czechoslovakia protest – there was always a 
‘dynamic of tension’ brought about by the ‘dichotomy’ between student internationalism and TYL 
nationalism.725 
The TANU leadership felt threatened by USARF’s theoretical criticisms of ujamaa socialism. 
According to the editor of Cheche, USARF was ‘too independent; too outspoken; and too often 
stated the facts as they were.’726 In 1970, the magazine carried an extended essay by Issa Shivji, a 
precocious law student. ‘Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle’ was a damning Marxist critique of 
Arusha socialism, which Shivji argued had led only to ‘the triumph of a bureaucratic bourgeoisie’.727 
In November, Nyerere banned both USARF and Cheche. He reasoned that since the TYL was a 
‘revolutionary organisation’ with a monopoly on political activity in all Tanzanian educational 
institutions, USARF was redundant. It was subsumed into the TYL, which excluded all non-
Tanzanian students, among them Museveni.728 Under the TANU regime, youth politics – even 
when engaging with distant events – were to be dedicated to the practice of building the nation 
through the institutions of the one-party state.  
Challenging the ‘imperialist’ press 
The response of the Tanzanian government to the perceived threat from radical student dissent 
was paralleled by an authoritarian turn in its policy towards the national press. At the same time 
that Dubček was dismantling censorship in Prague, the TANU party-state took a firmer grasp of 
Dar es Salaam’s ‘above-ground’ public sphere. As in the case of the crackdown on independent 
student organisation, the regime’s constriction of the free press took a dual track: top-down 
government control, plus a popular campaign waged through the party’s media and youth wing that 
sought to monopolise political discourse in the name of the taifa. 
To many Tanzanians, the Standard was an unwelcome remnant of colonial rule. The newspaper, 
which outsold the Nationalist, was staffed entirely by foreigners. It was owned by the Nairobi-based 
East African Standard Group until 1968, when the Lonrho conglomerate of mining interests 
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bought it out. In the aftermath of the Arusha Declaration and the sweeping nationalisation 
measures of foreign interests, criticism of the Standard grew. When Nyerere addressed a crowd in 
Dar es Salaam in February 1967, a voice called for the newspaper to be brought under public 
ownership. ‘Can you edit it?’, shouted back Nyerere, highlighting the shortage of experienced 
journalists at the time.729 Although the Standard generally supported the government line, it lacked 
the nationalistic fervour of the TANU press and was not averse to moderate criticism. In January 
1968, it even published several letters to the editor expressing sympathy for Kambona.730 
 In May 1968, the government brought a surprise ‘Newspaper Ordnance (Amendment) Bill’ 
before parliament. This empowered the president to close down any newspaper when he 
considered it in the public interest to do. The bill was inspired partly by the difficulties encountered 
by the government when it had shut down Otini Kambona’s Ulimwengu in December 1967. Lacking 
legal tools for closing the newspaper, the regime had banned it on a spurious technicality related to 
its registration. Introducing the bill in parliament, the minister for information and tourism, Hasnu 
Makame, defended the measures as vital for national security against foreign subversion. He argued 
that the freedom of the press could be abused, to ‘express subversive ideas with the intention of 
hindering the development of the country.’731 
The bill was received with hostility. Concerned about its consequences for the trade union 
paper, Mfanyakazi, Michael Kamaliza criticised the government for not making clear the grounds 
upon which the president would ban a publication. Lady Chesham, a European close to Nyerere, 
told parliament that the bill ‘smells of Fascism’ and expressed her ‘great fear of the future and the 
future generations of Tanzania if the power to muzzle and kill the Press is in the hands of the 
Office of the President.’732 One MP spoke of his concern that while Nyerere could be trusted with 
such powers, his successors might not be so responsible.733 
When the house adjourned the debate on the evening of 2 May, there was some doubt that the 
bill would pass. The next day, Kawawa made a decisive intervention. Appealing to threats from 
imperialist ‘enemies’ of the nation, the second vice-president rounded on the Standard and its 
foreign owners. Kawawa claimed that ‘capitalists are using newspapers as weapons for influencing 
the people’. He noted that the Standard had recently reported that Tanzania had acquired missiles 
and that such false stories might be seized on to justify an attack from outside. Kawawa argued that 
the bill was intended to prevent ‘intrigues and designs by the imperialist press to subvert our people 
and their aspirations.’734 His speech rallied support for the bill, which passed by 107 votes to 19, 
 
729 Sturmer, Media History, 120. 
730 Kyaluzi Tibesigwa, letter to the editor, Standard, 10 January 1968, 2; George Ntabaro, letter to the editor, 
Standard, 29 January 1968, 2. 
731 Quoted in Mytton, Mass Communication, 106. 
732 Quoted in Aminzade, Race, 168. 
733 Mytton, Mass Communication, 106. 
734 Quoted in Aminzade, Race, 168. 
Tanzania’s ‘68   
 153 
with 6 abstentions and 51 members absent. The latter included, the Standard reported, some of the 
law’s ‘strongest critics’.735 
The confrontation continued in the pages of the Standard itself. On 4 May, a front-page editorial 
stressed that it respected the rule of parliament and had never ‘wittingly published anything which 
could be termed undesirable’ to the nation interest. It asked for clarification for what Makame had 
meant by ‘undesirable’. The newspaper likened the bill to ‘a pistol pointed at the head: the victim 
never knowing when the trigger will be pressed.’736 The government chewed over the matter for a 
week, before issuing a scathing response. In the Standard, A. A. Riyami, the director of the 
information services, challenged the entire premise of the original editorial. He claimed that 
Makame had not used the word ‘undesirable’. ‘This appears to be your own invention’, he wrote, 
‘or, perhaps, you have been let down by a poor translation.’ His tone was uncompromising and 
deeply sarcastic: ‘[a]ny responsible newspaper would understand what is “subversive” material and 
what is not.’ Riyami concluded by reaffirming the government’s commitment to freedom of 
expression.737 
The authoritarian streak in the Tanzanian government’s treatment of the press was in evidence 
again in October, when it banned Kenya’s Nation Group of newspapers.738 The decision was 
announced soon after the Daily Nation published a story about unrest in the Arusha region.739 Like 
the Standard Group, the Nation Group was under non-African ownership – in this case, the Aga 
Khan. The Daily Nation responded indignantly, pointing out that in June, editors and publishers 
representing newspapers from across to world had come to Kenya for the annual conference of the 
International Press Institute. ‘With newspapers censored, suppressed or muzzled in so many parts 
of the world (Czechoslovakia and South Africa are examples that spring easily to mind), it is sad 
indeed that the bright image recorded in Nairobi four months ago has been so quickly tarnished’, 
reflected the Daily Nation.740 In a tit-for-tat response, in January 1969 the Kenyan government 
banned the sale of the Nationalist, after the newspaper published an ‘extremely hostile and 
irresponsible article’ about student protests in Nairobi. Taking a swipe at the Nationalist’s Marxist 
and Maoist sympathies, a Kenyan government statement declared that it was ‘not prepared to 
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accept lessons on democracy’ from a newspaper ‘whose pre-occupation is with clichés and slogans 
borrowed from foreign countries.’741 
When the Standard displayed scepticism about the purpose of Operation Vijana, a campaign 
against ‘indecent dress’ described in greater detail below, the TYL turned on the newspaper. On 2 
January, ‘the standard bearer of reaction’ – as the Nationalist described its rival – ‘got a rude shock’. 
Shouting ‘slaughter! slaughter!’, TYL cadres marched from their headquarters in Lumumba Street 
to the Standard offices near the Askari Monument. They demanded to speak to the editor. When he 
refused to appear, the youths lit a bonfire of copies of the Standard. The TYL’s secretary general, 
Moses Nnauye, read out a statement on behalf of the ‘sons and daughters of the workers and 
peasants of Tanzania’, who constituted ‘the most dynamic vanguard of Tanzania’s revolution’. 
Nnauye condemned the newspaper’s ‘subversive activities’ and vowed ‘a life-and-death struggle’ for 
its ‘liquidation’. The Standard had been founded by ‘colonial interests’ and ‘always stood for the 
oppression and exploitation of the African by foreign finance monopolies.’742 A fortnight before, in 
his ‘Pressman’ column, Babu had called a Standard editorial on Operation Vijana ‘a blatant sermon 
in anti-Tanzanianism, racism and subversion’, which symbolised ‘the notorious mission of that 
imperialist newspaper against the people of this country’.743 
Although the moment of anti-Standard militancy soon passed, the underlying notion of a 
newspaper owned and staffed by Europeans in socialist Tanzania remained problematic. In early 
1969, there were whisperings of an impending nationalisation. In April, the Standard’s editor, 
Brendan Grimshaw, confirmed to Burns that the government intended to take over the newspaper, 
although the decision was not formally made until the following year.744 On 5 February 1970, its 
front page announced the Standard was ‘appearing for the first time as the official newspaper of the 
Government of Tanzania’.745 However, as explained in chapter 7, far from taming the Standard, the 
violent swing to the left under the editorship of Frene Ginwala presented Nyerere with a set of 
problems that closely mirrored those caused by the TYL. 
Political ventilation and the purpose of protest 
There was a marked chasm between Nyerere’s cool diplomacy and the feverish language of anti-
imperialism which greeted events in Czechoslovakia and Vietnam, as well as local targets like the 
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Standard. At times, the actions and words of the radical groups within the TANU apparatus 
embarrassed the president. His ‘Pity the ambassador’ editorial in the Nationalist implied his 
disappointment with the behaviour of the protestors at the Soviet embassy, especially the 
involvement of two government ministers. In conversation with Burns in November 1968, Nyerere 
said that he had been ‘stunned’ by Mgonja’s and Sijaona’s antics. ‘We still have a lot of growing up 
to do’, he remarked.746 He was also aware of the problems arising from the provocative stance 
adopted by the Nationalist. When Burns raised the issue with him, Nyerere laughed and said that 
‘that newspaper’ was responsible for more diplomatic complaints than anything else in Tanzania.747 
Why did Nyerere and the TANU leadership tolerate the activities of the TYL and the members 
of the Nationalist staff? Although calls for ‘vigilance’ and dedication to nation-building may have 
been welcomed, their more radical views often clashed with Nyerere’s efforts to anchor Tanzanian 
political discourse to ujamaa socialism. Since the government subsidised the production of the 
Nationalist, it could doubtless have exercised far greater control over its editorial line.748 Indeed, 
Nyerere did intervene on occasion, by writing a leading article (as, for example, he had also done so 
in the case of the ‘Hands Off’ editorial) or ordering silence on Indochina during sensitive 
negotiations regarding future peace talks. But in general, the president was content to give the 
newspaper a relatively free rein. 
In part, this was because that despite being associated with the TANU party-state, the TYL and 
the Nationalist were removed from central government. The TYL provided an outlet through which 
the country to register its outrage at examples of superpower imperialism without bringing State 
House into direct conflict with Washington, Moscow, or their allies. When assessing the Vietnam 
demonstration of 20 July, the French ambassador recognised that given the low turnout in 
numbers, the most significant aspect of the protest was that ‘it was authorised by the government – 
the newspapers suggested at its wish – and perhaps discreetly encouraged in certain circles close to 
power. We know that it is hardly the habit of the Tanzanian regime to permit demonstrations of 
this type.’ The French report noted the irony that just two hours before the demonstration, Burns 
had signed an agreement under which the United States would give a $13 million loan to cover the 
construction of a road connecting Tanzania and Zambia – the American counterpunch to the 
Chinese-funded TAZARA project.749 Tanzania’s politics-blind aid policy permitted such behaviour, 
but the use of the TYL still allowed brazen protest to coexist with the acceptance of development 
aid. 
Likewise, when Juma Mwapachu, who was at the time chairman of the university branch of the 
TYL, explained to me the sequence of events that led to the Czechoslovakia protest, he emphasised 
Nyerere’s concern not to endanger Tanzania’s relationship with Moscow. 
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Mwalimu again called me to say, look, Juma, you have to lead a youth demonstration against the 
Soviets. Everyone wondered at that time how a country that was very close to the Soviet Union 
or to the socialist countries could actually undertake that. But Mwalimu was very clever. Instead 
of using state authority to say, ‘we don’t agree with you’, he allowed the youth movement to 
perform that particular task […] When I met Mwalimu, he was basically saying that the state 
would protest against the Soviets for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. But we had a kind of 
relationship, and didn’t really want to be seen to be formally doing that, and so we want you, the 
youth in this country, to lead this protest. But for us, even though we were protesting against 
the Soviets, we were actually supporting the state, we were like agents of the state. It was not 
spontaneous on our part. It was very much state-driven.750 
The protestors who took to the streets elsewhere in the world did so to condemn the superpower 
interventions in Vietnam and Czechoslovakia, but also the Cold War order which they felt their 
own national government was sustaining. Superpower interventions and the global order were also 
the target of demonstrators in Dar es Salaam, but – critically – the Tanzanian government was not. 
Nyerere’s regime made clear its position on Vietnam and Czechoslovakia, while ujamaa socialism 
was firmly aligned against a Cold War world-system that perpetuated inequalities between the 
wealthy North and the poor South. Government and demonstrators shared the same perspective. 
This permitted the recruitment of student and youth protestors to express Tanzanian discontent 
with Cold War interventions elsewhere, without provoking diplomatic tiffs with the superpowers. 
However, when government ministers or journalists in a party-owned newspaper launched into 
crude anti-American tirades that did little to help Tanzania’s standing in the global order, this logic 
collapsed. Tanzania’s policy of accepting aid from all sources, provided no strings were attached, 
discouraged against needlessly provoking potential donors. Yet vocal members of the Tanzanian 
elite were unlikely to accept being muzzled by the government. Some, such as Babu, thought that 
Nyerere’s ujamaa socialism was ideologically misdirected. Others sought more intense Africanisation 
and were hostile to the wealthy Asian business class. Allowing radical journalists and hot-headed 
politicians off the leash on matters of foreign policy therefore represented a form of ‘political 
ventilation’ in Dar es Salaam’s public sphere, channelling passions outwards, rather than at the 
party-state. 
The American embassy became wearily attuned to this dynamic. In December 1967, Burns 
challenged an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs over the content of ‘Pressman’s 
Commentary’ and received a wry smile. The official privately told him that ‘Pressman’ was a 
‘foolish person who wrote a lot of meaningless material, but whom the government felt should be 
allowed to express himself in print from time to time as a kind of cathartic exercise.’751 Nyerere 
judged it preferable to have Babu inside his government, with a weekly opportunity to vent his 
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spleen under a pseudonym in the Nationalist, than attack the principles of ujamaa socialism from the 
outside. 
By March 1969, Burns felt he understood the situation. In a lucid critique of politics in Tanzania 
– among the best produced by any foreign diplomat in the archives I consulted, though still 
carrying patronising undertones – he identified the reason Nyerere kept figures like Mgonja and 
Sijaona in government, as well as members of the Nationalist staff at the party newspaper. 
Their speechmaking and editorial writing are good prods and stimuli, but there is also the 
equally, if not even more important advantage that by giving them jobs and a platform, Nyerere 
keeps them out in the open where they can be seen, where they have opportunities to work off 
their neurosis in public, and where they can mature through having to live with their mistakes. 
He also realizes that if he cast them out of the establishment, he would not only lose their 
usefulness as goads and gadflies, but he would also run the risk of having them plot against 
him.752 
Already unnerved by the spate of coups in late 1960s Africa, Nyerere had been further shaken by 
the events of 1967. His dispute from Kambona had created a powerful enemy in exile. A one-party 
state necessitated the maintenance of unity at the top, which required the toleration of powerful 
individuals who occasionally (or even consistently) stepped beyond the party line. 
‘Argue Don’t Shout’ and the demise of Lawi Sijaona 
However, Nyerere’s patience was finite. Even when writing his report on ‘The Nationalist and other 
radicals’, Burns recognised that the success of the president’s technique of rhetorical bloodletting 
had been at the expense of Tanzania’s image abroad.753 In July 1968, an expatriate Nationalist staff 
member, Belle Harris, told a researcher that Nyerere and other ministers were concerned about 
what the newspaper said, especially when it was ‘rude’ to other countries and endangered aid 
relations.754 Soon after the Czechoslovakia demonstration, Mgonja and Sijaona were moved to less 
politically sensitive ministerial roles in more technocratic institutions. Mgonja became minister for 
education and Sijaona was appointed minister of health and housing. In Belgrade in October 1969, 
Mgonja’s successor, Stephen Mhando, acknowledged to William Leonhart – then Washington’s 
ambassador to Yugoslavia, but formerly to Tanzania – that his country still had its 'radicals and 
extremists’, but they had now been placed in jobs where they were ‘buried bureaucratically but 
effectively’.755 
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Sijaona’s change of ministries marked the beginning of a lengthy tussle with Nyerere that 
became enwrapped in the politics of protest. Sijaona had long occupied a central role in the TYL. 
In 1956, he became the organisation’s first secretary-general. Though he relinquished the position 
in 1960, Sijaona continued to be a dominant force within the movement’s ranks. In September 
1967, he assumed the role of chairman and began to exercise de facto leadership, despite Joseph 
Nyerere, the president’s brother, serving as its secretary-general. But as the previous chapter 
established, while minister of state at the second vice-president’s office, Sijaona actively 
undermined the security of Eduardo Mondlane, whom Nyerere greatly respected. Sijaona’s 
connections with Lazaro Kavandame cast his loyalties under suspicion. His hostility towards non-
Africans, combined with a volatile temper, also dismayed Nyerere. His reputation was further 
damaged by his past associations with Kambona.756 
On 3 October 1968, the TYL announced its plans for ‘Operation Vijana’, a campaign against 
‘indecent dress’.757 The wearing of miniskirts or tight trousers was deemed antithetical to Tanzania’s 
‘national culture’ – TANU’s reclamation of an African heritage which had been trampled on by 
colonialism and risked corruption by the influence of a decadent cosmopolitan modernity. Sijaona 
emphasised that the enforcement of the ban would be concentrated on Dar es Salaam, since ‘the 
people whose minds have been enslaved by dehumanising practices are confined into the urban 
areas’.758 After the introduction of the ban in January 1969, TYL members patrolled the streets of 
the capital in search of any sartorial impropriety. 
By this stage, there were palpable tensions between Nyerere and Sijaona. The TYL’s militancy, 
epitomised by the language which accompanied Operation Vijana, posed a threat to the authority of 
the TANU leadership. The British high commission reckoned that the anti-miniskirt campaign was 
intended to bolster Sijaona’s position within the party. ‘As a self-appointed custodian of youthful 
morals he aims to distract attention away from past indiscretions’, it noted.759 Nyerere himself 
reined in the TYL during Operation Vijana, by ordering that cadres involved must carry 
identification cards, wear uniforms, and only carry out arrests with police assistance. These 
restrictive measures meant that the campaign soon fizzled out.760 
In March 1969, Nyerere convened a surprise meeting of TANU’s Central Committee in 
Mwanza. TANU announced in public that the meeting had only discussed the issue of candidate 
selection for party district chairmanships. However, its unexpected nature and the fact that it was 
the first of its kind held out of the capital led to much speculation in Dar es Salaam about Sijaona’s 
position.761 The CID’s regional chief confided in an American diplomat that Sijaona was under 
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surveillance by the security services, who were amassing evidence against him.762 On 29 March, 
Sijaona organised a TYL rally in Dar es Salaam, where he expressed support for the Vietnamese 
cause and promised ‘that the imperialists and particularly the United States imperialists, who are the 
rampant abomination inflicting death tears on humanity, are bound to meet with an ignominious 
defeat.’763 The American embassy considered it an attempt by Sijaona ‘to wrap himself in an issue 
which is popular with some segments of Tanzanian society and therefore make it difficult for 
Nyerere to attack him directly.’764 
Sijaona responded to the wave of public enthusiasm in Tanzania that greeted the Apollo moon 
landing in July by launching another attack on the United States. At a procession at the university, 
the language of protest reached a new level of vehemence. Sijaona shouted ‘slaughter Nixon’. 
Mkapa told the TYL members that the United States was ‘bestial’ and connected the situation in 
Indochina to the national revolution in Tanzania, claiming that ‘what is happening in Vietnam 
today should be a greater reminder to us of the nature of imperialism and we should heighten our 
vigilance for Africa is the next theatre of aggression and plunder.’ Among a clutch of virulently 
anti-American editorials in the Nationalist, Kaisi produced a photo essay which contrasted the 
success of the moon landings with the conflict in Vietnam.765 
This spate of attacks elicited renewed American complaints to the Foreign Ministry. At a party 
at the Israeli embassy, the chargé d’affaires, Thomas Pickering, brought up the issue with Daniel 
Mfinanga, the ministry’s chief of protocol. When Pickering mentioned Sijaona’s name, Mfinanga 
‘winced’, but agreed to a more official meeting, at which Mfinanga distanced the government from 
the activities of the TYL. Given the organisation was ‘specifically for children (watoto)’, he asserted, 
‘some of its actions were inclined to be childish (utoto) and had to be overlooked’. He also suggested 
that Sijaona was not acting in his ministerial capacity, but as chairman of the TYL, and so his views 
did not reflect those of the government, which sincerely believed Nixon was working for peace in 
Indochina.766 
His patience exhausted by such antics, Nyerere issued a pamphlet entitled ‘Argue Don’t Shout’, 
in which he called for a more mature attitude from his government towards international affairs. 
After recapitulating the principles of Tanzania’s foreign policy – liberation, non-alignment, self-
reliance – he rounded on the emotional strain among many of his spokesmen. ‘Of course’, he 
observed, 
it is much more difficult to present a reasoned argument than to shout slogans like 
“imperialism”, “communism”, or “racism”, and there is sometimes less immediate emotional 
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satisfaction. But temper tantrums are the reaction of children; adults who speak for their 
country should have better control over themselves.767 
These scolding words were not popular among Nyerere’s target audience. One member of the 
Nationalist staff, speaking in passing to an American embassy officer, described it as ‘nonsense’ and 
that Tanzania would sap its ‘revolutionary vitality’ if it failed to stand up to ‘imperialism, 
colonialism, and neo-colonialism’.768 The schism between Nyerere’s measured foreign policy and 
the radical ideologues was clear. 
As the following chapter sets out, the discovery of a coup plot orchestrated by Kambona in 
October 1969 increased President Nyerere’s suspicion of rivals within Tanzania. In April 1970, 
Joseph Nyerere resigned at the TYL’s secretary-general, after being outmanoeuvred by Sijaona and 
Mgonja. Concerned about its militancy, in 1971 President Nyerere slashed the TYL’s funding. The 
situation came to a head in August 1971, when the TANU leadership introduced a new age limit of 
35 for the movement’s leaders, which would have excluded the 43-year-old Sijaona. The TYL’s 
biennial conference, dominated by elders, rejected the proposal. When Ngombale-Mwiru, a senior 
TYL cadre, told Nyerere of the decision, the president was furious. He fell back on the TANU 
leadership: the party’s Central Committee ruled in Nyerere’s favour and Sijaona was stripped of his 
role. In the 1970s the TYL continued to act as a body for political mobilisation in Tanzania, but 
became more subservient to the TANU leadership.769 
Conclusion 
Babu began 1969 in characteristic fashion. In his Nationalist column, he surveyed events of the 
previous year, dwelling especially on the American setbacks in Vietnam. Decrying imperialism as 
the ‘number one enemy’, he declared that 
the people of Tanzania – particularly the youth – must raise their vigilance against the people’s 
enemies here and abroad. The people must fearlessly expose the enemies, rout them out and 
move forward to socialism under the banner of the Arusha Declaration […] Let us all resolve to 
make 1969 the year of imperialist doom.770 
The combination of damning assault on ‘imperialism’ and exhortation to fight its enemies in 
building the nation on the home front was a fitting finale: ‘Pressman’s Commentary’ did not appear 
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in future editions of the Nationalist. Although I have found no explanation, public or private, for its 
cessation, it seems unlikely that the decision was made without Nyerere’s approval. 
Whereas protestors in the West, the Soviet Bloc, and other Third World countries questioned 
the authority of the state, Tanzania’s experience of ’68 resulted in a bolstering of the national 
government. While an element of transnational and international exchange was present in 
Tanzania’s engagement with developments in Vietnam and Czechoslovakia, they were largely 
interpreted in African and especially national terms. Since the government was unwilling to go 
beyond sober condemnation of superpower interventions, radical journalists and student protestors 
were mandated with expressing local anger. Attacks on ‘imperialism’ fed into a national discourse 
emphasising the need for vigilance and unity in order to fulfil the revolutionary goals set out by 
ujamaa socialism. Herein lies another essential difference between the European or North American 
‘68ers and the protestors in Dar es Salaam: while the former articulated a ‘counterculture’ to the 
political mainstream, the Tanzanian youth rallied around the banner of the ‘national culture’ which 
Nyerere and TANU espoused. These nation-building tasks were entrusted to the TYL, which was 
assigned a monopoly over popular mobilisation. 
Providing space for protest – whether on the streets of Dar es Salaam or in the pages of the 
Nationalist – allowed potential troublemakers to direct their frustrations and ambitions outwards, 
rather than inwards at the regime. There were limits to this freedom, however. Having been bitten 
hard by the foreign policy crises of 1964-65, Nyerere did not want to alienate potential donor states. 
As Mhando told Leonhart in Belgrade in 1969, Tanzania was more interested in its domestic issues 
than in quarrelling with foreign powers. While remaining true to their core principles, especially 
non-alignment and African liberation, Nyerere and his government were now ‘less inclined to look 
for opportunities to antagonize countries which might wish to help them.’771 Nyerere also feared 
the dangers inherent in potential rivals establishing power bases within the state apparatus. 
Enmeshed in multiple political controversies, Sijaona became locked in a struggle with Nyerere, in 
which the president ultimately demonstrated the decisive quality of his own authority within the 
party-state. 
Finally, one striking feature of the Tanzanian presentation to superpower interventions in 
Vietnam and Czechoslovakia was the conspicuous absence of the the term ‘Cold War’. Rather than 
interpret developments through the lens of an ‘East versus West’ ideological and geopolitical 
dichotomy, the dividing line was drawn between the weak and the powerful. The United States was 
a wealthy superpower, Vietnam was a poor ex-colony; the Soviet Union was a big state, 
Czechoslovakia was a small state. Local intellectuals, journalists, students, and politicians articulated 
an alternative global vision to the Eurocentric metanarrative of Cold War competition. Instead, 
they deplored American and Soviet interference beyond their own borders as a continuation of the 
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same imperialist practices under which Africans had previously suffered, and which continued to 
obstruct Tanzanian development after independence. They echoed Nyerere’s own worldview, 
which, as the obstacles posed to Tanzania by the structural inequalities of the global economy 
became clear, was increasingly concerned with what are today termed North/South divisions.772 
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Chapter 6 
Politics in the time of ujamaa, part one: openings 
On the third anniversary of the Arusha Declaration in February 1970, Nyerere made a radio 
broadcast to the nation. He praised Tanzania’s leadership for embracing the spirit of ujamaa, but 
warned against any relaxation. ‘The feudalists and capitalists know that their hopes of defeating our 
socialist policies by using TANU and Government leaders have been very much reduced’, he 
claimed. ‘You will notice that I said reduced, not ended: the appetite of a hyena does not end as 
long as he sees a bone.’773 
Over the half-decade which followed the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere ground down the 
opposition to and within his government. Ultimately, the ‘hyenas’ included not just those who 
rejected the principles of ujamaa, like Oscar Kambona, but other internal threats, especially from 
the Marxist left. As previous chapters have demonstrated, while the government preached the need 
for unity – umoja – the leadership of the TANU party-state contained divisions along ideological, 
political, and personal fautlines. Faced by a mixture of external threat and internal dissent, Nyerere 
moved to eradicate domestic opposition and shore up his authority in Tanzania. 
While existing narratives of Tanzania’s shift towards authoritarian government abound, they 
overwhelmingly focus on the centrepiece of the ujamaa reforms, the villagisation campaign, at the 
expense of political feuding at Frederick Cooper’s ‘gate’. References to schisms among the elite are 
rare. This chapter and the one which follows therefore seek to plug a gap in the history of post-
colonial Tanzania. After his flight to London in 1967, Kambona told a press conference that he 
would ‘take the lid’ off Tanzanian politics. The Nationalist confidently welcomed his proposal. 
‘Tanzania will be very pleased if he “takes the lid off” our politics’, an editorial stated. ‘We have no 
fear. We have nothing to hide.’774 Taking up the Nationalist’s challenge, this chapter and the next set 
out a detailed narrative of politics in the ujamaa years. While the prism here is in part distinctly 
Tanzanian, the city of Dar es Salaam continued to serve as a nodal ‘gate’ between the mainland and 
the islands, the rural interior and the rest of the world, the national and the international. 
The deaths of Kassim Hanga and Othman Shariff 
By 1968, four years after the revolution and union with Tanganyika, Zanzibar had sunk into an 
economic and political malaise. In contrast to Nyerere’s flexible policies of self-reliance on the 
mainland, Karume’s regime pursued genuine economic autarky. Despite a boom in clove prices, the 
government hoarded foreign exchange and preferred to develop local agriculture, which led to food 
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shortages. Racial persecution of Zanzibaris of Arab and Comorian descent continued.775 Africans 
benefitted from the land redistribution which followed the revolution, but their everyday freedoms 
were significantly curbed. Zanzibaris were prevented from travelling to the mainland. The Stasi-
trained security forces clamped down on any signs of dissent.776 One Tanzanian I interviewed 
compared Karume’s Zanzibar to Macias Nguema’s Equatorial Guinea or ‘Papa Doc’s’ Haiti.777 
Another Zanzibari academic describes the narrowness of political space on the islands as being like 
communist Albania and Romania.778 This opacity encouraged rumours of coup plots, which 
continued to fester in Zanzibar after the revolution. Although Babu had been transferred to the 
mainland and his party banned, talk of a residual network of Umma cells on the islands persisted.779 
While Karume retained a dominant public presence in Zanzibari politics, power became 
increasingly concentrated in a cabal of hardliners. They included Seif Bakari (member of the 
Revolutionary Council, chairman of the ASPYL, and political commissar in the army), Said Natepe 
(vice-chairman of the ASPYL), and Yusuf Himidi (commander of the armed forces). As leaders of 
the ASPYL, these men had played a leading role in the seizure of power in 1964, after disagreeing 
with Karume’s policy of nonviolent opposition to the incumbent ZNP-ZPPP government. Indeed, 
Karume initially owed his position to Bakari and his supporters, who had summoned him from Dar 
es Salaam to serve as the figurehead of the revolutionary regime. Only in the following weeks did 
Karume consolidate his personal rule.780 Like their TYL colleagues on the mainland, the ASPYL 
became close to the Chinese, from whom they imbibed the rhetorical and performative repertoire 
of Maoism, to Western concern.781 
Relations among the Zanzibari leadership were fractious. In October 1966, Saleh Saadalla, 
Zanzibar’s minister for public works and communications, attempted to shoot Karume at a 
meeting of the Revolutionary Council. He was incarcerated and later ‘disappeared’.782 The following 
September, heated exchanges among the Revolutionary Council broke into open violence, after 
which the ASP secretary-general, Thabit Kombo, required medical care.783 In early 1969, Natepe 
was secretly imprisoned for a month after daring to criticise Karume’s orders to suppress slogans 
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attacking the West.784 In Zanzibar’s opaque politics, news of these confrontations remained solely 
the subject of rumour. 
On 22 August 1969, Bakari chaired a meeting of the upper ranks of Zanzibar’s police and armed 
forces, which discussed the alleged subversion of officers by conspirators from the mainland. 
Those present adduced that a plot had been conceived to overthrow the Karume government. 
Karume then travelled to Dar es Salaam, where he asked Nyerere to transfer Kassim Hanga, 
Othman Shariff, and Ali Mwinyi Tambwe to Zanzibar. Since being released from preventive 
detention in December 1968, Hanga had been living quietly in one of Kambona’s properties in Dar 
es Salaam. Shariff had served as Tanzania’s first ambassador to Washington immediately after the 
union of 1964. The following year, he was recalled to Tanzania in the fallout from the ‘phone 
tapping’ plot. Shariff was subsequently accused of plotting against the Zanzibari regime and briefly 
imprisoned, until Nyerere negotiated his transfer to the mainland and release. In 1969, Shariff was 
working as a veterinary officer in Iringa, central Tanzania. Tambwe was a Zanzibari of Comorian 
descent, who had held a senior position in TANU prior to Tanganyika’s independence and later 
served as deputy minister for foreign affairs in Zanzibar. At the time of his arrest, he was working 
as a director of Continental Ore, a private firm specialising in precious metals.785 
Nyerere initially refused to grant Karume’s request, but when the latter returned with ‘evidence’ 
of a plot involving the subversion of Zanzibari army officers, the former acquiesced.786 On 1 
September, the Standard reported the trio’s arrest. Zanzibar’s police commissioner, Eddington 
Kissassi, and attorney-general, Wolfgang Dourado, immediately refuted the story. There were 
rumours of further arrests, but no official announcement from the government on either the 
islands or mainland.787 ‘Whether the plot was genuine, concocted, or a mixture of both, [the 
Zanzibar] government is at least acting as if it has nipped it in the bud’, remarked the American 
consulate.788 
The arrest of Hanga alarmed the Soviet Union. While there is no indication that Moscow had a 
hand in any plot, its diplomats were worried about their potential implication via their associations 
with Hanga, whose pro-Soviet inclinations were well known. He had studied at Lumumba 
University in Moscow and had a Russian wife of partial African descent. In the pre-revolution 
years, Karume and Hanga had shared a close relationship, but friendship became enmity after 1964, 
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inter alia because Hanga had visited Saadalla in prison after his arrest.789 In October 1968, the Soviet 
embassy in Dar es Salaam had reportedly given Hanga financial assistance upon his release from 
preventive detention.790 Hanga, the British high commission believed, was Moscow’s ‘bought 
man’.791 
The Soviet Union therefore had grounds for concern. Its representatives feared that their 
connections with Hanga might lead to their further marginalisation in Tanzania, especially in 
Zanzibar, where Chinese influence was growing at the expense of the Eastern Bloc. Indeed, the 
first news to reach Washington about the arrests came – via the French consulate in Zanzibar – 
from a Soviet diplomat.792 At a private dinner with his American counterpart on 11 September, the 
Soviet consul, Stephen Rogov, asked about the arrests. Rogov’s unusually direct inquiry suggested 
to Jack Matlock that Moscow was worried.793 Reports reached the British that the Soviet 
ambassador in Dar es Salaam had leant on the Czechoslovakians to extract Hanga from his fate in 
Zanzibar, by offering to provide Hanga with medical aid in Europe. The Czechoslovakian 
ambassador Mikulas Surina had defiantly maintained a pro-Dubček stance even after the crushing 
of the Prague Spring and seemed an unlikely partner for Soviet cooperation. He refused the Soviet 
request, in the belief that Moscow was trying to rope him into the plot.794 
The Zanzibar regime finally broke its silence at a mass rally on 26 October. Addressing a crowd 
marked by a high turnout of policemen and soldiers, Major Lazaro X. William set out the alleged 
coup conspiracy and gave the names of the conspirators, four of whom had been sentenced to 
death. In his own speech at the end of the rally, Karume pre-empted criticisms of the lack of due 
judicial process, by arguing that the courts system represented the inherited vestiges of British 
colonialism – though he then claimed that the executions were also justified under colonial law, 
which stipulated the death penalty for treason. ‘Those whom you have slaughtered, have been 
slaughtered’, Karume told a baying crowd. The names of those executed were not given, although it 
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was generally assumed that they included Hanga and Shariff.795 At another rally on 2 November, an 
ASPYL spokesman encouraged Nyerere to treat those arrested on the mainland in the same way.796  
The news of the executions took the Tanzanian government by surprise. When the American 
chargé d’affaires called on Mark Bomani on 27 October, the attorney-general ‘made no effort to 
hide his consternation’. Bomani claimed that he had no knowledge of the death sentences before 
the previous day’s rally and that the special court in Zanzibar had no legal basis.797 The Canadian 
high commission reported that General Mrisho Sarakikya was angry at not only the executions, but 
the role played by TPDF(Z) officers in the affair. According to Sarakikya, Nyerere himself was 
‘furious’. Tellingly, the TANU press offered no comment.798 
This sense of embarrassment on the mainland was felt by Maurice Foley, parliamentary under-
secretary at the FCO, when he visited Tanzania shortly after the announcement of the executions. 
He pointed out to Nyerere the problems which might arise from the ‘external presentation’ of these 
events. Nyerere was evasive on the Zanzibari ‘conspiracy’: he affirmed that there had been a plot 
against Karume’s regime, but did not think it had posed a genuine threat. In Zanzibar, Foley found 
Karume defiant, claiming he had evidence of links between the plot against his government, 
Kambona, and a number of non-Tanzanian co-conspirators, including Kwesi Armah, a Ghanaian 
who had served in Nkrumah’s government. Stephen Mhando, the minister of state for foreign 
affairs, accompanied Foley to Zanzibar. Mhando told Foley that in private talks he had made 
Karume aware of the likely backlash to the executions from the outside world.799  
Nyerere’s mistake in handing the prisoners over to Karume was ammunition to his conservative 
critics in the West. In the Times, Roy Lewis accused Nyerere of failing to protect Shariff, whom it 
was claimed had been personally assured of his safety by the president. Referring to the Cold War 
spectre of China, Lewis wrote that the union, 
far from restoring Zanzibar to normality, appears to be spreading Zanzibar’s arbitrary rule to 
Tanganyika. The importance of the Chinese in Zanzibar, and now in building the Tanzania-
Zambia railway, may afford some explanation. Whatever the wider issues, the story of Othman 
Shariff is a miserable comment on conditions in island and mainland alike.800 
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How could Nyerere’s condemnations of executions in Rhodesia or South Africa be taken seriously, 
when even murkier extrajudicial killings were taking place in his own backyard?801 The crisis 
surrounding the deaths of Hanga and Shariff also exposed the weakness of Nyerere’s authority over 
Zanzibar. The Times article, observed a British diplomat, ‘reflected well the President’s inability to 
bring himself to the point of grasping nettles’.802 Spurred into action, Nyerere and several union 
ministers held a series of meetings with Karume, whom they told was embarrassing Tanzania in 
front of the world. This intervention seemed to have some effect. At a far calmer rally on 8 
November, in the presence of Mhando, Karume avoided the topic of the plot altogether and 
confined his speech solely to the advent of Ramadan.803 
The episode also demonstrated the relative weakness of Karume’s position in Zanzibar. The 
driving force behind the arrests had been the faction led by Bakari and Natepe, which brought 
together the authority of the Revolutionary Council, the coercive power of the army, and the 
grassroots strength of the ASPYL.804 A member of the Revolutionary Council, Hafidh Suleiman 
Almasi, later claimed that the executions were ordered by Bakari’s faction, with few dissenting 
voices.805 In an indication of his weakness, Karume told Foley that he had not held a public trial of 
the plotters, since the Revolutionary Council ‘could not afford to wait, but had to act’.806 Much 
later, Babu argued that Karume – his bitter enemy – had been hostage to the Bakari clique. ‘On 
several occasions when I visited Zanzibar Karume himself would complain to me about the 
viciousness of this committee and how helpless he was in the circumstances’, wrote Babu. Hanga 
and others were thus ‘killed in the name of Karume’, rather than on his orders.807 
Given the perception of Chinese influence within the ASPYL, the United States noted the role 
played by Bakari and Natepe in the executions with alarm. The fact that this faction could gain 
enough support within the Revolutionary Council to present Karume with a ‘fait accompli’, 
reflected the American consul, ‘is disturbing evidence of ChiCom potential to wield influence in 
Zanzibar political affairs.’808 The Americans were concerned that the discord between mainland 
Tanzania and Zanzibar might lead to the dissolution of the union. The strong Chinese presence on 
the islands was perceived as a potential threat, should the Zanzibar regime snap the leash that 
tethered it to Nyerere’s moderating influence. The United States was unnerved by reports from 
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figures close to Nyerere that, even before the arrests and executions, he was weighing up the pros 
and cons of breaking the union. Washington therefore welcomed an approach by Séan MacBride, 
the international chairman of Amnesty International, who was considering relaying his concerns to 
Nyerere about human rights abuses in Zanzibar. The United States believed that outside pressure 
might encourage Nyerere to deal with the deteriorating condition of Zanzibar more forcefully, 
whereas to let the matter drift risked a situation whereby Nyerere would determine that the 
liabilities of the union outweighed its benefits.809 
The mainland coup plot and treason trial 
These calls for greater transparency and justice in Tanzania were sharpened by developments in 
Dar es Salaam which paralleled events in Zanzibar. In August and September 1969, there were 
rumours of discontent among the armed forces. On a tip-off from exiled Portuguese communists 
in Algeria – who had connections with FRELIMO representatives moving between Algiers and 
Dar es Salaam – the GDR warned of an imminent period of stasis within the army.810 Amid these 
murmurs, Nyerere told a military parade at the National Stadium that there were two types of 
soldier: the one who fights for the nation, the other who fights for money alone.811 
On 11 October 1969, while Nyerere was on a state visit to Moscow, Radio Tanzania reported 
that six people had been arrested for activities ‘not conducive to good order’. They included 
Michael Kamaliza, the former NUTA secretary-general and minister for labour, and Bibi Titi 
Mohammed, the former secretary-general of the UWT. Four TPDF officers were detained, 
although their names were not made public.812 The following day, the Kenyan Sunday Post claimed 
that Gray Mattaka, the former news editor of the Nationalist, had been arrested while disembarking 
a flight at Nairobi airport the previous weekend and then handed over to the Tanzanian authorities, 
although it later came to light that Mattaka had been arrested a month earlier, on 6 September.813 
The armed forces and police in Dar es Salaam were placed on full alert.814 
Tanzanian intelligence had been tracking Oscar Kambona’s movements since his flight to 
London in 1967. From late 1968 onwards, they detected a coup plot in the making, involving a 
group of army officers loyal to Kambona, plus Bibi Titi and Kamaliza, both of whom already bore 
grudges against Nyerere. Bibi Titi, a long-time Kambona ally, had resigned from her role as head of 
the UWT in 1967 due to ‘back trouble’, which many took as a coded rejection of the leadership 
rules attached to the Arusha Declaration. Bibi Titi was also embittered by the marginalisation of the 
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East African Muslim Welfare Society, of which she was vice-president.815 Kamaliza had been 
dropped as minister for labour in the post-Arusha fallout in 1967 and then was replaced as 
secretary-general of TANU earlier in 1969.  Prior to leaving the country on 28 September 1969, 
Nyerere was fully aware of the conspiracy, but unconcerned by it. According to information 
received by the Canadian high commission (potentially from Sarakikya), the president felt that it 
presented no immediate danger. The Canadian source reported that Nyerere first heard of the 
arrests via a BBC radio news bulletin in Moscow and was furious at the breach of his orders.816 
After the crackdowns which followed the mutiny and the abolition of multipartyism, the 
Tanzanian government had become increasingly reliant on the Preventive Detention Act of 1962 as 
a means of control, exemplified by the cases of Anangisye and Hanga.817 Here, circumstances 
cautioned otherwise and prompted Nyerere to hold a public trial. The scandal of the Zanzibar 
executions had brought Nyerere’s international image into question. To simply imprison his 
enemies without charge or fair trial would also have substantiated Kambona’s accusations that 
Nyerere was establishing a dictatorship in Tanzania. However, the nature of Tanzanian law, which 
defined ‘treasonable offences’ as involving some recourse to violence, presenting a sticking point: 
the evidence amassed by the authorities amounted to a plot confined to paper. In March 1970, the 
government hastily amended the penal code to include such offences as ‘deposing the president by 
unlawful means’. The trial therefore took place under retrospective legislation, which contravened 
the UN Declaration of Human Rights.818 
 The treason case was brought before court in Dar es Salaam on 8 May 1970, although the trial 
did not begin until 1 June. Alongside Bibi Titi, Kamaliza, and Mattaka there were four other 
defendants: John Dunstan Lifa Chipaka (referred to as ‘Chipaka’), a former opposition leader in the 
multiparty period and cousin of Kambona; his brother, Captain Eliya Lifa Chipaka (‘Lifa’); 
Lieutenant Alfred Millinga; and Colonel William Chacha. The first three had been arrested in the 
round-up in October; Chacha had lately been serving as a military attaché at the Tanzanian embassy 
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in Beijing, until he was summoned back to Dar es Salaam and arrested in April 1970.819 Kambona 
was initially also named among the accused. However, under Tanzanian law he could not be tried in 
absentia. After some deliberation, the Tanzanian authorities decided against requesting his 
extradition from Britain and his name was not included when the formal charges were 
announced.820 
Space here precludes a full retelling of the twists, turns, accusations, and counter-accusations of 
the trial itself, which lasted seven months. In his opening statement, the attorney-general, Mark 
Bomani, set out the case for the prosecution. He alleged that Kambona had been plotting the 
overthrow of Nyerere since his flight into exile in 1967. Mattaka and Chipaka were soon recruited 
into his conspiracy; they had produced a pamphlet entitled Ukweli (‘Truth’) in July 1968, which 
contained ‘seditious passages and defamatory allegations’ about Nyerere. Ukweli accused the 
president of being a ‘madman’, an ‘exploiter’, and a ‘thief’. It claimed Nyerere hoarded money in a 
Swiss bank account, enjoyed funding from the CIA, and worked in cahoots with the Asian business 
elite in Tanzania.821 The other plotters were later roped into a plan which involved the 
overthrowing of Nyerere’s regime, to be replaced by a government headed by Kambona. Much of 
the proceedings involved an assessment of the veracity and meaning of various letters, which had 
been sent among the accused and had been seized by the authorities following the arrests in 
October.822 
It quickly emerged that despite this slew of written evidence, the prosecution’s case rested 
mainly on the testimony of Potlako Leballo, the acting president of the PAC, a rival South African 
liberation movement to the more established ANC. Leballo claimed that Mattaka had approached 
him in March 1969 in Nairobi, informing him about the coup plot and asking for the PAC’s 
cooperation, in return for a favourable relationship with a post-Nyerere government. Leballo 
immediately reported the approach to the Tanzanian authorities, who instructed him to continue to 
cooperate with the plotters as an intelligence-gathering mole. Leballo served as the key intermediary 
between Kambona in London and the conspirators in East Africa. After Mattaka’s arrest, Kambona 
told Leballo, whom he now suspected of being an informer, that the plot had been called off. 
However, the plans for the coup were not abandoned, as Kambona maintained a dialogue with his 
supporters in Tanzania.823 
The prosecution’s reliance on Leballo’s evidence was problematic on several grounds. In legal 
terms, the role he had played in disingenuously cooperating with the plotters opened him up to 
charges that he had been acting as an agent provocateur of the state, entrapping the conspirators. 
As the chief justice, P. T. Georges, recognised, Leballo was ‘an enthusiastic agent who revelled in 
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his role’ and so ‘his evidence has to be examined with care’.824 Leballo’s circumstances also brought 
his credibility as a witness into question. Even by the standards of the liberation movements based 
in Dar es Salaam, the PAC was a fractious organisation. Although recognised by the OAU 
Liberation Committee, it lacked the infrastructure or support base of the ANC. Leballo’s leadership 
was divisive and caused a series of expulsions and desertions from the party in 1967-68. Leballo 
therefore had a vested interest in collaborating with the Tanzanian authorities, which, after his 
starring role in the treason trial, he fell back on to suppress resistance within the PAC.825 
During the trial, Leballo was subject to multiple character assassinations. In its cross-
examination, the defence presented Leballo as a greedy, venal individual, who had been charged 
with offences of fraud in South Africa. This image chimed with accusations previously levelled at 
Leballo by his critics within the PAC. A report from a dissident faction within the movement, 
submitted to the OAU Liberation Committee in November 1967, alleged that ‘truthfulness is not 
one of his attributes’ and that ‘Leballo’s lying and inconsistency go hand in hand, and this has 
embarrassed the PAC as a whole.’826 Delivering his judgement on the treason trial in January 1971, 
Georges echoed this assessment. Leballo, he said, was ‘given to swagger’ and had ‘the capacity of 
convincing himself that that which he believes to be true is in fact true.’827 
In order to protect Leballo’s security, Bomani initially asked for his cross-examination be held in 
camera. When Georges rejected this request, the Tanzanian government ordered the local press to 
give Leballo’s turn on the witness stand only perfunctory coverage. The only journalist permitted to 
report on this part of the trial was the local Reuters correspondent, who was told by the director of 
information that he could file fully ‘with the exception of anything that reflected discreditably on 
Leballo’.828 This blackout contrasted with coverage of the rest of the trial, which dominated Dar es 
Salaam’s newsprint over the second half of 1970. The lengthy transcripts carried by the press often 
included vocal criticism of Nyerere and the government from the defendants. Chipaka stated in his 
testimony that ‘this might be my last chance to talk, and I want my children to come and read these 
things’. He then accused Nyerere of presiding over a dictatorship, with no freedom of the press.829 
Leballo’s involvement represents further evidence of the extent to which the liberation 
movements were enmeshed in Tanzania’s domestic affairs. An OAU Liberation Committee official 
told an American embassy employee that Leballo had informed him that other liberation 
movement members had been approached by Kambona and his co-conspirators. These included 
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members of the ANC and ZAPU, plus Sam Nujoma, the SWAPO president. None of these men, 
Leballo alleged, had reported the approaches to the Tanzanian government nor rejected the 
advance out of hand.830 Kambona was said to have tapped-up Oliver Tambo, the leader of the 
ANC’s ‘external mission’, who also failed to notify the Tanzanian authorities of such advances. 
Stephen Ellis suggests that this may have triggered a Tanzanian decision to suddenly close down an 
ANC training camp at Kongwa in July 1969, ostensibly on the grounds of national security, since 
the camp was ‘a lucrative hunting ground for enemy agents.’831 Still wilder rumours reached Lusaka, 
where a ZANU official claimed that FRELIMO members, including Marcelino dos Santos, were 
implicated in the conspiracy, together with Mzwai Piliso, an ANC official who had received 
financial support from Moscow for an anti-Nyerere plot. American diplomats afforded these 
reports no credibility, but their mere existence is another indicator of the destabilising 
consequences of competition among the Dar es Salaam-based liberation movements.832 
Exemplifying the subversive potential of these rivalries, there were reports that Frene Ginwala, the 
Standard editor and an ANC supporter, was supplying evidence to the defence lawyers, which they 
redeployed in court to denigrate Leballo’s character: an employee of a government newspaper was 
seeking to undermine a state prosecution of Tanzanians charged with treason.833 
The trial proceedings showed how, in contrast to 1964-65, Cold War politics no longer provided 
an overarching framework through which local developments in Tanzania were interpreted. There 
were admittedly references in the trial to Western attempts to subvert local politics: there was some 
concern at the American embassy when Prisca Chiombola, a USIS employee and niece of 
Kambona, was placed in detention and then summoned as a witness for the prosecution. Leballo 
also alleged that money had been transferred to Kambona via USIS channels. Another state witness 
made the wild allegation that American and British diplomats in Nairobi had provided the plotters 
with support, but this gained little traction. Rather, the actors in a home-grown plot were all 
Africans reputedly involved were dragged into the plot by Tanzanian connections.  The diplomatic 
spat with Nigeria over Tanzania’s recognition of Biafra allegedly led Lagos to provide secret 
support to Kambona. In a statement given to police while he was under preventive detention (and 
which he then repudiated in court), Mattaka said that the Nigerians had furnished Kambona with 
£5,000 to support the plot.834 The proceedings demonstrated that the threat to the Nyerere regime 
came not via some unseen Cold War deus ex machina, but networks of discontented Tanzanians and 
exiled liberation movements operating outside of the immediate context of superpower rivalry. 
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Georges delivered his verdict on 30 January 1971. Four of the accused were found guilty of 
treason and conspiracy: Mattaka, Bibi Titi, Chipaka, and Lifa. Kamaliza and Chacha were acquitted 
of treason, but convicted of the lesser offence of misprision. Millinga was acquitted on all charges. 
Georges’ judgement was not without criticism for the government, however. He expressed his 
hope that ‘this trial would be the beginning of an era in which preventive detention as a deterrent 
would be less frequently used, and the courts would be accepted as places where all persons 
suspected of criminal activities would be tried and dealt with.’835 Foreign onlookers were generally 
impressed by the proceedings. A British report concluded that ‘one has to give Nyerere a little 
credit for stomaching a trial of this nature, which meant that some whom he suspected could not 
be booked at all […] Certainly he has succeeded in pointing up the contrast to Zanzibar – and 
many other African states as well.’836 
This rather uncritical acceptance of the court’s ruling was revealed to be hollow when the 
defendants took their protest to the East African Court of Appeal – and obtained a number of 
victories. Although the Court of Appeal agreed that a conspiracy had existed, it questioned the 
legitimacy of the case brought forward by the prosecution. In particular, the court noted that 
despite Georges’ sceptical treatment of Leballo, several of the convictions were wholly dependent 
on his ‘tainted evidence’. The judges therefore acknowledged that Mattaka’s activities had been 
‘highly suspicious’, but acquitted him on the grounds that there was no other ‘positive evidence’ 
than Leballo’s testimony. The court also upheld appeals made by Kamaliza and Chacha. Bibi Titi’s 
appeal was allowed on one count, but dismissed on two others. The appeals of both Chipaka 
brothers were dismissed.837 Having been freed on technical grounds – a reflection of the ineptitude 
of the prosecution – Mattaka was immediately re-arrested by the government and kept in 
preventive detention. Ultimately, the requirements of justice, intended to present a positive image 
of Tanzania to the outside world, were overridden by the party-state’s prioritisation of national 
security.838 
The Guinean invasion and the Ugandan coup 
On the night of 22-23 October 1970, in the midst of Tanzania’s treason trial, a force of undercover 
Portuguese forces, mercenaries, and local opponents of Sekou Touré’s regime invaded Guinea-
Conakry from neighbouring Guinea-Bissau. Operação Mar Verde sought to free Portuguese prisoners 
of war and destroy the assets of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde 
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(Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, PAIGC), which had been given shelter in 
Conakry. The invaders also unsuccessfully tried to stage a coup to overthrow Touré.839 Although 
Portugal denied any involvement, the invasion sparked international outrage, especially in Africa. 
As a state which provided a base for multiple liberation movements, Tanzania had particular 
cause for fear. The dangers inherent in housing the guerrillas were fresh in the memory after the 
assassination of Mondlane, which had been followed by another parcel-bombing at the FRELIMO 
offices in July 1970.840 Nyerere sent a personal message to Touré, conveying Tanzania’s shock at 
and sympathy for ‘the dastardly invasion of Guinea by foreign mercenaries’.841 At an emergency 
cabinet meeting held on 23 October, Tanzania pledged 10 million shillings in assistance to 
Guinea.842 Two days later, the TYL staged a pre-office hours march from Lumumba Street to 
Luthuli Road, where Kawawa addressed the crowd from the balcony of the Guinean embassy. In a 
sabre-rattling speech, he described the invasion as ‘further evidence of imperialist barbarism and an 
attempt to reconquer our continent.’ Kawawa called on the nation to remain watchful and warned 
Portugal against perpetrating similar acts against Tanzania. ‘Let them cross the Ruvuma into 
Tanzania and they will see’, he said. ‘Let them land in Dar es Salaam and they will see.’843 The 
invasion proved a justification for the mantra of vigilance which the government, the TYL, and the 
press had routinely extolled over the previous years. 
It was in this spirit that in January 1971 Nyerere travelled to Singapore for a Commonwealth 
Conference. He went with an explicit agenda: to rally opposition to Britain’s proposed sale of arms 
to South Africa. ‘Let the Commonwealth members sit together and work out our different 
problems’, read a document Nyerere circulated among attendees, ‘without considering the needs or 
desires of this non-member – South Africa – whose basic doctrine of faith and every action, is a 
denial of everything the Commonwealth stands for.’844 As part of the so-called ‘Mulungushi Club’, 
Nyerere sought to form a common front against ‘arms to South Africa’ with the presidents of 
Uganda and Zambia, Milton Obote and Kenneth Kaunda. However, on 25 January, the 
Mulungushi campaign was abruptly derailed: in a move that echoed the fall of Nkrumah in 1966, 
General Idi Amin had overthrown the absent Obote in a military coup. 
Developments in Kampala sent shockwaves through political circles in Dar es Salaam. For all 
the fury that had accompanied the Portuguese intervention in Conakry, Guinea was situated in 
distant West Africa. Uganda, on the other hand, shared a common border with Tanzania and was a 
member of the EAC. The Nationalist condemned the ‘rightest, reactionary coup’ as ‘the saddest and 
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most shameful thing that could befall Uganda, East Africa, and Africa as a whole.’845 In Nyerere’s 
absence, Kawawa called an emergency meeting of the cabinet. 
Obote immediately returned to East Africa from Singapore, touching down first in Nairobi. The 
Kenyan government, which had never warmed to Obote, sought to prevent his possible return to 
Uganda. Under virtual house arrest at Nairobi’s Panafric Hotel, Obote received a telephone call 
from Kawawa, who invited the deposed president to Dar es Salaam. On 26 January, after arriving 
with all the trappings of a state visit at the airport, Obote held a press conference at State House. 
He insisted he would return to Uganda, denied that Amin had popular support, and accused Israel 
of engineering the coup. Nyerere himself cut short a state visit to India, arriving back in Dar es 
Salaam on 28 January, to a rapturous popular reception.846 
The Tanzanian response to the Ugandan crisis was complicated by the close relations between 
Nyerere and Obote. Aside from a common stance on issues of African liberation, the two 
presidents shared socialist convictions. There were shades of the Arusha Declaration – 
symbolically, if not substantively – in Obote’s ‘Common Man’s Charter’ of October 1966, which 
set out a theoretical basis for removing inequalities via the redistribution of wealth. Nyerere had 
supported Obote’s ‘Move to the Left’, under which the Ugandan government proposed the 
nationalisation of key sectors of the economy. However, whereas after the mutiny of 1964, the 
Tanzanian army had been reconstructed as a politicised arm of the state, Obote had bought off 
Uganda’s armed forces to maintain their fragile loyalty. The ‘Common Man’s Charter’ therefore 
threatened the privileged position of a nouveau-riche military, thus paving the way for the coup.847 
Given this close relationship with Obote, Nyerere chose to back his friend, rather than 
recognise the Amin regime as the legitimate government of Uganda. On his return from India, 
Nyerere asserted that Tanzania continued to regard Obote as the president of Uganda. ‘We do not 
recognise the authority of those who have killed their fellow citizens in an attempt to overthrow the 
established government of a sister republic’, a statement read.848 Yet by 1971, the military coup was 
commonplace in Africa, and Nyerere had not refrained from recognising usurping juntas before. 
His decision to reject Amin’s claims to power and provide shelter for Obote in Tanzania was a 
crass move, born from an impulsive desire to assist a friend. 
The matter of non-recognition was complicated by the Uganda’s and Tanzania’s common 
membership of the EAC. The regional trade bloc depended on cooperation between all three 
member-states, especially their heads of state. Deploying a mixture of moral condemnation and 
claims that Amin lacked democratic legitimacy, Nyerere declared that he would not work with 
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Amin. ‘How can I sit on the same table with a killer?’, he told a mass rally at the Jangwani Grounds 
on 30 January. ‘Jomo [Kenyatta] is speaking for the people who elected him. I am speaking for you. 
Whom will Amin be representing? I cannot sit with murderers.’849 Nyerere stressed he sought 
continued cooperation among the EAC member-states, but his arguments rested on vague claims 
of regional brotherhood that were at odds with the unfolding realpolitikal situation in East Africa. 
Tanzania’s support for Obote was not matched by Kenya. As part of a tour of regional capitals in 
an attempt to solicit support, Obote, accompanied by Kawawa, met President Kenyatta in 
Mombasa. According to David Martin, Kenyatta promised to help Obote, but this never translated 
into action.850 
Meanwhile, Tanzanian military activity hinted at a possible attempt to restore Obote by force. 
Between 1 and 4 February, Western diplomats in Dar es Salaam relayed sketchy reports about 
movements of troops and vehicles to the Ugandan frontier in northwest Tanzania, from 
Nachingwea in the south, where they were stationed in order to counter a potential Portuguese 
invasion. While this might purely have represented a precautionary reaction to any threat from 
Uganda, Horace Phillips, the British high commissioner, thought that Nyerere may have had more 
aggressive intentions. Splicing together knowledge of a visit by the Somali foreign minister to 
Tanzania with that of an unpublicised trip by Obote to Sudan, Phillips believed that Nyerere had 
attempted to establish a joint alliance of progressive states with Khartoum and Mogadishu. Phillips 
attributed the abrupt cessation of these military movements on 4 February to his own 
communication to Nyerere that day that Britain intended shortly to recognise the Amin regime. 
‘What would have been for him action against a rebel regime in support of a legitimate president 
thus suddenly assumed the character of an attempted overthrow of an internationally recognized 
government’, Phillips determined.851 
Tanzania’s refusal to recognise the Amin regime contrasted with the position adopted by 
Britain. London’s relationship with Obote had deteriorated as a result of the ‘Move to the Left’, 
which threatened to nationalise the assets of British firms operating in Uganda. The alignment of 
Obote’s views on British arms sales to South Africa with those of Nyerere and Kaunda also caused 
disquiet in London. While there is no documentary evidence to suggest that Britain played a hand 
in the coup, London welcomed Amin’s seizure of power as an ultimately misplaced guarantee 
against the appropriation of British business interests in Uganda.852 As the former colonial power, 
the question of Britain’s recognition or non-recognition of Amin’s regime set the tone for the 
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international community. Despite Nyerere’s urgings, on 5 February Britain announced its 
recognition of the Amin government.853 The Nationalist condemned the decision as ‘one more insult 
to Africa’.854 
Britain’s swift recognition of the military regime in Kampala, together with rumours of Israeli 
involvement in the coup itself, fuelled allegations in Tanzania that Amin’s seizure of power was a 
neocolonial conspiracy to smash anti-imperialism in Africa. A TYL statement issued on the day 
after the coup declared that it had been ‘engineered by imperialism and international Zionism in 
collaboration with servile internal reactionary forces opposed to the Common Man’s Charter’.855 
Subsequent press commentary suggested that the putsch was part of a calculated imperialist plot to 
sever a geopolitical alliance of socialist African states. 
Perhaps the greatest danger posed by Amin’s treasonable act is that it is designed to break 
Africa’s only remaining progressive axis. There is an axis of progressive states that runs right 
from Cairo through Khartoum to Dar es Salaam and Lusaka. The intention of the imperialists is 
to break this axis from the middle, thus isolating the north from the south and making it ‘easier’ 
for them to ‘reconquer’ us.856 
The idea of a pan-continental assault on progressive government and African liberation leant for 
support on the experience of Guinea. From the authorities and the media, Tanzanians were told 
that imperialism was on the march. ‘Imperialism is on an all-out offensive to reconquer Africa’, 
warned the Nationalist. ‘This counter-revolutionary trend will not only be attempted in Guinea or 
Uganda; it will be tried elsewhere.’857 
This vitriolic language sought to mask a pervasive atmosphere of fear and unrest. ‘The 
commotion produced by the Ugandan rebellion is of exceptional gravity’, wrote the French 
ambassador.858 A sober Standard editorial reflected that ‘[w]e are all concerned. For if a gun toting 
soldier in Kampala is allowed to get away with undermining everything we are trying to build up – 
is there any security for any one of us?’859 Nyerere’s bullishness also betrayed his own anxiety. ‘I can 
be assassinated, but there will never be a coup d’état’, he told the Jangwani rally. ‘This [an 
assassination] is possible because it can be done by any maniac, but not a coup d’état in 
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Tanzania.’860 His hubris echoed that of Obote, who had once stated, ‘I am perhaps the only African 
leader who is not afraid of a military takeover.’861 
To the left? The politics of Mwongozo 
The Ugandan crisis took place against the backdrop of a deteriorating economic situation in 
Tanzania. After a burst of growth which followed the Arusha Declaration, the economy had 
plateaued by 1970. The State Trading Corporation (STC), a bloated parastatal, responded to 
shortages of consumer goods by importing them in huge quantities. This led to a drain of foreign 
exchange and Tanzania became faced with a balance of payments crisis, as a trade surplus of 135 
million shillings in 1967 became a deficit of 519 million shillings by 1970.862 The political crisis over 
Uganda prompted Nyerere to call an emergency meeting of the TANU NEC, which convened in 
Dar es Salaam on 13 February. 
The behind-closed-doors NEC meeting was unusually long, lasting a whole week. It was also 
particularly fractious. Paul Bomani, the minister of commerce, told the British high commissioner 
that he and others had criticised Nyerere’s handling of the Ugandan situation – some accusing the 
president of endangering the EAC, others calling for Tanzania to leave the Commonwealth or 
sever its ties with Britain again.863 The regional commissioner for Morogoro, Joseph Namata, 
overstepped the mark in his opposition to the president, threatening – Kambona-style – to ‘blow 
the lid off the Uganda affair’. Nyerere reasserted his control by instantly suspending Namata and 
exposing him to charges relating to the illegal poaching of elephants, which the president had 
previously suppressed.864 A Stasi report noted a widening split among the ‘progressives’ and the 
‘reactionaries’. The latter group, including Bomani, Derek Bryceson, and Amir Jamal, was 
responsible for Tanzania’s increased use of aid from ‘imperialist’ states and the World Bank, to the 
progressives’ dismay. The Uganda coup had exacerbated these pre-existing divisions, which had led 
to the left wing demanding the establishment of a special committee for economic affairs, 
independent from the cabinet and filled with only those educated in socialist countries, the Stasi 
reported.865 
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A more significant – and even more contentious – task set before the NEC was the agreement 
of a landmark party document, Mwongozo or the ‘Guidelines’.866 Announced by Nyerere on Radio 
Tanzania on 21 February, then printed in full in the local press the following day, Mwongozo 
represented an ideological intensification of TANU’s position, as established by the Arusha 
Declaration.867 They were drafted by Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru, the TYL secretary-general, with 
assistance from other leading politicians, including Kawawa and Babu. Importantly, this was the 
first major party document that did not directly bear the stamp of Nyerere himself. Mwongozo 
affirmed the role of TANU in leading the Tanzanian revolution as a Leninist vanguard party, which 
had long been advocated by TYL leaders, including Ngombale-Mwiru, Lawi Sijaona, and Chediel 
Mgonja. ‘For the first time in the history of our glorious Party, its vanguard role has been given 
new, definite and concrete expression’, enthused the Nationalist. ‘The Party and the Party alone shall 
exercise the vanguard role of leading Tanzania’s revolution.’868 In addition, Mwongozo provided for 
the creation of a people’s militia, a demand which had been frequently been made by the TYL since 
the Arusha Declaration.869 This was on the recommendation of Ngombale-Mwiru, who had been 
despatched to Conakry to witness the Guinean response to the mercenary invasion.870 In 1967, 
Nyerere had fiercely resisted calls for similar change; in 1971, hemmed in by mounting crises at 
home and abroad, he compromised with the radical faction within TANU.871 
The imprint of events in Conakry and Kampala on Mwongozo was clear. The NEC meeting in 
Dar es Salaam was addressed by both Obote and the Guinean ambassador.872 One paragraph was 
dedicated to the Guinea invasion, another to the Uganda coup. The ‘big lesson’ of Guinea was the 
threat to African regimes which were committed to equality and supportive of liberation 
movements. ‘For similar reasons the imperialists may attempt to attack Tanzania one day.’ 
Regarding Uganda, Mwongozo said that the coup showed how instead of bringing down 
revolutionary governments by direct invasion, imperialism prefers to employ local stooges to 
achieve its goals. ‘The people must learn from the events in Uganda and those in Guinea that 
although imperialism is still strong, its ability to topple a revolutionary government greatly depends 
on the possibility of getting domestic counter-revolutionary puppets to help them thwart the 
revolution’, the section concluded. Critically, while Mwongozo emphasised that the responsibility for 
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‘liberating Uganda’ lay with Ugandans alone, Tanzania had a duty to aid its ‘brothers’ in their 
efforts, essentially setting it on a war footing with Amin.873  
Mwongozo did little to calm the leadership’s post-Uganda nerves. Phillips, the British high 
commissioner, noted a ‘distinct sense of uncertainty and malaise within the leadership and the 
country’.874 His French counterpart detected ‘many indications that the Tanzanian leaders have 
been – and are – afraid. They are afraid of their own army, afraid of senior bureaucrats, afraid of 
foreigners, afraid of the wealthy bourgeoisie in which they see the accomplices of an elusive and 
omnipresent imperialism.’875 The army established checkpoints around strategic sites in Dar es 
Salaam.876 The city again swirled with rumour. As Phillips observed, although ‘the content of 95% 
of these rumours can be dismissed […] the existence of them cannot be.’877 
In an attempt to calm the foment, Nyerere convened another meeting of the NEC. He tactically 
chose to hold it in Kigoma, near the border with Burundi, between 16 and 20 March. This was, as 
Phillips recognised, ‘to put it about as far away from the capital – and cocktail gossip – as 
possible.’878 The NEC discussed in detail problems surrounding the implementation of the ujamaa 
villagisation programme and sketched out arrangements for the creation of a militia, as provided for 
in Mwongozo.879 More significantly, it provided for the nationalisation of all houses worth over 
100,000 shillings and not primarily occupied by their owner, which was quietly passed into law by 
parliament. This was a radical but popular move, since it largely targeted an Asian rentier class 
which urban African Tanzanians had long considered enemies of the taifa. It had originally featured 
on the draft of Mwongozo, before being scrapped out of fear that it would appear insensitive at the 
same time as Amin was turning on his own Asian population in Uganda. The decision ran counter 
to Nyerere’s long-standing opposition to racialism; it indicated the weakness of his position, ground 
down by economic frustrations and foreign policy misjudgements.880 
While few suggested that Nyerere’s position as president was under threat, many questioned 
whether he had full control of Tanzania’s political direction. At a grassroots level, a clause in 
Mwongozo which criticised the behaviour of exploitative factory managers was invoked by urban 
workers to launch a series of wildcat strikes, which had been circumscribed with the creation of 
NUTA in 1964. In less than eleven months between the promulgation of Mwongozo and the end of 
1971, 15 strikes were called, involving 11,403 workers, with the the consequent loss of 31,915 man-
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days of work. These figures far outstripped those for the six-year 1965-70 period, in which 74 
strikes involved 9,308 workers at the cost of 26,518 man-days.881 
The frictions between workers and the authorities mirrored tensions on the plane of high 
politics. The majority of Western European diplomats in Dar es Salaam, the Stasi felt, believed that 
Nyerere had responded to pressure from the Marxist faction of TANU to radicalise ujamaa 
socialism in order to not be ‘overtaken by the left’. ‘The key point was to give people the 
impression that socialism in Tanzania had taken a great leap forward’.882 By the time TANU 
delegates gathered in Dar es Salaam in September for the biennial party conference, more moderate 
cabinet ministers had reportedly tendered their resignations. Among them was Amir Jamal, the 
minister of finance, whom the Stasi understood had only reversed his decision after Nyerere 
persuaded him that it would have negative effects on Western investment in Tanzania.883 
Conclusion   
In February 1970, Nyerere attended a relaxed question-and-answer session with students at the 
university. The discussion covered a variety of topics – Zanzibar, non-alignment, scientific 
socialism, the EAC. One student mentioned several ‘disturbing recent events in Tanzania’ which 
seemed ‘very curious and rather unusual in this country’. He cited the assassination of Mondlane 
and the coup plot, in addition to the theft of a police armoury, a bank robbery in Tanga, and the 
sabotage of the oil pipeline to Zambia. ‘It is not highly probable that all these incidents have a 
common cause and aim?’, he asked the president.884 
Nyerere laughed away the idea. Yet the line of questioning hinted at deeper fears about 
instability in Tanzania and the atmosphere of uncertainty in Dar es Salaam. The splits among the 
elite which followed the Arusha Declaration continued to have repercussions. While Nyerere 
continued to speak enthusiastically about the pan-African bond which brought together the 
mainland and the islands, Zanzibar was increasingly an embarrassing blot on his government’s 
record. A stuttering economy, the Portuguese threat, and a new enemy-at-the-gates in Uganda – a 
creation of Nyerere’s rash diplomacy – pushed the TANU leadership left. Like the Arusha 
Declaration, the political levée en masse of Mwongozo electrified Tanzanian nationalist and anticolonial 
sentiment. But, like Arusha, it also released forces which challenged Nyerere’s control. As the next 
chapter shows, in tackling these multiple threats to the government’s security, the TANU party-
state turned increasingly to the architecture of authoritarianism. 
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Chapter 7 
Politics in the time of ujamaa, part two: closures 
As the previous chapter showed, in early 1971, a combination of internal pressures and external 
threats led Nyerere to compromise with the more radical wing of TANU. Mwongozo was framed as a 
decisive step forward in the Arusha revolution. However, the workers’ strikes and ruptures among 
the elite that it occasioned unsettled Nyerere’s hold on power. Equally, the treason trial had left 
several of Nyerere’s internal critics locked up, but Oscar Kambona remained at large, colluding 
with Tanzania’s more powerful enemies abroad. This chapter demonstrates how in a series of 
political interventions, Nyerere reconsolidated his authority in Tanzania. In marginalising potential 
rivals and tightening TANU’s grasp over public debate, Nyerere and his supporters virtually wiped 
out opposition among the elite. They drove forwards an ujamaa programme based on ‘decentralised’ 
government and a more aggressively enforced villagisation policy. By late 1972, the endpoint of this 
thesis, Nyerere had finally mopped-up the messy political fallout from the Arusha Declaration five 
years before. 
The February 1972 government reshuffle 
The radicalising spirit of Mwongozo continued at the TANU conference in September 1971, where 
delegates unanimously approved the ‘Guidelines’. The party’s left wing gained in confidence. On 
the tenth anniversary of Tanzania’s independence in December 1971, A. M. Babu wrote an article 
for London’s Financial Times, in which he argued that the country was on the verge of an economic 
revolution. Criticising post-colonial governments and the international donor community for 
perpetuating underdevelopment in Africa, Babu asserted that Tanzania was beginning to cut these 
dependency ties by focusing on an internal structural transformation of its economy. The TANU 
conference, Babu believed, had marked a ‘decisive shift’ in Tanzania’s development strategy, with 
the ‘acceptance of the basic premise of the new school of thought – that development stems from 
within and not from outside’.885 Babu later wrote that he had thought at the time that Tanzania was 
‘on the way towards restructuring our economy from colonial to an internally integrated and 
independent national economy’.886 
Babu’s hopes proved misplaced. On 17 February 1972, Nyerere announced an unprecedented 
reshuffle of central government. ‘Some of these changes are on a familiar pattern, but others – 
especially as regards Ministers – are more unusual for Tanzania’, he said in a radio broadcast. Five 
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ministers were moved out of the cabinet to become regional commissioners. Moreover, three 
senior figures, who had held cabinet portfolios in the union government since its formation, were 
dropped altogether: Babu, Derek Bryceson, and Paul Bomani. Amir Jamal remained in the cabinet, 
but was transferred to the Ministry of Commerce and Industries, where he was tasked with clearing 
up the chaos at the STC.887 
The relocation of senior ministers to regional commissioners was not unexpected. Since the 
TANU conference in September, the government had committed itself to decentralising 
administration to the regions, in order to implement the Arusha programme more efficiently. The 
decentralisation proposals had been drawn up under guidance from an American consultancy, 
announced by Nyerere in December 1971, and rubber-stamped by the NEC a month later.888 
Nyerere’s choice of new regional commissioners, who included Chediel Mgonja and Lawi Sijaona, 
was carefully calculated. As the American embassy reported, they were ‘young, active, ideologically 
strongly socialist, hard-driving men likely to shake things up and get them moving more quickly.’889 
At the same time, Nyerere’s decision moved several of his more radical ministers out of Dar es 
Salaam. This prefigured the official rolling-out of the decentralisation programme in July.890 
Both Bomani and Bryceson lost their positions after profound disagreements with Nyerere. Pro-
business and friendly to the West, Bomani’s longevity in the cabinet had seemed anomalous, but 
Nyerere had entrusted him with vital economic posts which the president sought to keep away 
from more radical politicians. However, Bomani had openly criticised the president’s reaction to 
the Uganda coup, accepted Mwongozo with unease, and opposed the nationalisation of private 
property.891 Shortly afterwards, he was appointed Tanzania’s ambassador to Washington. As a 
white Tanzanian of European descent, Bryceson’s continued presence in government was also 
unusual, especially as the racial edge of populist ujamaa politics sharpened in the post-Arusha years. 
His departure owed to disagreements with Nyerere over the government’s increasingly 
authoritarian approach towards rural resettlement and the crushing of local farming cooperatives 
and workers’ trade unions.892 
The case of Babu is more complicated – and more significant, given later events. When the 
reshuffle was announced, Babu was leading a delegation to the OAU Council of Ministers in Addis 
Ababa. To learn about his dismissal in such a manner, Babu later recalled, was ‘embarrassing and 
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humiliating’.893 Babu subsequently sought to put a positive gloss on his fall from power. In a letter 
to the Standard, he argued that the relegation of senior ministers to the backbenches – ‘an injection 
of more than thirty years’ accumulated experience in government business’ – would strengthen the 
government, since the ex-ministers would be able to scrutinise it more closely in parliament.894 But 
Babu’s public expression of his lack of bitterness towards the government suggested insecurity as 
much as loyalty. ‘It is curious that he thought this was necessary’, remarked the French ambassador, 
wryly.895  
Some commentators have accused Nyerere of being swayed by pressure from Karume in axing 
Babu. Interviewed in 1995, Babu claimed that Nyerere had caved in to Karume’s long-standing 
demands for him to be removed from the union government.896 Others have pointed to the sacking 
of Ali Sultan Issa and Badawi Quallatein, two former members of Babu’s Umma party, from the 
Zanzibari government the day after Nyerere’s announced reshuffle as evidence of a wider plot.897 
However, the roots of Babu’s dismissal more likely lay in ideological disagreements with Nyerere. 
As seen in chapter 1, Babu had misgivings about the Arusha Declaration, which he felt failed to 
provide for the structural transformation of the Tanzanian economy. While he had viewed 
Mwongozo as a moment for potential change, he also harboured concerns at a fresh wave of 
nationalisations of wholesale trade. He argued at a meeting of the TANU Central Committee that 
‘the state should not become a seller of bread and butter’, but invest in large-scale farming and 
industry.898 Shortly after his dismissal, Babu told Jenerali Ulimwengu, a journalist then working for 
the Standard, that his downfall was due to political differences with Nyerere, rather than the 
influence of Karume.899 The two explanations are not incompatible: Nyerere, concerned about the 
shift to the left following Mwongozo, may have been tipped into action by the arrival of a delegation 
from Zanzibar. Regardless, in replacing Babu, Nyerere removed from government the only 
member of the political elite capable of sustaining a genuine intellectual challenge to ujamaa 
socialism. 
The February 1972 government reshuffle was therefore a clinical political move which 
confidently reasserted Nyerere’s authority after the wobbles of the previous year. The ‘most 
compelling fact which emerges from these changes is [the] demonstration of Nyerere’s power to 
make important decisions without internal consultation or deliberation’, concluded the American 
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embassy.900 In one fell swoop, Nyerere removed three discontented ministers from the upper 
echelons of power and dispersed their radical colleagues into the provinces, where they could 
zealously enforce the policies of ujamaa at a distance from the febrile politics of Dar es Salaam. The 
shift of power towards the regional commissioners was further confirmation of the party’s grasp of 
the state apparatus, which had been signified by Mwongozo. Those left within an emasculated cabinet 
and central bureaucracy, the Polish ambassador noted, comprised ‘specialists and people hitherto 
unengaged in political games.’901 ‘In our place were appointed some very junior and inexperienced 
technocrats’, wrote Babu in his draft memoirs, ‘whose only qualification for such senior 
appointments was their total and uncritical loyalty to Nyerere personally.’902 
The crisis of the union 
While Nyerere tightened his grip over politics on the mainland, the situation in Zanzibar 
deteriorated further. Inefficient administration and crude policies aimed at achieving economic self-
sufficiency led to shortages of goods, while the elite continued to enrich itself. In early 1972, 
Karume transferred an account at the Moscow Narodny Bank in London, containing around £25 
million in foreign exchange from clove exports, from the Revolutionary Council to his own 
name.903 Visible signs of material wealth became equated with a political threat to the regime. As 
Seif Sharif Hamad recalls, ‘people were arrested for possessing a tube of Colgate toothpaste. If you 
were caught owning toothpaste, you were obviously involved in smuggling since that sort of thing 
was not available in the state shops.’904 In June 1971, the Zanzibar government introduced a 
rationing system, which was only accessible for those carrying ASP membership cards.905 Writing in 
the Standard in September, Philip Ochieng quoted a number of Zanzibaris who spoke of their 
experience of empty markets, soaring prices, and bread queues forming in the middle of the night. 
Both the Zanzibari and union authorities should be advised, Ochieng concluded, ‘that we are 
dealing with human beings, and we cannot sacrifice humans at the altar of political considerations 
and narrow minds.’906 
As the appearance of such a frank assessment of Zanzibar in a state-owned newspaper suggests, 
there was a growing friction between the mainland and island governments. In September 1970, 
four girls of Iranian descent, aged between 14 and 20, were forced into marriages with senior 
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government figures, causing revulsion in East Africa and beyond.907 The story attracted interest in 
the Western press, which again highlighted the tension between Nyerere’s support of liberation in 
southern Africa with his inability to guarantee basic human rights at home.908 The union 
government’s public response was to permit the publication of articles and letters in the Standard 
condemning Karume’s behaviour. A column signed by ‘Msemakweli’ (‘Speaker of the Truth’) called 
on Tanzania to respect the basic rights of its own people. It declared that ‘[i]f we denied our own 
citizens the right to choose whom to vote for, where to live, or even whom they should marry, we 
would be guilty of the grossest hypocrisy.’ Tanzania was a signatory to the UN Charter on Human 
Rights because, Msemakweli concluded, ‘we cannot demand […] national ethics in other countries 
which we would deny to our own citizens.’909 
On the level of high politics, the relationship between Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam continued to 
sour. According to information obtained by the French consulate through its network of Comorian 
sources in Zanzibar, in April 1971 the Revolutionary Council travelled en masse to Dar es Salaam, 
where they asked Nyerere to cease all intervention in Zanzibari affairs and take on a purely 
ceremonial role there as union president.910 Relations between Nyerere and Karume broke down 
completely. Nyerere used an intermediary, Bhoke Munanka, his chief personal assistant, when 
conducting relations with his first vice-president.911 By early 1972, the future of the union seemed 
more precarious than at any point since 1964. 
The assassination of Abeid Karume 
At around 6.30pm on 7 April 1972, as the sun set over the Indian Ocean, Karume was at the ASP 
headquarters at Darajani, Stone Town. He was playing bao – a popular Swahili board game – with 
Thabit Kombo, the ASP secretary-general, and Ibrahim Saadalla, another party grandee. Suddenly, a 
grey Peugeot pulled up outside. A man armed with a submachine gun jumped out, entered the 
building, and sprayed bullets into Karume, killing him instantly. Saadalla was also shot dead; 
Kombo survived, though he was seriously injured. The assassin and four accomplices took flight in 
two cars, passing by the ASPYL headquarters en route, with the intention of also killing Seif Bakari, 
should he have been present there at the time.912 
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As the assassins fled the scene, Aboud Jumbe, the minister of state in Karume’s office, was 
passing the party headquarters and noticed a great deal of commotion. Having found Karume dead 
at the Lenin Hospital, Jumbe telephoned Nyerere. He later recalled how the union president gave 
the impression that he had already heard the news.913 Over Radio Zanzibar, Jumbe announced that 
a curfew had been imposed. The streets of Stone Town, usually lined with bread queues, emptied. 
Meanwhile, the police had tracked down the driver of Peugeot some fifteen kilometres north of 
Zanzibar Town. Under torture, he admitted that the assassins were former members of the Umma 
party. 
That night, the security forces combed Stone Town, searching out men with Umma 
connections. Among those arrested were Ali Sultan Issa and Badawi Quallatein, the Zanzibari 
ministers who had been dismissed in February.914 Scores were summarily shot dead; hundreds more 
– perhaps as many as 1,100 – were rounded up in subsequent days and placed in detention.915 After 
the assassination of Karume, there was ‘general relief in the country’, recalled Seif Sharif Hamad, 
today an opposition politician in Zanzibar, and so the Revolutionary Council ‘began a campaign of 
arrests, to replace celebration with fear.’916 
Although telecommunications between Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar had been severed, rumours 
began to circulate in the capital that Karume had been killed by an aggrieved Arab.917 Anxious to 
maintain his grasp on events on the islands, early on the morning of 8 April Nyerere despatched 
Kawawa and John Malecela, the foreign minister, to Zanzibar to discuss the situation with the 
Revolutionary Council. When the second-vice president returned, Nyerere called an emergency 
cabinet meeting. At 1pm, Radio Tanzania announced that Karume had been assassinated and called 
on Tanzanians to remain calm and avoid rumour-mongering.918 Reports reached the American 
embassy that Nyerere’s advisors were urging him to intervene directly and seize the opportunity to 
take control of the Zanzibari government.919 
At a press conference on 11 April, held in the same building where Karume had been gunned 
down four days beforehand, Jumbe was announced as president of Zanzibar (and thereby also first 
vice-president in the union).920 Jumbe himself later stated that he had been anointed as Karume’s 
successor immediately after the assassination, when Bakari had instructed him to take the chair at 
an emergency meeting of the Revolutionary Council.921 But others, including the Zanzibari scholar 
Haroub Othman, have pointed out that since Bakari was widely considered Karume’s heir 
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apparent, the appointment of Jumbe is evidence of a direct intervention of Nyerere in the 
succession process.922 In any event, the swift succession prevented the opening up of a power 
vacuum in Zanzibar, which would have represented a common danger to Nyerere and the 
Revolutionary Council. 
In Dar es Salaam, news of the assassination was kept to the bare minimum by the government. 
The Standard was instructed to ‘play Zanzibar down’.923 This inevitably triggered a spate of rumour. 
Some contemplated whether a foreign hand was involved – perhaps the Soviet Union, concerned 
about mounting Chinese influence in Zanzibar? Others suggested that the plot may have had 
Nyerere’s blessing. ‘There was a lot of speculation that maybe Karume had been stopped in his 
tracks because he wanted to breakaway from the union’, recalled Juma Mwapachu.924 Certainly, the 
gut reaction of most observers was that the assassination of Karume and his replacement by Jumbe 
would strengthen Nyerere’s position. ‘Having supported for so many years, in the name of African 
unity, the caprices and tantrums of his embarrassing first vice-president, Monsieur Nyerere has 
finally been compensated for his patience’, reflected the French ambassador.925 
The government’s public response was limited to vague allegations that the assassination had 
been perpetrated by ‘imperialists’. The unsympathetic reaction of the British press to Karume’s 
death came under attack from Radio Tanzania, which reminded listeners that the Zanzibar 
Revolution had ended a British-Arab alliance which had ‘dehumanised, sucked dry and stripped of 
dignity’ the islands’ African population.926 The local media also carried a Zanzibari government 
statement which criticised Kenyan newspapers, especially the Lonrho-owned East African Standard, 
for engaging in ‘journalism in its lowest form and the dregs of the gutter press.’927 Addressing a rally 
held in Dar es Salaam under torrential rain on 16 May, Kawawa emphasised that ‘Africa is for 
Africans’ and that if the imperialists ‘think they will come back here to recolonize us, then they are 
cheating themselves.’ Providing further evidence of the imperialist threat, three days beforehand the 
TPDF had shot down a Portuguese aircraft which it claimed had bombed an ujamaa village near the 
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Mozambican border. ‘We want to show the Portuguese aggressor that when we hit back, we really 
hit hard’, Kawawa told the crowd.928 
Although reliable news about developments in Zanzibar was difficult to come by in Dar es 
Salaam, the French consulate’s network of contacts on the islands revealed the identities of the 
assassination team. All five were former members of the Umma party. Karume was assassinated by 
Humud Mohammed, an Arab and a lieutenant in the TPDF. Humud was motivated by pure 
vengeance, since his father – also an army officer – had been killed while in detention during the 
early months of the revolutionary regime.929 
The involvement of Umma cadres in the assassination naturally meant that suspicion fell on 
Babu. According to Babu himself, at Karume’s funeral on 10 April, Zanzibar’s commissioner of 
police, Eddington Kissassi, told the Algerian deputy secretary-general of the OAU, Mohamed 
Sahnoun, ‘[w]e are going to get Babu, dead or alive’. Passing through Dar es Salaam after departing 
Zanzibar, Sahnoun sent a message to Babu, advising him of the threat.930 Babu later recalled that 
‘security people’ were beginning to trace his movements. ‘I realised then that something was going 
wrong.’931 Shortly afterwards, the American embassy picked up reports that Babu had expressed to 
several journalists in Dar es Salaam his fear about being made a scapegoat for Karume’s 
assassination. Around the same time, he urged David Martin to publish a story in the Observer, 
which would make clear that the assassins were motivated purely by revenge.932 Babu also 
attempted to speak to Nyerere, but the president declined to meet him.933 
At 3am on 14 April, the Tanzanian police arrested Babu and placed him in preventive 
detention. ‘My house was surrounded by the para-military police, armed to the teeth, and in typical 
Gestapo tradition, banged my door in the name of the law and order, walked in, arrested and 
handcuffed me, with loaded sub-machine guns pointed at my head’, wrote Babu, in a letter 
smuggled out of prison.934 Former members of the PLA were also imprisoned on the mainland. 
There was no mention of the arrests in the local press and the government remained silent, even 
when pressed by foreign correspondents.935 The prisoners were not released until 1978. 
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The exact course of events which culminated in the assassination is unlikely ever to be clarified. 
However, triangulation of various sources – the prosecutor’s report,936 oral testimony,937 and 
foreign archival documents938 – permits the establishment of some firm ground. Over a period 
stretching back to 1968, Umma networks split between Zanzibar and the mainland planned to 
overthrow Karume. This group held intermittent meetings in Dar es Salaam, particularly at Babu’s 
favourite drinking-hole, the Palm Beach Hotel. After Babu, Quallatein, and Ali Sultan Issa lost their 
government offices in February 1972, the plotters accelerated their plans. They stole a large cache 
of weapons from an armoury in Zanzibar, which was later found by the police at Humud’s house in 
the Shangani quarter of Stone Town.939 The plotters intended to seize key installations around 
Zanzibar Town, capture Karume, and then force him to announce his resignation on the radio. 
Babu would be named president: the prosecution described a stash of portraits bearing his image 
found in the home of one of the plotters, to be distributed after the coup. 
Babu and other plotters based on the mainland were expected to arrive in secret by boat on 6 
April, the night before the planned seizure of power. They never arrived, possibly fearing that the 
authorities had noticed the missing weapons after the head of the armed forces, Yussuf Himid, 
returned from a visit from the GDR, where he had been receiving medical care.940 In the absence 
of Babu, the plotters reconvened at Humud’s house to discuss the plan of action. Recognising that 
the stolen weapons – should they be found – were incriminating in themselves and, in the case of 
Humud, driven by pure revenge, the conspirators present then took matters into their own hands. 
Mindful of the fate of Hanga and Shariff, Nyerere resisted requests for Babu and his former 
Umma colleagues to be extradited to stand trial in Zanzibar. After some preparation, the case 
opened in Zanzibar in May 1973, when eight-one defendants were charged with treason.941 Under 
the system of the ‘People’s Courts’, the accused were denied legal aid. The prosecution’s case 
largely depended on the testimonies of the defendants themselves, many of which were obtained 
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through torture: one defendant described the interrogation room as ‘an abattoir, splashed with 
human blood’.942 Babu and the other seventeen who were detained on the mainland were tried in 
absentia, contrary to union law. In an indication of the shift away from the ideological politics of 
the revolution, the prosecution sought to denigrate the characters of the accused – especially Babu 
– by highlighting their Marxist beliefs. Khamis Abdallah Ameir recalled that Dourado, the 
prosecutor, asked him, ‘[d]o you know what Marx said, religion was the opium of the people?’ ‘Am 
I accused of being a Marxist or of killing the president?’, Khamis replied.943 In total, forty-three of 
the defendants were found guilty of treason and sentenced to death, including Babu.944 
Nyerere’s detention of Babu was a pragmatic, if partial solution to multiple political dilemmas. 
The decision not to extradite Babu avoided the public relations disaster which would have followed 
his almost certain execution in Zanzibar. Although the Zanzibari authorities were unhappy, the 
imprisonment of Babu on the mainland at least prevented an absurd situation whereby he could 
have freely criticised developments from afar, while his co-accused stood trial. After his release, 
Babu said that he knew that Nyerere realised that ‘the whole thing was a made up story’, but did 
not want to embarrass the Zanzibar authorities while trying to stabilise the union.945 
Nyerere always claimed to have acted in Babu’s own interests. Immediately after Babu was 
arrested, Nyerere rang Ngombale-Mwiru, whom Babu had assisted in drafting Mwongozo, to tell him 
about the news. ‘He explained what had happened to my friends’, Ngombale-Mwiru told me. ‘He 
said, “they will be safe here”’ […] it was better than risking other consequences.’946 The African-
American activist Amiri Baraka, who had previously met Babu in the United States, asked Nyerere 
himself about the situation. The president replied that he thought Babu was guilty, but would not 
hand him over for fears about his safety.947 When Nyerere found out that Zanzibari interrogators 
had tortured the Umma members imprisoned on the mainland, the president immediately ordered 
them to stop.948 Having already removed Babu from office in the 1972 government shake-up, it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that by imprisoning Babu (rather than let him flee into exile), 
Nyerere closed off another potential source of dissent. After his release from prison on 1978, Babu 
became a vocal critic of Nyerere and ujamaa socialism, among an exiled African left in Europe and 
North America.949 
Babu publically denied any involvement in a plot to overthrow Karume. ‘I did not know 
anything about it. I only heard the news on the radio’, he told an interviewer, the day after his 
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release from prison.950 His draft memoirs gloss over it. Among friends and acquaintances, Babu 
mostly remained tight-lipped.951 But one Zanzibari, who met him while studying in the United 
States in 1980, told me that Babu talked to him about Karume’s assassination at length. Babu said 
that he knew about the plan in advance and confirmed that the intention was to arrest Karume and 
force him to resign over the radio.952  
From a mainland perspective, the net result of the assassination of Karume was the silencing of 
Babu and the coming to power of a more pliant president in Zanzibar. The Jumbe regime quickly 
improved living conditions in the islands, by using the foreign exchange from clove exports to 
relieve food shortages. Jumbe restructured the party apparatus of the ASP to take power away from 
the Revolutionary Council. In December 1972, he told the ASP’s first conference for ten years that 
‘leaders should seek to serve the people, not to dominate others’.953 The relationship between the 
mainland and Zanzibar was consolidated in 1977 by a new constitution, which provided for the 
merger of the ASP and TANU to form CCM.954 
Frene Ginwala and the Standard 
As explained in chapter 5, faced with the contradiction of a foreign-owned newspaper that proved 
unpopular with the more militant wing of TANU, in February 1970 Nyerere nationalised the 
Standard. In a statement which accompanied its first issue under new ownership, Nyerere set out the 
government’s rationale. 
In accordance with the Arusha Declaration, it is clearly impossible for the largest daily 
newspaper in independent Tanzania to be left indefinitely in the hands of a foreign company. In 
a country committed to building socialism, it is also impossible for such an influential medium 
to be left indefinitely in the control of non-socialist, capitalist owners. The reasons for 
Government’s [sic] decision to acquire the “Standard” are thus both nationalistic and socialistic; 
we want Tanzanians to have control of this newspaper, and we want those Tanzanians to be 
responsible for the people as a whole. 
However, Nyerere stressed that although the Standard would be expected to support the 
government’s policies, it would also be free to attack their implementation and ‘acts of 
individualism’. The newspaper, he wrote, ‘will be guided by the principle that free debate is an 
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essential statement of true socialism’.955 The Standard’s commitment was to the res publica, rather 
than the government. The French ambassador suggested that Nyerere wanted to use the Standard to 
correct the ‘often doctrinaire and extremist’ position of the Nationalist and highlight problems 
within the government. ‘Whatever the cause’, wrote André Naudy, ‘Nyerere will add a new lever of 
power to those which are already concentrated in his hands’.956 
Given that the government acquisition of the Standard was partly justified on ‘nationalistic’ 
grounds, Nyerere’s choice of a foreign editor seemed odd. In late 1969, he invited Frene Ginwala, a 
South African ANC supporter of Asian descent, to Dar es Salaam. Following the Sharpeville 
massacre in 1960, Ginwala had joined Oliver Tambo in establishing the ANC’s ‘external mission’ in 
exile. From Dar es Salaam, she had edited the movement’s magazine, Spearhead. Ginwala served on 
the editorial board of the Algiers-based journal Révolution africaine, worked as a stringer for the 
British newspaper, the Guardian, and was rumoured to be a member of the South African 
Communist Party. However, in 1963 Ginwala was declared persona non grata in Tanzania, after 
becoming embroiled in local disputes. According to street gossip, she was romantically connected 
with a government minister, Nsilo Swai. Another story held that she had clashed with Sijaona. A 
third suggested she appeared too close to an unnamed foreign government.957 
Nyerere’s appointment was therefore a radical move, especially given the eclectic editorial staff 
which Ginwala assembled. She recruited Richard Gott, a British national who had written on 
revolutionary movements in Latin America, to the position of foreign editor. Other members of 
staff included Iain Christie, who developed a close association with FRELIMO; Tony Hall, another 
ANC supporter; Rod Prince, the former editor of Peace News; and Philip Ochieng, a talented young 
Kenyan columnist. Ginwala committed the newspaper to a polemical approach: in the reborn 
Standard’s first editorial meeting, she stated that there was ‘no such such thing as objectiveness’.958 
The newspaper’s editorial line was similar to Mkapa’s Nationalist, but took a more 
internationalist slant. Andy Chande, a Tanzanian Asian businessman who remained on the board of 
the Standard after its nationalisation, recalled that on the centenary of Lenin’s birth in April 1970, 
the newspaper published a supplement so bulky that it was ‘jettisoned into the gutters of the city in 
such numbers by so many of our over-loaded delivery boys that it caused a blockage in Dar es 
Salaam’s drainage system.’959 Ginwala and Gott sought to diversify the Standard’s news sources. 
Ginwala took on communist news from Xinhua and Tass, while Gott made use of Cuba’s Prensa 
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Latina and the Liberation News Service (LNS), a Harlem-based underground agency which 
connected the American New Left into global circuits of counterculture and revolution.960 
The sharp anti-Western tone adopted by the Standard predictably led to confrontations with 
diplomatic representations in Dar es Salaam. The editorial team, remarked Chande, was ‘packed 
with political and ideological nitroglycerine’.961 In November 1970, the newspaper published a pair 
of articles by Walter Rodney, in which the Guyanese academic extolled the practice of the 
kidnapping of diplomats and the hijacking of civilian aircraft as a form of revolutionary violence.962 
The prickly British high commissioner, Horace Phillips, responded by writing two letters to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inquiring as to what place such articles had in a government 
newspaper.963 Someone – presumably a ministry employee – leaked the note to Ginwala, who 
replied in turn through an editorial in the Sunday News on 13 November. The leading article accused 
Phillips of ‘gross interference in the internal affairs of Tanzania’ and suggested that the letter was 
part of a British attempt to distract attention from the Conservative government’s consideration of 
resuming the supply of arms to South Africa.964 There were rumours in Dar es Salaam that Phillips 
would be recalled to London, which the high commissioner dismissed as the invention of David 
Martin, then working as a stringer for the BBC.965 Indeed, an article in the Guardian – without a by-
line, but likely to have been written by Martin – expressed surprise that Phillips had taken up the 
issue at all, given his good relations with Nyerere, and correctly suggested that the letters had been 
sent without consulting London.966 
The day after the editorial appeared in the Sunday News, Phillips expressed his disquiet over 
lunch at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His hosts, who included the minister of state, Israel 
Elinewinga, appeared embarrassed by the episode. They had contacted Ginwala to express their 
concern, but the editor had merely replied that she had acted as such ‘to make the position clear’.967 
At a reception shortly after, Phillips challenged Ginwala, who responded that the editorial was an 
attempt to establish her right to publish as she wished. When Phillips reported this conversation in 
an audience with Nyerere himself, the president ‘raised his eyebrows in incredulity’ and stressed 
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that the matter would have no impact on relations between Britain and Tanzania. The high 
commissioner left with the impression that Nyerere felt that Ginwala had overstepped the mark.968 
A similar confrontation took place in March 1971, when another Standard editorial launched a 
savage attack on Washington, criticising its policy towards Africa, racial discrimination in the 
United States, and the war in Vietnam.969 Earlier in the month, ambassador Claude Ross had 
complained to Nyerere about the general presentation of the United States as an ‘imperialist’ power 
in the Tanzanian press.970 Through the LNS, the Standard also reproduced a statement made by the 
Black Panthers in New York, which the newspaper connected to Mwongozo’s call for Tanzanians to 
establish ‘fraternal and revolutionary relations’ with Americans fighting against racial 
discrimination.971 Tiring of these assaults, Ross followed Phillips in expressing his concern to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ross accepted the officials’ assurance that the article did not 
represented the government’s views, but argued that it would raise doubts about Tanzania’s non-
aligned foreign policy. The editorial, Ross thought, was ‘indistinguishable in tone, content, and 
general animus from what might have appeared in Moscow and Peking’. The embarrassed officials 
promised they would speak to Nyerere about the matter.972 Ross subsequently noted that the 
negative coverage of the United States quietly fell away. A Tanzanian MP told American diplomats 
over dinner that State House had instructed the press to avoid explicit criticism of Washington.973 
On 12 June, the president summoned local newspaper and radio editors to State House, where 
he lectured them over their ‘inaccurate’ reporting. His words were reported verbatim in the press. 
In a tone redolent of ‘Argue Don’t Shout’, he ridiculed the excessive use of terms like ‘imperialism’, 
‘stooge’, and ‘puppet’. This ‘nonsense’, he said, was ‘becoming something of a disease in Tanzania 
[…] It is almost getting to a position where I am afraid to use the word ‘imperialism’ once in a two 
hour question and answer session, because it will be presented with such headlines that the people 
will imagine I talk about nothing else’.974 Ross noted that Nyerere’s intervention came shortly after 
a Standard editorial had misrepresented the president’s views on the Paris negotiations over peace in 
Vietnam, describing the talks as ‘the US’s search for an honourable, but cowardly, retreat’. 
According to Joan Wicken, Nyerere’s personal assistant, the president had summoned Ginwala the 
day after the story’s publication and rebuked her. The Americans believed that this was the third 
time in two weeks that Nyerere had done so.975 
Ginwala’s troubles were not limited to her relationship with the president. A cabal of editorial 
staff at the Standard schemed for the full Tanzanianisation of the newspaper, as Nyerere’s initial 
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mission statement had set out. They capitalised on the wave of racial invective that accompanied 
the Buildings Act of 1971, which cast Asians like Ginwala as enemies of the ujamaa state.976 The 
Standard’s criticism of the National Development Corporation, the parastatal that owned the 
newspaper, was also resented by the local establishment.977 In a first move against foreign staff, on 
1 July, Gott, Hall, and Prince were all given three months’ notice.978 
The breaking point for Nyerere arrived when the Standard delivered a scathing attack on the 
government of Gaafar Nimeiry in Sudan. On 19 July 1971, Nimeiry was briefly toppled from power 
in a left-wing coup. After being relieved by loyal troops, he then carried out a violent purge of the 
Sudanese Communist Party.979 A Standard editorial written by Gott on 29 July accused Nimeiry of a 
‘senseless witch hunt of people whose only crime is to share an ideology with countries like the 
Soviet Union and China’. It condemned the Sudanese president for practicing ‘a form of ideological 
intolerance which in Africa has been hitherto the preserve of Mr. Vorster and Mr. Houphouet-
Boigny’, the moderate Ivorian leader who had controversially entered into a dialogue with South 
Africa.980 The article was published weeks before Nimeiry was scheduled to visit Tanzania. While 
Nyerere could not have approved of the purges, geopolitical circumstances meant that he was 
reluctant to criticise Nimeiry. The recently established dictatorship in Uganda threatened both 
Sudan and Tanzania, which were among the few African states not to recognise Idi Amin’s 
regime.981 Ginwala, Gott, and the other foreign editorial staff were relieved of their jobs. Sammy 
Mdee, a Tanzanian who had led the anti-Ginwala bloc among the Standard staff, was appointed as 
the new editor.982 The Ginwala experiment thus came to a swift end: a ‘free’ state-owned newspaper 
run by internationalist foreigners proved incompatible with predominant nationalist ideological 
forces and Tanzania’s geopolitical priorities. 
Within a year, the Standard ceased to exist. In April 1972, it was merged with the Nationalist to 
form the Daily News, which became the sole English-language newspaper published in Tanzania. 
Mkapa was named as the new managing editor. The first edition of the Daily News set out that in a 
socialist country, the press must act as a ‘collective mobiliser, collective educator, collective inspirer 
and an instrument for the dissemination of socialist ideas […] Like all true revolutionary activities, 
such a task for the press begs of no liberalism.’983 The Daily News was far more subservient to the 
party than the Standard. Jenerali Ulimwengu joined the newspaper at the time of its formation, soon 
after graduating from the University of Dar es Salaam. Two years later, he was dismissed. ‘The 
reason I was removed,’ Ulimwengu told me, ‘was because I was perceived as not being totally 
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compliant with the party line, seen to be a bit too radical.’984 Ochieng came under similar pressure 
from the authorities for his left-wing views and tendered his resignation in January 1973.985 The 
lively content of the Nationalist and the Standard under Ginwala was thus subsumed into a 
monotonous organ of the party-state. 
Oscar Kambona, Tanzania’s enemies, and the June 1972 bombings 
While Nyerere fought fires within Tanzania, he remained concerned by threats from the country’s 
enemies abroad. After the failure of the coup plot of 1969, Oscar Kambona had sought out new 
avenues for usurping the Nyerere regime. In 1970, he was introduced to Jorge Jardim, the 
Mozambique-based businessman who, as shown in chapter 4, was implicated in the assassination of 
Mondlane. Jardim, in close contact with Portuguese prime minister Marcelo Caetano, identified 
Kambona as a potential figurehead to overthrow Nyerere and then cast FRELIMO out of 
Tanzania. With the consent of the South African minister of defence, P. W. Botha, Jardim 
established Operação OK. This planned the formation of a Tanzanian government-in-exile and 
military forces which would infiltrate southern from bases in Mozambique. In June 1971, Jardim 
began to channel funds to Kambona, which reached $8.4 million by the end of the year and $42.4 
million by the time of the Carnation Revolution in 1974.986 
Kambona also turned to Nyerere’s newly established bête noire in Uganda, Idi Amin. In March 
1971, a group of exiled Kambona supporters in Kampala asked Amin for aid to liberate Tanzania 
‘with the mercy of god from the hands of communism.’ According to Jardim’s biographer, the 
Portuguese businessman also had a hand in facilitating this meeting.987 On 6 April, Ngurumo 
reported that Kambona himself was currently in Uganda.988 In the anxious climate which followed 
the Uganda coup, the appearance of such rumours in the Dar es Salaam press stoked fears of an 
anti-Nyerere alliance between his most outspoken Tanzanian critic and his most dangerous 
opponent abroad. The day after the Ngurumo story, Kambona published a letter in the Guardian – a 
newspaper usually staunchly pro-Nyerere – in which he accused Nyerere of crushing the party in 
merging it with the apparatus of the state. On this occasion, Nyerere declined to respond to 
Kambona’s criticism.989 
A more serious indication of the threat facing Nyerere came in October 1971, when Godfrey 
Binaisa, a Ugandan lawyer, approached the American embassy in Kampala. Binaisa had previously 
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defended several of the accused in the treason trial in Tanzania. He explained that a plot had been 
prepared, involving groups in Britain and Tanzania, to overthrow Nyerere. The Ugandan foreign 
minister, Wanume Kibedi, had been informed of these plans. Binaisa asked Ross whether they 
might arrange a cover job for Kambona – perhaps with an American oil firm – in order to permit 
his passage to Uganda. Although Ross immediately rejected the idea, the United States did not warn 
the Tanzanian government about the plot.990 
Further evidence of Kambona’s deepening relationship with Portugal was provided by a 
propaganda stunt on 9 December 1971. Two aircraft, flying north from Mozambique, dropped 
pamphlets written in English and Swahili over the Saba Saba fairground in Dar es Salaam, where 
crowds had gathered to celebrate Tanzania’s Independence Day. The leaflet was an open letter to 
Nyerere from Kambona, in which the latter attacked the president’s ‘shameful’ record since 
independence. ‘The Party and the Militia are under oppressive control of a tyranic [sic] minority 
working against people’s interest and wellfare [sic]’, Kambona wrote. ‘In [sic] this tenth anniversary 
of independence Tanzania faces a stage of near civil war’. Kambona implored Nyerere to call free 
elections and declared his willingness to return immediately to Tanzania to stand as a candidate.991 
While the government maintained a public silence about the pamphlets, security in Dar es 
Salaam was visibly increased. The police established checkpoints on the city’s major road arteries 
and placed a night guard on the Selander Bridge. The impunity with which the aircraft had 
infiltrated Tanzanian airspace was an embarrassing reflection on the country’s defence capabilities. 
Although neither explicitly mentioned the incident, Nyerere and Kawawa both made speeches in 
the following days which criticised those ‘bad leaders’ and ‘self-seekers’ who sought to derail 
Tanzania’s socialist revolution. An editorial in the Standard said that the party and government were 
ready to ‘listen to genuine complaints and grievances’, and that ‘those who have chosen to indulge 
in murmur, rumour, grumbling or leaflets have done so not for want of ways to get their views 
heard. They have chosen the latter in order to feel free to distort facts to suit their own sinister 
ends.’992 On 16 December, Edward Sokoine, the minister of state in the second vice-president’s 
office, broke the government’s silence on the pamphlets at a regional TANU meeting in Dar es 
Salaam. He said that citizens should be on guard against attempts to subvert them and that the 
leaflets were intended to foment discontent.993 
The leaflet drop gave rise to an exceptional spate of wild rumours in Dar es Salaam, including 
stories that various officials had disappeared or been arrested, that Nyerere was gravely ill, that a 
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British warship had been seized by the Tanzanian navy, that a coup was imminent. ‘There is no 
doubt that there is a jittery atmosphere here and if this is what Kambona wished to achieve by the 
leaflet raid, then he seems to have succeeded’, noted the British high commission.994 The 
assassination of Wilbert Klerru, the regional commissioner for Iringa, by disaffected locals on 
Christmas Day furthered a sense of disquiet. Klerru’s role in the local implementation of ujamaa 
villagisation had met widespread resent.995 
In June 1972, just as Nyerere was bringing Zanzibar to heel, Tanzania’s enemies moved from 
paper-based propaganda to state-sponsored terrorism. At 2.10am on 12 June, residents of Upanga 
and Oyster Bay were woken by an explosion, followed by another blast fifteen minutes later. 
Daybreak revealed damage to supporting pillars of the Selander Bridge, the main artery into the city 
centre from the northern suburbs, closing it to traffic. An electricity pylon had also been brought 
down, which caused a power cut for several hours.996 
At 5am, a third explosion occurred, when a bomb wrecked a car owned by a Swiss expatriate 
worker. Another car bomb went off at 3.25pm, on Independence Avenue, the city’s main 
commercial thoroughfare. This, the British high commission reported, caused ‘near pandemonium 
among shoppers’. Later that evening, at 7.15pm, a car belonging to a junior member of staff at the 
British high commission exploded. Although there were no casualties, the scattergun effect of the 
bombings elicited anxiety among the city’s population. An emergency meeting of TANU’s regional 
branch on 13 June decided that the militia should be deployed to guard industrial premises and 
residential areas. The Daily News decried the architects of the bombing as ‘enemies of our 
revolution and the African revolution’. The explosions were not just ‘acts of destruction’, but had a 
‘political purpose’, to ‘deflect us from our chosen path of revolution, of total liberation of the 
African in Tanzania and on the Continent. They aim to create an atmosphere of insecurity, of fear, 
of panic.’997  
The security services calculated that on the night before the explosions the three bombed cars 
had all been parked outside the same apartment block near the Selander Bridge. A fourth device 
was found attached to another vehicle there, primed to explode several days later. According to a 
junior Tanzanian diplomat at its London embassy, a further seven bombs were found under the 
Selander Bridge, with fuses set for a two-week delay.998 The Tanzanian police established that the 
bombs were of a ‘NATO make’, which suggested a potential Portuguese hand.999 In Dar es Salaam, 
the usual rumours abounded, with much speculation about the role of Kambona. Although the 
government had no evidence linking Kambona to the attacks, his brothers – who had been released 
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in an amnesty in February, along with Anangisye and Bibi Titi – were re-imprisoned as a 
precautionary measure.1000 Some made connections between the bombings and a second drop of 
pro-Kambona leaflets, which had taken place on 31 May over provincial cities in Tanzania.1001 
After the end of apartheid, members of the South African special forces claimed responsibility 
for the bombings. The Lisbon-Pretoria axis had hoped to undermine the Nyerere regime by 
demonstrating the militancy of Kambona’s supporters. ‘There was a need to stage incidents on an 
escalating basis to, hopefully, stir the fires of insurrection’, writes military historian Peter Stiff in his 
exposé of the operation. A crack squad of troops travelled to Dar es Salaam by submarine, paddled 
into the city by canoe, and planted their devices on Selander Bridge and a series of vehicles. Stiff’s 
account suggests that the explosives attached to the car which detonated on Independence Avenue 
was originally intended to have been affixed to the British high commissioner’s car.1002 
Although Nyerere claimed to be unconcerned by the bombings, telling one inquirer that this 
was not the way a coup would take place in Tanzania, foreign observers testified to a heightened 
sense of insecurity in Dar es Salaam over the following weeks. The British high commission 
reported that certain areas were ‘bristling with armed soldiers in combat dress, who have not 
hesitated to stop, search and pick up quite innocent passers-by, particularly those with white 
faces’.1003 Connections were made by the Zambian state press – and relayed by its Tanzanian 
equivalent – between the Dar es Salaam bombings and a recent parcel-bomb attempt on the life of 
Kaunda.1004 Elsewhere in Africa, Tanzania’s enemies gloated. The Zairean newspaper Elima set to 
the bombings against a backdrop of the assassinations of Mondlane and Karume, as evidence of a 
‘serious malaise, to which the leadership in Dar es Salaam must provide an urgent solution’. If not, 
Elima warned, Tanzania would ‘lose its reputation as an island of stability in an African ocean 
boiling over’.1005 According to Portuguese representatives in Kinshasa, Mobutu’s Zaire was also 
rumoured to be subject of an inquiry by Tanzanian security forces regarding relations between its 
ambassador in Dar es Salaam and one of Kambona’s principal agents in the city.1006 
The June bombings provided substance to the language of vigilance which had dominated the 
government’s rhetoric since independence and especially since the Arusha Declaration. By 
sheltering the liberation movements, Tanzania had created enemies in Lisbon and Pretoria. 
Exploiting circumstances of domestic unrest – itself entwined with events in Guinea and Uganda – 
Portugal and South Africa aimed to destabilise Tanzanian politics. Through the weapons of 
propaganda and terror, forces committed to maintaining white minority rule in southern Africa 
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sought to use Dar es Salaam’s reputation as a hotbed of rumour to foment opposition to Nyerere. 
In Kambona, they found an opportunistic and desperate collaborator, who articulated a critique of 
Nyerere that was rooted in local discontent with the implementation of the ujamaa programme. 
 The matter was aggravated by the fact that the Tanzanian security services (and their British 
colleagues) had lost track of Kambona in late 1971, when he had left London and had last been 
seen in Rome. In the aftermath of the bombings and leaflet drops, Tanzanian intelligence became 
increasingly obsessed by his whereabouts. In September, Emilio Mzena, the director of the 
intelligence services, arranged a meeting with the British overseas police advisor to Tanzania. ‘Time 
and time again during our conversation Mzena harked back to Kambona and his alleged 
machinations’, the advisor reported.1007 Around this time, according to David Martin, the 
Tanzanian government also received dubious reports that a former British army officer had drawn 
up plans for a joint Ugandan-Portuguese invasion of Tanzania, including the involvement of 
Kambona.1008 
Border clashes between Tanzania and Uganda had flared up on several occasions since the coup 
in Kampala, and each side regularly accused the other of plotting an invasion. Then, on 17 
September 1972, around one thousand armed supporters of Obote crossed from Tanzania into 
Uganda, with the secret backing of Nyerere. Amin responded by bombing Tanzanian cities near the 
border and the invading force was quickly routed. To avoid a wider conflagration, Amin and 
Nyerere eventually signed a peace settlement, brokered by Somalia’s president, Siad Barre. The 
Mogadishu Agreement stated that both sides must withdraw ten kilometres behind the border and 
refrain from supporting forces hostile to the other’s regime.1009 
Kambona was eventually spotted in Lisbon in November 1972, accompanied by Jardim. The 
American embassy in Lisbon received advanced copy of the text of an interview with Kambona 
filed to a British newspaper. Kambona explained how Portugal had established and trained an 
armed group, which infiltrated southwestern Tanzania from bases in Mozambique. The unnamed 
journalist described Kambona as ‘obviously nervous over the fact his cover had been broken’.1010 
On 4 November, the East African Standard ran an interview with Kambona, datelined London, 
much of which was then repeated in the Tanzanian press. The Daily News reported that Kambona’s 
appearance in Lisbon ‘only lends weight to the belief held by many progressive people that he is 
anti-Tanzania.’1011 
Having been rumbled, Kambona’s Portuguese contacts offered him a platform for setting out a 
scathing criticism of Nyerere. In December, Lisbon’s Diario Popular published a three-part interview 
 
1007 Macoun to Holmes, 12 September 1972, UKNA, FCO 31/1285/34. 
1008 Martin, General Amin, 181. 
1009 This short summary simply sketches out a complex story: see Martin, General Amin, 170-210. 
1010 Post to State Dept, 3 November 1972, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2618, POL 29 TANZAN. 
1011 ‘Mozambique base for Dar raids’, East African, 4 November 1972, 1; ‘Kambona in Lisbon’, Daily News, 5 
November 1972, 1. See also David Martin, ‘Plan to attack Tanzania’, Observer, 12 November 1972, 6. 
Politics in the time of ujamaa II 
 203 
with Kambona, supposedly conducted ‘clandestinely along the coast of the Mediterranean.’ The 
series was syndicated in the Notícias da Beira, a Mozambican newspaper owned by Jardim. Kambona 
described Tanzania as a police state, governed by a paranoid regime which had sold out to China. 
He argued that the struggle against white minority rule, which he had supported so fervently as 
chairman of the OAU Liberation Committee, had achieved nothing and should be abandoned.1012 
But his words were not backed by any effective action. Despite continuing to scheme with the 
Portuguese until the collapse of the Estado Novo, Kambona’s attempts to undermine the Nyerere 
government fell flat. 
Conclusion   
In the ujamaa years, dissent among the political elite was first marginalised, then shut down 
altogether. Formulated amid a deteriorating economic situation and the shock of the Ugandan 
coup, Mwongozo momentarily suggested a leftward shift in Tanzania’s political direction. Yet this 
aperture was soon closed up, as Nyerere reasserted control through a programme of 
decentralisation and an increasingly dogmatic enforcement of villagisation. Frustrated by the 
peasantry’s reluctance to resettle into ujamaa villages, TANU adopted a more coercive strategy. ‘To 
live in villages is an order’, stated Nyerere in November 1973.1013 
By the end of 1972, Nyerere’s main critics were mostly in exile, in prison, or neutralised by their 
exclusion from the inner circles of government. The Karume assassination might have split an 
already fractured union; instead, the Jumbe regime proved more amenable to improving relations 
between the mainland and the islands. The failed Umma plot also provided an opportunity to 
remove the remaining vestiges of Marxist dissent among the political class, especially through the 
imprisonment of Babu. In control of the media, the government prevented little more than rumour 
seeping out into the public sphere. The 1970s were not a time of absolute stability: in early 1974, 
the government quashed an incipient coup plot among disaffected members of the armed forces, 
which took place against a background of lengthening bread queues.1014 But the intra-governmental 
tensions of the post-Arusha period, rife with the politics of personality and ideology, gave way to 
an administration manned by apparatchiks committed to realising the goals of ujamaa socialism as 
envisaged by Nyerere. 
This growing authoritarianism was both influenced and justified by external threats confronting 
Tanzania. Whereas previously references to a vague ‘imperialist’ nemesis served as a source of 
nation-building rhetoric, the events of the early 1970s demonstrated that these enemies were very 
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real. Instead of fabricated American ‘letter plots’ or misinterpreted phone taps, Tanzania now faced 
enemies prepared to conspire with an exiled opponent to the regime, to spread propaganda and 
even bomb Dar es Salaam. The Portuguese and South African threat, rooted in Nyerere’s principled 
support for African liberation, was supplemented by the dangerous Idi Amin – a problem of 
Nyerere’s own making. 
Although scholars have explored the authoritarian bent of ujamaa socialism in detail, they have 
rarely done so with direct reference to competition among the political elite. More generally, while 
the Tanzania media retains an obsession with elite politics, few publications are prepared to revisit 
these controversial episodes in an era which is celebrated as a golden age of Tanzania’s history, 
juxtaposed against a neoliberal present characterised by corruption and moral failure. Biographies 
of Nyerere tend to skate over issues like the coup plot or the use of preventive detention. This 
problem has been most acute in Zanzibar, where the state of the union continues to dominate local 
politics. Such debate often descends into memory wars over the zama za siasa, the revolution, and 
the ‘dark years’ under Karume.1015 The brief existence of the newspaper Dira demonstrates the 
constraints on political freedom for the practice of history on the islands. Established in 2002, this 
Zanzibari weekly challenged hegemonic narratives of the revolution and the Karume years.1016 Dira 
was banned by the government after just a year in press, for ‘undermining peace and security by 
selectively digging up parts of the Zanzibar history.’1017 In one sense, then, the purpose of this 
chapter has been simply to lay out a narrative of high politics in the critical period in Tanzanian 
history which followed the Arusha Declaration. The diplomatic documents which form the 
bedrock of this narrative may present the viewpoint of the foreign observer, but as primary source 
material they represent a means whereby the distortions of contemporary politics can be at least 
partially cast aside. 
A history which emphasises the degree of opposition among the political elite also allows for a 
more nuanced understanding of the Nyerere years. On the one hand, an analysis of internal 
divisions and factionalism within the TANU party-state militates against the Mwalimu-worship that 
characterises not just hagiography, but also some serious academic works. By understanding that 
ujamaa (socialism) did not necessarily equal umoja (unity), Nyerere’s achievements and the scope of 
his authority become more clearly defined and thus take on greater meaning. On the other hand, 
the focus on high politics offers an antidote to the teleological interpretations of the rise and fall of 
ujamaa socialism articulated by historians concerned with development practices. Like those which 
preceded it, this chapter has emphasised the importance of individual agency and political 
contingency, in which domestic and foreign affairs were intertwined. Ujamaa was not an inexorable 
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descent into economic disaster or authoritarian rule. Developments like Mwongozo show how 
political space could be opened up, then sealed up again. Rather, ujamaa socialism was negotiated in 
a complex political environment, in which Nyerere may often have been the dominant individual, 
but never the sole or omnipotent actor. 
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Conclusion 
Arriving Kapuściński-style today, a visiting journalist would encounter a very different Dar es 
Salaam. No longer a ‘Cold War city’, the sprawling metropolis is now characteristic of a 
postsocialist Africa’s urban landscape. Caught up in the throws of globalisation, the effects of 
neoliberalism have rendered the gulf between rich and poor starker than ever. Where once 
diplomats and spies played out games of Cold War politics, now workers for non-governmental 
organisations jostle for influence in the congested development sector. Ramshackle liberation 
movement offices have been replaced by gleaming skyscrapers. The bar at the rebuilt New Africa 
Hotel – a grey, concrete eyesore – is now not propped up by guerrilla leaders, but businessmen 
working for multinational corporations, seeking to break into a growing African market. Major 
Western embassies no longer occupy premises among the noise of the city centre, but are protected 
in highly securitised compounds. This is a consequence of the nature of Tanzania’s new breed of 
enemies: rather than South African recce forces, terrorist danger in the city comes from Islamic 
extremism, as Al Qaeda’s bombing of the American embassy in 1998 demonstrated. 
The changes in this urban environment are bound up in the transformation of Tanzania’s 
political economy since the demise of ujamaa socialism. Despite massive injections of aid from the 
Nordic social democratic governments and especially the World Bank, ujamaa socialism failed to 
produce the expected growth in rural production. Between 1975 and 1983, the standard of living 
for the average Tanzanian fell by half.1018 These difficulties were not unlike those faced by many 
African states, particularly after the first oil crisis in 1973. However, while other leaders caved in to 
the demands of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for structural adjustment reform in the 
early 1980s, Nyerere stubbornly refused to comply with his potential creditors. Eventually, faced by 
mounting internal pressure and the withdrawal of financial lifelines from donor partners, in 1985 
Nyerere chose to stand down as president.1019 This ushered in a new era of neoliberal reform, 
especially after the end of the Cold War. The fall of the one-party systems in Eastern Europe also 
came as a critical blow to the embattled TANU party-state, leading to the reintroduction of 
multiparty democracy in 1992. 
These developments were not purely the result of structural economic failures, but exacerbated 
by two dynamics set in motion by Nyerere’s somewhat Pyrrhic ‘victory’ over his internal 
opponents. First, ujamaa became increasingly dogmatic in approach and authoritarian in 
implementation. The switch from voluntary to enforced villagisation alienated vast sections of the 
peasantry, upon which the rural revolution depended. On an elite level, the elimination of 
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dissenting voices deprived ujamaa of the oxygen it required for its own rejuvenation.1020 In 1972, 
William Tordoff and Ali Mazrui noted with prescient alarm that ‘[Nyerere] alone has emerged as a 
creative political theorist, and there seems to be a dearth of creative socialist thought among 
Tanzanians.’1021 This was not entirely correct: creative thought was present, for example at the 
university or among the pro-Mwongozo wing in TANU, but was crushed by Nyerere. The ideological 
and political divisions which characterised the period discussed in this thesis did not return until the 
internal conflicts surrounding the structural adjustment reforms. 
Second, Nyerere’s greatest foreign relations mistake culminated in a critical blow to an already 
faltering ujamaa project. The feud with Uganda brought about by his non-recognition of Amin 
rumbled on throughout the 1970s. On a regional level, the war-of-words fuelled an expensive arms 
race. Nyerere’s refusal to compromise with Amin hastened the demise of the EAC, which 
eventually collapsed in 1977 amid an acrimonious dispute between Tanzania and Kenya. When a 
Ugandan barracks mutiny the following year spilt over into a haphazard invasion of northwest 
Tanzania, Nyerere took the opportunity to unleash a counteroffensive. This drove Amin into exile 
in April 1979 and – after two years of instability – eventually returned Obote to power. However, 
‘victory’ came at a high financial cost, further depleting Tanzania’s foreign exchange reserves and 
thus contributing to its turn to the IMF.1022 
At the same time as the ujamaa revolution stalled, Dar es Salaam lost its centre-stage position in 
African international politics. The Carnation Revolution in Lisbon in 1974 and the subsequent 
negotiation of independence in Portugal’s colonies meant an end to exile for several Dar es Salaam-
based liberation movements. It also ended the Portuguese military threat. The frontiers of the 
struggle against white minority rule moved south, with Lusaka and Luanda becoming new hotspots 
of Cold War and anticolonial politics. The authoritarian impulses of the TANU party-state sucked 
much of the vitality out of the cosmopolitan political scene of the late 1960s in Dar es Salaam, 
especially at the university. 
Over the course of the 1970s, the Cold War paranoia of foreign powers in Tanzania faded away. 
As other post-colonial African states succumbed to plagues of military coups, Tanzania appeared a 
model of stability. Even as Nyerere continued to act as the leading spokesman for African 
liberation, the United States and Britain came to regard him as a reliable if stubborn negotiating 
partner, especially in the Rhodesian endgame. After the end of the war in Indochina, the United 
States experienced an improvement in its relations with Tanzania. China’s retreat from the Third 
World from the mid-1970s eased not only Western fears, but also those of the Soviet Union. 
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Moscow’s relationship with Tanzania improved: when the TPDF invaded Uganda in 1979, it did so 
using Soviet arms. By the mid-1970s, the perceived threat no longer came from Cold War 
interventions, but from Tanzania’s continental enemies, South Africa and Uganda.  
This local détente in Dar es Salaam was encouraged by Nyerere’s own foreign policy. After the 
‘crises’ of 1964-65, Nyerere sought not only to diversify Tanzania’s sources of aid, but also to 
disconnect political disputes from economic agreements. Irritated by the GDR and recognising the 
potential of West German aid, he looked to rebuild Tanzania’s donor relationship with Bonn. 
Although cognisant of the domestic propaganda value to be reaped from attacking superpower 
‘imperialism’ abroad, he refrained from allowing issues like Vietnam or Czechoslovakia from 
affecting his own diplomatic endeavours. Conscious of the negative implications in some quarters 
of Tanzania’s close relationship with Beijing, Nyerere sought to maintain a balanced public image, 
for example by appointing the pro-Eastern Bloc Stephen Mhando as minister for state for foreign 
affairs in 1968. 
Over time, Nyerere’s experience of Cold War politics and Tanzania’s development struggle led 
him to see non-alignment in primarily economic terms. While Nkrumah had once urged Africans, 
‘seek ye first the political kingdom’, Nyerere realised that political freedom required economic ‘self-
reliance’, as the Arusha lexicon put it. ‘The real and urgent threat to the independence of almost all 
the non-aligned states thus comes not from the military but from the economic power of the big 
states’, he told a preparatory conference of non-aligned states in Dar es Salaam in 1970. ‘It is 
poverty which constitutes our greatest danger, and to a greater or lesser extent we are all poor.’1023 
In the 1970s, Nyerere was at the forefront of calls for a ‘New International Economic Order’, 
which set out to redress the needs of the developing world. While others interpreted global politics 
in terms of East-West divides, Nyerere concentrated on the inequalities between what became 
known as the global ‘North’ and the global ‘South’.1024 
This thesis explicitly set out to write about independent Tanzania without becoming transfixed 
by the ideas and politics of Nyerere himself. However, in doing so, it has provided a context within 
which the extent of Nyerere’s power and influence can be better assessed. Both in domestic politics 
and especially in foreign affairs, Nyerere still emerges as a dominant figure. It is unavoidable at 
times to write about ‘Nyerere doing this’ or ‘Nyerere deciding that’. The causes of African 
liberation and non-alignment became inscribed into national foreign policy. Ibrahim Kaduma, who 
became foreign minister in 1975, told me that Nyerere rarely provided instructions on foreign 
affairs to him, since the principles were so well established that even a student could have 
represented Tanzania at the OAU.1025 
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Yet Nyerere’s authority did not go unchallenged. During the ujamaa years, his ideological 
position and presidential authority were opposed by numerous other Tanzanian politicians. The 
Arusha Declaration, held as a lieu de mémoire around which Tanzanian nationalism became organised, 
created ruptures as well as unity.1026 Mostly glossed over or sanitised in the national narrative, the 
fallout from Arusha had major repercussions in creating a host of local enemies to the ujamaa 
project. Government policy was not dictated by Nyerere, but contested among an elite fighting for 
influence over the direction of the state. The two major party initiatives of the era – the Arusha 
Declaration and Mwongozo – were both thrashed out against a background of impending crisis. In 
1967, Arusha catalysed rumbling tensions within TANU into open dissent. In 1971, the party’s left 
succeeded in turning it into a vanguard organisation, triggering a second bout of instability. Finally, 
Nyerere exercised little control over Karume in Zanzibar. The improvised union of 1964, driven by 
dynamics rooted in Cold War ideological politics, if not direct superpower intervention, essentially 
insulated a despotic regime which Nyerere was reluctant to confront. When Karume was 
assassinated in 1972, Nyerere seized the moment to bring the islands to heel and imprison the one 
true ideological threat to his authority on the mainland, Babu. 
The more radical impulses among the Tanzanian political elite were not necessarily detrimental 
to TANU’s nation-building and socialist project. As chapter 5 showed, polemics voiced by the 
TANU Youth League and the party press located the struggle for ujamaa in a broader international 
context. This provided the government with a means of attacking acts of ‘imperialism’, while 
avoiding direct confrontation with powerful states at an official level. It also channelled frustrations 
outwards, rather than inwards. The benefits of mass mobilisation came with the negative side effect 
of politicians building up rival power bases within the country. Attempting to resolve this dilemma, 
Nyerere chose to nullify such dangers by tethering troublesome parts of the political apparatus 
closer to the party-state. 
Rather than situate Tanzanian politics in a narrow, nationalist framework, this thesis has 
analysed their entanglement with a set of broader, cosmopolitan dynamics which came together in 
Dar es Salaam. The city became a focal point of superpower rivalry in sub-Saharan Africa, 
especially given the close – though often exaggerated – relationship between Tanzania and China. 
But a focus on tripartite superpower politics masks the series of sub-plots to the global Cold War 
that played out in Tanzania, among them the GDR’s struggle for recognition in the non-aligned 
world. Splits in Tanzanian politics presented opportunities for Cold War powers to gain influence 
among the local elite, even if Nyerere himself clung to a steadfast non-aligned position. But the 
labyrinthine world of Tanzanian politics also resisted the normative Cold War categorisations 
through which outside onlookers attempted to interpret developments. As more archive material 
become available to historians, particularly in Eastern Europe and the former Third World, new 
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multilateral and multilingual histories will shed further light of the complexities of the Cold War in 
Africa. 
The Cold War was not the sole outside influence on politics in Dar es Salaam, where it clashed 
with the other metadynamic of the international history of the second half of the century, 
decolonisation. Most obviously this involved the liberation of those African still under white 
minority rule. As the case of Mondlane and FRELIMO shows, the activities of the liberation 
movements were embedded in the political life of Dar es Salaam, becoming embroiled in Cold War 
rivalries and Tanzanian affairs. Nyerere’s advocacy of African liberation, rooted in political 
principle, came with political capital on the continental stage, but also introduced a destabilising 
factor into local affairs. 
Decolonisation also had a broader meaning. Tanzania made a distinction between ‘flag 
independence’ and true uhuru, which required the country’s emancipation from an unjust global 
economic order weighted against the former colonised world. It was this problem which Arusha 
socialism and non-alignment sought to address. Tanzanians became suspicious of outsiders, 
portrayed in the press as subversive threats to the ujamaa project. The response was an increasingly 
assertive Tanzanian nationalism that left little space for political dissent. Superpower interventions 
in Africa and the rest of the world were followed intently by the local media, but they were then 
articulated through the language of anticolonialism rather than that of the Cold War. 
The urban lens represents a means of reconciling these diverse, yet interconnected global 
dynamics and their collision with national politics, here in Dar es Salaam. The city constituted a 
terrain upon which people, ideas, money, and especially information circulated among 
cosmopolitan networks. Disaggregating these constellations to the level of individuals and factions 
reveals matters of agency and contingency. In particular, this thesis has sought to foreground 
African individuals in shaping and disrupting narratives of Cold War politics and anticolonial 
liberation. The porous framework of the city allows African histories to move beyond the 
parochialism of the nation-state, while not denying the significance of powerful post-colonial elites. 
Through this analysis of Dar es Salaam, the Cold War in Africa emerges less as a diplomatic 
struggle, but a key feature of a landscape which left a major imprint on politics in the era of 
decolonisation. Scholarship that concentrates on superpower relations often dissects the Cold War 
in terms of neat chains of decision-making, traceable via paper trails in metropolitan archives. Seen 
from Dar es Salaam, the messy elaboration of this high diplomacy on the ground suggests a more 
complicated story. The Cold War was the ideological and political fuel for many of the conflicts 
within the Tanzanian political elite, as Marxism and Maoism of varying shades clashed with 
Nyerere’s own ujamaa vision. While the Zanzibar Revolution was not directly a product of the Cold 
War, the pro-communist drift of the islands’ foreign policy pushed Nyerere into brokering the 
union with Karume. The improvised arrangements came to cause a significant headache for the 
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mainland government – and continue to do so today, as the union remains a politically fraught issue 
in contemporary Tanzania. 
The Cold War provided potential allies to Tanzania, but also numerous potential enemies. Real 
or imagined, they gave rise to an insidious political climate, pregnant with threat. This had a 
corollary in in the global North, where the fear of imminent nuclear holocaust loomed large over 
public life. In Africa, the concern was not mass annihilation, but a fear for the loss of the 
independence which the continent’s nation-states had only recently obtained. Dar es Salaam 
became a ‘Cold War city’, rife with rumour which echoed the contemporary fears of post-colonial 
African elites. In this light, Nyerere’s announcement in 1972 that the capital would be moved to 
Dodoma, a dusty provincial town in central Tanzania, was unsurprising. Although entirely in 
keeping with the anti-urban animus of ujamaa, it was also consistent with Nyerere’s anxieties about 
foreign subversion in his capital.1027 
The politics of ujamaa were thus very much a product of the Cold War, and as the Cold War 
recedes into history memory, so too does Tanzania’s socialist era. The early signs of a post-Nyerere 
epoch are beginning to emerge. Much of the research for this thesis was carried out against the 
backdrop of Tanzania’s fiercely contested 2015 election. Nyererite rhetoric predictably loomed 
large over campaigning: one minor opposition party consciously evoked the spirit of ujamaa by 
issuing a ‘Tabora Declaration’. Infighting within the labyrinthine apparatus of Chama cha Mapinduzi 
(Party of the Revolution; CCM – formed by the merger of TANU and the ASP in 1977) left 
Tanzania’s ruling party wounded by a bitter factional split. After a leading candidate for CCM’s 
presidential nomination, Edward Lowassa, was spurned by rival groups, his decision to join a new 
opposition coalition triggered a number of high profile defections. Among those who decamped to 
the ostensibly pro-free market opposition was Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru, the Marxist architect of 
Mwongozo forty-four years previously.1028 CCM ultimately held strong and won another election, but 
its unprecedented, messy fallout hints at change on the not-so-distant horizon. 
These disputes are shaped by the contemporary neoliberal environment, dominated by moneyed 
backers moving in the political shadows, but, as this thesis has shown, divisions among the elite 
have a much deeper history. As the generation of Tanzanians brought up in the ujamaa years grows 
old, an acknowledgement of the realities of politics under Nyerere, characterised by friction as well 
as unity, offers a more nuanced past to the ‘golden age’ presented by prevailing nationalist 
narratives. 
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